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In developing an analysis of a single case study, consideration has to be given to the specificity of the case.  This chapter considers two methodological implications: a single case study and a comparative benchmark.  In order to set out in study, it is useful to focus on four main dimensions of its approach: (1) Definitional clarity (social democracy and revisionism) and theoretical framework; (2) Single case study with limited comparison to other relevant countries as reference points; (3) Triangulation; (4) Semi-structured in-depth interviews.

Definitional Clarity and Theoretical Framework
The main question of this thesis is why Korean socialism didn’t develop in a social democrat direction.  In this sense social democracy is a heuristic.  It is important to note that, from a comparative perspective, social democracy has developed both in the context of the Western European political economy and as a response to democratisation in Latin America.  We are therefore presented with an interesting historical question: What constrained social democrat development in Korea when it appears to have flourished within its comparative benchmarks?  In this vein, we also argue that the characteristics of a social-democratic route are not self-evident.  We agree with interpretation of Sandbrook et al. that the term “social democracy” has meant different things to different people.​[1]​  Christopher Clapham excludes from the definition of socialism any regimes managed by the social democrat parties of Western Europe, such as the Partie Socialiste in France or the Labour Party in the United Kingdom.​[2]​  This is too narrow an interpretation of socialism.

Padgett and Paterson define the key principles of social democracy as “a hybrid political tradition composed of socialism and liberalism and social democracy is inspired by socialists and ideals, but is heavily conditioned by its political environment and incorporating liberal values.  The social democrat project may be defined as the attempt to reconcile socialism with liberal politics and capitalist society.”​[3]​  Haywood defines social democracy as “a moderate or reformist brand of socialism that favours a balance between the market and the state, rather than the abolition of capitalism.”​[4]​

There are some necessary pre-conditions for the birth of social democracy, such as capitalism (or industrialisation) and democratisation.  In this same vein of thought, it could be said that the development of class structure and a certain relative size of the working class are also necessary for the birth of social democracy.​[5]​  But such preconditions have a particular pattern of capitalist transformation.  The process of state formation, reconfiguration of class structure and civil society does not automatically account for the development of social democracy.​[6]​  In lieu of these realities, the success or failure of socialism is not merely a reflection of social structural change.  Thus, we emphasise that the rise or fall of socialism is often linked with the socialist parties’ leadership and its ideology.

Kitschelt states that leaders of socialist parties are becoming a more important factor than external variables such as social, economic and institutional settings.​[7]​  The following two notions support Kitschelt’s claim: first, depending upon socialist parties’ strategic appeals, the party may or may not take advantage of such changes and bring together new electoral coalitions.​[8]​  Moreover, the legacy of an incumbent social democrat government’s involvement and policies influence the success or failure of future party fortunes.​[9]​  Second, in the Third World, where material conditions for the emergence of social democracy such as capitalism and democratisation are relatively weak, organised actors and the political parties are more critical factors during the process of state building and the configuration of class relations.​[10]​

Case Study
This case study helps us to understand what is special to Korea; at the same time, it has a comparative element that demonstrates how Korea fits into previous analyses of the development of social democracy.  Case-based research typically encounters the problem of working with too few cases and too many variables.  We sought to reduce this problem by stretching the possibilities for comparative benchmarks that shed light on the Korean case in a comparative context.  Essentially, this is a single, historical and in-depth case study.

This research focuses on “the development of socialism in Korea” and the case study will be conducted through “assumption-testing” methods (see the three assumptions in the Introduction).  In some instances, this purpose may overlap with others, such as testing theories and explaining cases of importance.​[11]​  Case study allows a depth of understanding of specific topics.  The expectation is that a case study can serve the main purpose of identifying antecedent conditions.

Some may argue that a case study provides the least opportunity to control the effect of additional variables.  However, if case conditions are uniform, third- variable influence can be discounted as a cause observed within case covariance between values on independent and dependent variables.​[12]​  Moreover, we can control the effects of omitted variables by selecting whether to study those cases with extreme (high or low) values of the studied variables.  Still others may argue that a single case is a poor laboratory for identifying a theory’s antecedent background conditions.  According to S. Van Evera, this weakness can be repaired through additional smaller case studies.  The identity and importance of antecedent conditions emerges more clearly form large studies.​[13]​

Comparative Benchmark
In order to surmount the limitations of the case study (possibly sacrificing generalisation), this thesis will use a comparative benchmark analysis method.  Regarding the nature of comparative analysis, Lijphart states that “the comparative method can be understood best if it is compared and contrasted with the two other fundamental strategies of research… which consist of two elements: (1) the establishment of general empirical relationships among two or more variables, while (2) all other variables are controlled, that is, held constant.”​[14]​  

Although this research studies a single case, the history of socialism in Korea in the post-Korean War era, based on our assumption that party is an independent actor and a key determining factor (for success or failure), the socialist tendency in Korea is constantly compared to the socialist parties in both the main and the periphery.  This comparison will focus on the following points: (1) how the socialist parties in Western Europe and Latin America overcame structural variables; (2) how socialist parties established their own social democrat road to power (class alliance and class mobilisation politics).

Document Analysis
This thesis relies heavily on document analysis in response to the primary research question: Why has socialism in Korea failed and how can Korean socialists modernise their movement?  Above all, primary documents, such as party platform and tenets from the DLP, will be examined to identify the chasm between its radical socialist programs and the reality of the political climate, the socio-economic conditions and constituents’ consciousness.  In addition, throughout the primary document analysis, we will demonstrate the DLP leaders’ (mainly nationalistic socialists’) poor ability to produce sound theories or policies.

For the historical review, the sources support this thesis, covering the period from 1945 to 2007.  Therefore, it was just a matter of selecting the appropriate texts to allow for a short incursion into the historical background that enabled the appearance and development of socialist parties in Korea.  The analysis of printed sources dealing with Korea’s development at the turn and during the first few decades of this century provided the main insights into this area.

Empirical data provided mainly by primary sources (archives, letters, internal reports) was made available especially for this research, including the collection of archival materials housed in the libraries of the national congress, universities and the party’s headquarters.  Amongst the most important were the party’s congressional resolutions and various unofficial records, letters and internal reports.  Moreover, for the comparisons, tertiary sources such as journal articles, government and research institutions reports and archive data will also be considered and analysed to understand the relationship between empirical findings and their theoretical frameworks.

Triangulation
This thesis will apply methodological triangulation in order to secure validity of this research.  The triangulation will be accomplished by using different sources; documents of different types and interviews, which are not necessary bound by either qualitative or quantitative methods.  Methodological triangulation means the use of at least two methods, usually qualitative and quantitative, to tackle the same research issue.  Methodological triangulation falls into two subdivisions, simultaneous and sequential.​[15]​  Simultaneous triangulation is the use of the qualitative and quantitative methods at the same time.  In this case, there is limited interaction between the two data sets during data collection, but the findings complement one another at the end of the study.  Sequential triangulation is used if the results of one method are essential for planning the next method.  The qualitative method is completed before the quantitative method is implemented or vice versa.  For example, when this research deals with the correlation between the negative responses of the voters and the unrealistic aspect of the DLP’s strategies, we first use a quantitative analysis of past election results.  The aim of the analyses will be the following: (1) to examine the gap between the backing constituents for the DLP, such as the gap that existed between the working class and the DLP’s general politics and electoral tactics; (2) to observe the correlation between an ideological poverty and the failed practices of the DLP; (3) to identify the changed politics and socio-economic conditions as they-related to the practice of socialist party.  For the second and third goal, quantitative analysis, including an elite interview will be helpful.

Semi-structured in-depth Interviews
With respect to the third assumption, ‘semi-structured in-depth interviews’ will be conducted.  Some theorists criticise interviewing as having weaknesses such as bias, poor recall and inaccurate articulation.​[16]​  However, these criticisms may reflect only a positivist point of view.  On the contrary, face-to-face contact can encourage the development of interpersonal relationships between the researcher and the interviewees that allow for deeper involvement and observation on the part of the researcher than a questionnaire in a quantitative survey.  Furthermore, a high degree of trust and confidence between the two can prevent interviews from simply ‘chatting around the edges’ of the structured questions.​[17]​  In this research, the face-to-face in-depth interviews with the main figures of the socialist party, the DLP and the trade union movements allowed for the development of a relationship between the researcher and interviewees and accordingly made the interviewees feel that they could speak more honestly and truthfully.

Our major interviewees fall under two groups: (1) two former socialist party leaders; (2) five current congressmen from the DLP.

The elite interviews with the first group explore the relationship between structural variables; the military rule and the repression and the responses of the socialist party.  Before the presidential election in 2007, an affiliate institution of the DLP, the Institute of Progressive Politics and Hangil Research & Consulting took an empirical survey of the DLP’s leadership and electoral strategy among the DLP’s fervent supporters.  The interview questions for the second group focused on the DLP leaders and the DLP congressmen’s leadership:

1.	The party supporters responded as follows for what they believe are the key reasons for the crisis that the DLP was facing: the limitations of a small party (53.3%), shortcomings of leadership and their capability (13.8%), lack of policy production (13.3%), lack of progressive party identity (11.0%), sectarianism (6.7%).  What do you think of this outcome?






Socialist parties have been a major political force in many democratised and industrialised countries.  Despite the existence of a socialist party and what would seem to be the right conditions for development, the Korean socialist force failed to become a major force in politics.  The aim of this thesis is to examine and explain the failed development of an electorally popular socialism in Korea between 1945 and 2007.

The failure of socialism in Korea should be understood as being a product both of structural factor (such as the Cold War and military rule) and agency factor (such as the leadership and strategies of socialist groups).  The first of these created a hostile environment for socialism, while the second resulted in the development of strategies and positions that could not create a broad basis of support.  The Cold War and military rule provided the Korean ruling class (represented by the authoritarian regime) with a straightforward justification for its repression of socialism.  The repression by the Left during this era not only weakened socialism but caused its leaders to lean towards revolutionary campaigns, meaning that when democratisation and the end of military dictatorship represented opportunities to develop a new evolutionary strategy, they were unable to capitalise on those changes.  Considering the post-democratic context in which socialism developed, the socialist leadership failed to progress beyond a revolutionary socialism and build a more pragmatic social democracy that could build a broader alliance within Korean society.

The Cold War System
The Cold War had two significant consequences for Korean politics: the development of a strong state with a very weak civil society,​[18]​which included a conservative cartel in a party system that largely excluded representatives of the lower and working classes; and discontinuity within Korean socialism.  As Koo states, the origins of the strong state are historical and geopolitical: “a long tradition of a centralised state structure, the colonial legacy of a strong state apparatus, the affect of the Korean War and national division and the intense Cold War environment in which the Korean Peninsula found itself are all key elements in the development of a strong state.”​[19]​

In particular, the Korean War significantly prevented the formation of modern state as a consequence of right-wing superiority.​[20]​  Whereas the Korean state had a weak local base of support before the war, the war gave the state an ideological basis for building its legitimacy.  After the Korean War, anti-Communism was articulated and experienced in everyday life and it became the chief motive for the ideological legitimisation of the Korean state.​[21]​  The war was important in consolidating an anti-Communist state and it achieved several things for the Rhee regime: it eliminated leftist elements and sources of peasant rebellion; it bolstered Rhee’s political authority and provided political tools to control opposition groups; it led to a firmer U.S commitment to the security of Korea as a bulwark against Communism; and it established anti-Communism as the state ideology.​[22]​  

Accordingly, the Cold War provided an external threat that could legitimise repression of all forms of leftist politics.  As Kim K.W. states, after the Korean War there was a complete absence of revolutionary ideology among Koreans even in non-Marxist terms due mainly to the confrontation with Communist North Korea.​[23]​  The socialist tendency was completely destroyed by the Korean War and was quiescent for more than three decades until it revived on the eve of democratisation in the 1980s.

Military rule
Another key structural factor which challenged the socialist movement was the repression carried out by the military regime.  As with other military dictatorships in the Third World, the Korean military regime employed a campaign of anti-Communism to justify repression of socialists.  This fundamental structural aspect constantly impeded the development of socialism.  State-led economic development strategies justified a powerful military dictatorship which was supported and maintained by policies involving the suppression of the most basic political, civil and labour rights.​[24]​  As for the party system, there was only a conservative cartel sustained by the elites to mobilise anti-Communism and artificial regional cleavage.  The Korean party system in the pre-democracy era adopted a mobilisation of force which provided huge benefits to the elites rather than the masses.​[25]​

There were several similarities between Latin American and Korean politics during the state-building process.  First, the state maintained tight control over the economy and society.  While states possessed an enormous amount of coercive and allocated authority, civil societies were weakened both in Korea and Latin America.  Second, the party system barely connected with socioeconomic structure and class-based cleavage.  As Kenneth Roberts makes clear, in Latin America class cleavages have eroded the political arena due to highly disruptive patterns of socio-economic transformation.​[26]​  In Korea, non-class-based cleavages, such as regional cleavage strongly influenced the party system until democracy took hold.  Yet, the Korean socialist party was tied up with the working class movements.  Moreover, the electoral system used a simple-majority single-ballot system which favoured the two major incumbent conservative parties (a long-time conservative cartel) and the scheme always worked as a significant barrier for the socialist party’s electoral success. 

However, conditions unfavourable to the development of socialism under the military dictatorship cannot alone explain why Korean leftists failed to capture the public’s attention during and after the wave of democratisation.  There is a pattern in the history of socialism that leftist parties performed poorly in the early years of democratisation.  Yet the Korean Left’s campaign failures were salient.  A closer examination of two historical incidents — democratisation and rapid economic development — is needed to understand the failure of Korean socialism to capitalise on favourable conditions.  On the one hand, liberals and centrists demonstrated initiative during the democratisation movements, although the leftists’ activities​[27]​, particularly student activities, were the driving force.  As mentioned earlier, the leftists’ radical platforms, such as anti-capitalism and anti-Americanism did not accord with the sentiment of the public and the centrists took advantage of this.  On the other hand, unlike many military dictators in the Third World who often failed in economic modernisation, the Korean military dictators demonstrated insightful leadership in economic development.  However, as Martin Lansberg (2005) states, rapid state-led economic development exposed serious socio-economic problems — social inequalities and Chaebol (Korean conglomerates) centred or favoured economic structure with very weak small and medium-size entrepreneurs.​[28]​  Regardless of these negative aspects, it can be said that the military dictatorship’s economic modernisation seemed successful.  The success of the economic development in which the military juntas seized their initiatives on economic issues resulted in the Korean constituents having a strong bias that the right-wingers are better than the left-wingers on economic issues.  At this extremely opportune moment the Korean leftists failed to show what alternative should be taken.

The Leadership​[29]​ 
Parties are one of the key autonomous factors that affect either the success or failure of socialist movements.  The evidence reveals, very clearly, that repression does not necessarily weaken radical movements and may even strengthen them as long as that specific party is embedded within the parliamentary democratic system and obtains solid support from a supporter, such as the working class (or lower classes in South America) and the trade union movements.  The Socialist Party in Germany (SPD) had experiences in which its party membership was augmented and political influence was expanded under the ruling force’s reactionary campaigns.  For the SPD’s leadership, Lipset and Marks point out that “the attempt of the German government to eliminate socialism by outlawing Social democrat organisations from 1878 to 1890 failed miserably.”​[30]​  For the Spanish socialist party (PSOE), amid its difficulties (during the military dictatorship in the 1970s), the new leader of the party Felipe González attempted to move the party away from its Marxist and socialist background.  He tried to turn PSOE into a social-democratic party, similar to those of the rest of Western Europe.  Under Gonzalez’s leadership, the PSOE became a ruling party in the 1980s.

Interestingly, socialism in the U.S. provides a contrast to this previous case of success.  Under the affect of the Russian Revolution and the expulsion of pro-war Socialists, the Socialist Party as a whole had shifted decisively to the Left.  Christopher Lasch describes the radicalisation process and he states that the American Socialist Party in the late-1910s was dying from internal wounds inflicted by a series of struggles growing out of the Bolshevik revolution and the rise of a militant new left wing.​[31]​  The Socialist Party was the only official major national organisation to condemn American participation in the war,​[32]​and their anti-war campaign (which stood in stark contrast with the public opinion) brought harsh government repression.  The American revolutionary socialists’ radical and offensive campaigns did not fit in with the government’s fierce anti-Communism rooted repression (the intelligence agencies, CIA and FBI).

Indeed, party ideology and proper leadership can mediate structural conditions favourably for a party.  As Lipset and Marks suggest, in the short term, political parties reflects the citizens’ beliefs and concerns.  But over the longer term, political parties shape preference in terms of reinforcing special ideologies.​[33]​  The socialists in Western Europe expanded their political influence by seizing initiatives on the institutionalisation of two strategically significant goals, such as voting rights (suffrage) and building industry-based trade unions.  In South America, “comparatively moderate parties producing left-of-centre outcomes owing to the ratcheting-up effect of competitive mobilisation and the effect was triggered under well-organised lower classes and oriented toward distributive gains.”​[34]​  In contrast, the revolutionary militancy of the Socialist Party and its allies in Chile in 1970–3 produced a zero-sum confrontation with the dominant class and, consequently, the unrealistic and radical experiments caused an authoritarian reaction.​[35]​

The Integration of Structure and Agency
The development of socialist movements in Western Europe and South America tell us that: (1) the transformation from a Marxist party to a social democrat party ensured that the socialist parties would become a major force or could at least sustain themselves; (2) the success or failure of social democracy depends on how parties handle (leadership factor) social democracy’s genuine ideological and organisational dilemmas.  As the socialist movements in the main (Western Europe) in the nineteenth century and the periphery (South America) in the 1970s proved, socialist groups could at least sustain themselves even under very repressive or disadvantageous conditions.  But the Korean socialist tendency completely failed to sustain itself through the failed Communist armed revolts of the 1950s.  It is true that structural factors (repression and conservative cartel) are far more significant variables than any other agency factor in the failure of socialism in the pre-democratic era.  However, agency factors, the Communist tendency’s inappropriate revolts and the moderate socialist groups’ disunity and unrealistic unification centred politics are also factors in the weakness of socialism in Korea.  Moreover, agency factors affected the development of socialism in the process of democratisation.  

The failure of the DLP in the post-democratic era is another good example of the importance of party leadership.  As mentioned earlier, the DLP was established in 2000 in Korea by a coalition of socialist elites (the majority were pro-North Korea nationalistic socialists and the minority were moderate socialists), the trade unions and the peasant movement organisation.  The leaders and members of the major trade union, Minjunochong (Korean Confederation of Trade Unions: KCTU) and one of the progressive peasant associations, Junnong (National Peasant Association: NPA) joined the DLP.  However, over the past decade, the DLP’s leadership proved to be a disappointment.  Above all, when the party was established, very few leftists joined.  The DLP’s platform demonstrates radical reform policies, for instance the state socialism rooted radical economic restoration plan, which prevented the incorporation of moderate elite leftists and the leaders from their-related organisations.​[36]​  The DLP also failed to expand its influence into the working classes and this condition (weak support from the trade unions) was one of the most serious obstacles to realising socialist politics.

A comprehensive framework of the evolution of socialism in Korea must integrate structural and agent variables and illustrate the process of development as an outcome of their interaction.  Repression affected the way socialism was conceived, therefore, it didn’t develop around issues of class compromise because the ruling class was so repressive.  Harsh repression resulted in a climate that was difficult for the development of moderate socialism; thus, socialism failed in Korea.  It is true that a moderate (and pragmatic) socialism based on evolutionary socialist strategy was a main apparatus of the successful socialist parties in the main and the periphery in the post-war era.  Some of the traditional explanations​[37]​ for the failure of socialism (under the authoritarian regimes) over emphasise the affect of repression and lack a clear perspective on the deficiencies of the socialists’ revolutionary strategies.

The affect of the structural factor alone is not enough to understand some of the exceptional cases such as the success of the Progressive Party (PP) in the height of the Cold War, and, by contrast, the failure of the DLP under a fully functioning democracy (advantageous conditions) in the 2000s.​[38]​  As Yu and Shin stress, the socialist party’s leadership, with its ideology, was much the most important factor in the severe retreat of the socialist movements in Korea in the post-democratic era.​[39]​  Due to its incomplete conversion from a revolutionary socialist party to a reformist socialist party, the Korean voters (the working classes and the middle classes) did not consider the DLP to be a moderate progressive party.  Second, the DLP not only failed to capture working class support, but also did not successfully develop alliances with other classes, such as the middle classes (white collar, intellectuals, small and medium-size business owners, the self-employed etc.).  Third, the DLP demonstrated its poor ability in mobilising classes in elections by setting agendas.  In short, considering the context in which socialism developed in the post-democratic period, there was a failure to develop beyond revolutionary socialism and build a more pragmatic social democracy that could build a broader alliance within Korean society.


Chapter 1: Review of the Traditional Explanations

Introduction
In the height of the Cold War (1950s–1980s), Korean politics were abnormal as the ruling power never permitted issues around class compromise.   There were no major socialist parties except Jingo-Dang (the Progressive Party; the PP).  Even the PP faced repression within three years of its inception by the authoritarian Rhee regime.   However, such disadvantageous structural conditions for the socialist force turned to a relatively advantageous condition in the wake of the democratization in the 1980s.  In the post-democratic period, the Korean socialist force faced relatively advantageous conditions (democratisation and the revival of trade union movements).  The once destroyed socialist force was revived in the wake of democratisation in the 1980s.  But, the revived Left (the DLP) failed to create a broad alliance that resulted in a parliamentary majority because their practices were based on an obsolete revolutionary strategy and failed to develop detailed policies for parliamentary activities.  

This chapter consists of three sections. The first section explores the social democrat road to power in Western Europe and South America.  This section looks at how the socialists in those countries moved from being Marxist parties to social democrat parties and why this shift has not occurred in Korea.  The second section examines how Korean socialism has been assessed in the past and why those explanations are inadequate.  In addition to helping understand the failure of socialism in Korea, this section introduces an alternative analysis in which it states the interaction between the structural and agent factors with a strong emphasis on the decisive role of party leadership and ideology.  The last section demonstrates how this literature review will be used to provide a framework for analysis in future research.

Analysis of the development of socialism in other countries
Socialism in the main and the periphery
While Leninist-based Communist parties in Eastern Europe collapsed, the reformist socialist parties in Western Europe positioned themselves as major political forces in the post-war era.  The social democrat parties in Western Europe succeeded politically by basing their work in reformism which included organising broad based alliances (working class and peasant class or working class and middle class) in conjunction with Keynesian welfare state policies.  

In South America, where democracy and industrialisation are relatively less developed, the Western European prototypical social democrat features (a class compromise involving labour and capital, a welfare predicated on universal entitlements and full employment policies​[40]​) failed to develop with the exception of Chile.  According to Sandbrook et al., social democrat pacts or class compromises in South America, if forged, will be more complicated and fragile due to the circumstance that “public revenues were low while poverty and inequality were usually severe; the heterogeneous poor were found mainly outside the ranks of organised labour in the rural areas and the informal sector, where they enjoyed few, if any, effective rights; economic elites often prospered by extracting rents; and economies depended on a handful of industrial countries for investment, many imports and export markets”.​[41]​  Given this background, it is fair to say that the Latin American socialists were (and needed to be) more active agents than their Western European counterparts during the development of socialism in the contemporary era.

Western Europe
The development of Western European social democracy began with an ideological struggle with orthodox Marxism with the exception of the Labour Party in the UK.​[42]​  Marxism was not popular among the Left in the UK in the nineteenth century, whereas Fabianism and constitutionalism emerged as the leading ideologies.  Under the influence of the centre-left think-tank “The Association of Fabian”, the Labour Party progressed on the basis of a moderate socialism which championed the “inevitability of socialism and gradualism”.  Regardless of this difference, there is a commonality between the Labour Party and other socialist parties on the continent.  The socialist parties in Western Europe were successful in an ideological transition from revolutionary socialist party to reformist socialist party.

The transition from revolutionary socialism (Marxism) to revisionism can be summarised in two points.  First, the socialists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century sought to adapt Marxism to what they saw was a different assertion from Marxism.​[43]​  Therefore, the reformist socialists rejected the economic and deterministic interpretation of Marxism.​[44]​ Second, the revisionists not only recognised the advantages of efficiency and productivity under the capitalist system, but they also created the possibility of remodelling the capitalist world without a revolution.

However, the beginning of reformism exposed some problems.  As to these shortcomings of early revisionism, Heywood elaborates that due to its disposition towards moral and religious principles, theoretically speaking, early social democracy was weakened until it conceptualised the notion of a just or fair distribution of wealth in society: social justice.​[45]​  Apart from Sweden and Norway in the 1920s and 1930s, social democracy in Western Europe was not, on the whole, electorally successful until the end of the Second War.​[46]​

The ambiguity of early social democracy has been fixed by a two-fold solution: the welfare state and Keynesian demand-side macroeconomics that emphasise a state’s fiscal and monetary policies to stimulate aggregate demands and to sustain full employment.  Kim Sujin states that the most significant point of Keynesianism is that it provides the possibility for agreement on political economic issues, in particular, between very divergent political classes.​[47]​  This is possible because at a basic level it ensures protection for the working class from the merciless market and therefore requires the working class to participate in the capitalist system. Thus, Kim concludes that in economic policy Keynesianism aims to maintain a balance between employment and inflation, growth and distribution and consumption and investment.​[48]​  In this vein, Padgett and Patterson point out that Keynesian-based economic success can be the economic foundation of welfare capitalism.​[49]​    Social democrats pay attention to the attractiveness of Keynesianism because Keynesian macroeconomics was a way of controlling markets without full-scale nationalisation and also allowed a focus on unemployment.  Keynesianism legitimises another doctrine of social democracy, social equality: social justice is able to be realised through broadening consumption under the options that more easily diffuse the distribution of income and wealth.  

The evolutionary strategy is specified by the logic of majority politics, how its platforms address “national interest” and how the party moved from a “working-class party” to a “people’s party”.​[50]​  For Taylor, the Western European social democrats successfully employed “cooperative campaigns” to reconcile the puzzle:

What made social democrats such a dominant intellectual force in European democratic societies was that they stressed and practiced social cohesion, solidarity and collectivism.  They created voluntary and autonomous institutions, such as trade unions, cooperatives and mutual aid societies that constituted a recognised social force that in negotiated partnership with an enlightened state and responsible employers ran what was in effect a democratic corporatist system.  The created public funded welfare states based on redistributive taxation and the establishment of social partnership between capital and labour in the macromanaging and regulating of the market economy was the political outcome of such accommodations.​[51]​

In short, the essence of the development of social democracy in Western Europe can be identified as “a series of political and economic compromises”.​[52]​  As Moene and Wallerstein show, there are three divergent processes of concessions in the history of social democracy in Western Europe.  First, the early reformists were forced to compromise between Marxist programs and their implementation within electoral contest.  Most of the transition from Marxist parties to reformist socialist parties in Western Europe occurred in the post-war era beside the SAP (Social democrat Labour Party of Sweden) in Sweden.  The SAP discarded working-class party identification and changed to a people’s party in 1928.  This transformation occurred in Sweden with the following pre-conditions: (1) Marxism was not popular and Marxists were not a majority group; (2) as Sweden was a neutral state during the First World War, there was not a serious partition or antagonism among leftists; thus, this condition allowed the Swedish socialists to maintain unity​[53]​; (3) the peasant class led the process for establishing a class alliance between the peasant and working class (the SAP + the Agrian Party).​[54]​  Moreover, in the inter-war and post-war period, Swedish socialists feared that there would be a depression unless they could cure economic instability and stagnation and this condition caused corporatism.​[55]​  Given these backgrounds, the SAP “established a successful ‘cooperative’ structure for permanent negotiations between employers, trade unions and government on labour market and social policies.”​[56]​  After the beginning of modernisation, from 1944 to 1988, the SAP enjoyed a ruling party position by obtaining an average of 45 percent of votes.​[57]​  The Swedish (and Social democrat Labour’s Party of Norway in 1923) version of ideological conversion took place in the rest of Western European socialist parties in the post-war period.

After the end of Franco’s dictatorship, under the leadership of Felipe González, PSOE (the Spanish Social Workers’ Party) separated from the Marxist group in the late 1970s.  Like many of its Western European counterparts, after its dramatic ideological conversion the PSOE not only emerged as a major political force but also seized power in the 1980s.​[58]​  In the 1970s and 1980s, other Southern European socialist parties, including the PS in Portugal and the PASOK in Greece, followed a very similar path to PSOE.  The re-establishment of social democracy in Spain and Portugal overlaps with the transition from an oligarchic capitalist society to a social democrat society.  In Southern Europe in the 1970s, according to Sassoon, the growth of capitalism, which resulted in the increase of income and productivity, caused a rejection of conditions under the authoritarian regimes and made social democracy possible (so, the notion that democracy and industrialisation are main preconditions for the development of social democracy are justified).​[59]​  Social democracy revived in response to the following circumstances: a workers’ strike amid high levels of industrial unrest, social unrest (one of the determinants of the transition to democracy in Spain) and a tendency to mass consumption particularly amongst middle class consumers, who were more prepared to experiment with democracy in conjunction with consumer capitalism.​[60]​  Thus, in terms of the reformist socialism based in centre-left politics; the leaders of the PSOE in Spain seized their opportunity during the transition from dictatorship to democracy and led the way to social progress through social democracy.

Second, the democratic socialists focused on building an alliance between the working classes (manual workers in manufacturing, transportation, construction and mining) and the necessity of gaining backing from other classes (the middle class) in order to build an electoral majority.  As is commonly known, contemporary social democrat parties face a serious dilemma: whether to maintain their identities as a working class-based pure socialist party or to build a people’s party based upon a compromise of socialist ideologies.  Social democratic parties in Western Europe in the post-war period must choose one of these two identities.  With respect to this dilemma, Przeworski (1995) states that to win votes of people other than workers, particularly the petty bourgeoisie, to form alliances and coalitions, to administer the government in the interest of workers, a party cannot appear to be “irresponsible”.  A party must even restrain its own followers from actions that would jeopardise electoral progress.  Moreover, a party oriented toward partial improvements, a party in which leader-representatives lead a petty bourgeois life style, a party that for years has shied away from the streets cannot “pour through the hole in the trenches”, as Gramsci put it, even when this opening is forged by a crisis.  For this dilemma, Alfonso Guerra once lamented that “We find ourselves in a dual role.  At times we almost resemble the inquisitors of leftist thought, while at other times we are more like victims of this inquisition.”​[61]​

As Przeworski often states, social democrats have a genuine dilemma in reconciling left-wing ideological promises with the practical need for broad parliamentary majorities as long as they intend to build a socialist society within parliament democracy system.  The basis for the dilemma can be summarised as follows: (1) the working class alone is too small to permit socialist majorities; (2) when social democrats find a class ally, their purely socialist principles will be damaged; and (3) when social democrats want to remain pure socialists, the parties remain as permanent opposition parties.​[62]​  There can be little doubt about the veracity of the dilemma of social democracy.  However, it does not mean that the failure of socialism is inevitable.​[63]​  With Keynesian welfare state politics, the social democrats in Western Europe quite successfully consolidated these two divergent interests: national interests and working-class interests.  In Sweden, according to Esping-Anderson (1985), the social democrats successfully managed this puzzle by organising a class-alliance strategy, two different stages of class alliances: “(1) peasant-based alliance (worker-farmer alliance to power also introduced in Norway and Denmark in the eraly twentieth century:Frieden, 2007,p235) was commonly introduced the stage of social citizenship politics; (2) the new wage-earner alliance is sought as a steppingstone to the stage of economic citizenship politics.”​[64]​  Although it is important to acknowledge the dilemma of social democracy, this does not necessarily mean that Przeworski’s scepticism on the future of social democrat parties is the right approach.  As Esping-Anderson states, historically, the social democrats in the main have surmounted the original dilemma (insufficient capability of the working class to attain power alone) through a powerful class-coalition strategy and class-mobilisation tactics.  On the one hand, class alliances will have to permit socialists to implement a pervasive class unity and solidarity.  The very institutions and reforms that are implanted must become power resources in their own right.  On the other hand, these alliances allow socialists to perform reformist practices including class mobilisation which reconcile invidious cleavage and equity conflicts — something that is very likely to occur as the state’s influence over people’s lives steadily increases.  Hence, realignment genuinely secured positive-sum class politics and the electoral dilemma of socialism, as described by Przeworski, would not necessarily assert itself.

Accordingly, the Western European social democrats had to reconcile their left-wing ideological promises with the practical need for a broad parliamentary majority​[65]​ by creating a broad (and flexible) class alliance to change political-economic conditions.  They introduced a variety of class alliances: working class and peasant (Sweden); conventional working class and white-collar workers (Germany); working class and middle class (France).  Contemporary social democrats in Western Europe focus on the third stage, economic democracy after the establishment of political democracy (universal suffrage) and social democracy (the welfare state).​[66]​

Third, since Keynesian social democracy confronted difficulties in the 1970s, the social democrats had to promote a compromise between key principles of socialism, egalitarianism and sustaining economic growth with productivity and employment in a market economy driven by private investment.​[67]​  The economic difficulties of the 1970s and ’80s challenged the social democratic growth model and apart from the three socialist parties in Spain, Portugal and Greece,​[68]​ the social democrat parties in many countries in Western Europe had a difficult time electorally.​[69]​  In an economic recession, “the welfare states have faced a severe dilemma that the demand for welfare assistance increased as unemployment re-emerged, but the states’ fiscal capability was undermined due to the fact that fewer people were at work and businesses profited less.”​[70]​  Inevitably, in the wake of serious economic turmoil, progressive taxation policies crumbled as growing deficits led to even higher taxation to maintain the welfare system.​[71]​  Finally, the public sector became inefficient and the situation increasingly resonated with electorates.  The electoral defeats of the social democrat parties in the major countries in Western Europe in the 1970s and ’80s were related to these genuine shortcomings of a Keynesian macroeconomics-based welfare-state system.

However, according to neo-Keynesian economists such as Boix (1998), the trade-off between growth and inflation can be avoided if an economy is able to increase potential output by improving their supply-side performance, such as stabilisation of macro-economy and sustainable economic growth through increasing technological and management productivity.  Neo-Keynesians claim that LRAS (Long Run Aggregate Supply) can be increased by achieving sustained improvements in productivity, advances in technology and the benefits that come from product and process innovations.​[72]​  Potential output is also increased by expanding the stock of capital goods (by higher investment) and through an increase in the available labour supply.  Empirically, unlike the neoliberals’ criticisms, there is no relationship between the size of the public sector and economic performances as reflected in GDP growth rates, unemployment levels and inflation.​[73]​  The Keynesian welfare state model of social democracy could transform politics into a positive-sum affair because, from the perspective of the socialists, it promised to strengthen the cause of working-class political mobilisation and shift the balance of power in their favour.

Moreover, the Keynesian welfare state’s interventionist policies provide more benefits to capitalists in a globalising world than others.  Berman underscores that “the Scandinavian cases demonstrate that social welfare and economic dynamism are not enemies but natural allies”.​[74]​  As to the merits of interventionism, Sandbrook et al. (2007) also stress that “these benefits take the form of high productivity (a healthy, educated workforce, good infrastructure, an effective, legitimate state) and security of investment and profits owing to political stability” (219).  For true social democrats, efficiency can be an important criterion for judging policy, but it should not be the only or even the most important one.  Social democracy tolerates the market due to the fact that “its ability to provide the material basis upon which the good life could be built, but have been unwilling to accept the markets primacy in social life.”​[75]​

South America
While Western European social democracy emerged from an ideological schism with Marxism, the socialist parties in Latin America were not successful because of a strengthened revolutionary tradition.  Latin American socialists practiced under more vulnerable conditions than their Western European counterparts given that such socialist experiments often faced reactionary counter attacks by the U.S. and capitalist class-backed military coups.  Moreover, Latin American socialists had to promote their socialist campaigns under very disadvantageous conditions as democracy and industrialisation (preconditions for the development of socialism) were less developed.  This means that the socialist parties were poorly backed by the working-class movements and at the same time found it difficult to carry out socialist policies, such as social equality, without enough materials.  These disadvantageous conditions often lured Latin American socialists into instituting radical reform.  The poverty of the majority of citizens obliged the socialist parties in Latin America to practice populist campaigns which frequently brought economic turmoil (hyper-inflation and failure of sustainable growth).  Such radical nationalistic economic policies (normally originated from “the theory of dependency”) including “the import substitution industry (ISI)” policy, caused a lack of investment and heightened a moral hazard among domestic entrepreneurs.  During the Cold War, the Soviet-backed socialist force in Latin America opted for a traditional revolutionary strategy which failed to develop a growth-centred stable macro-economic strategy (Keynesian demand-side macroeconomic plan to fulfil essentially full employment) and a proper political alliance (with the lower classes) to overcome the genuine handicap of lack of material conditions and vulnerable political circumstances (U.S.-backed military coup frequently threatened the leftist governments).

However, the socialists in South America in the post-Cold War era recovered their clout after they discarded their radical socialist politics.  In particular, by struggling with two utopian projects, a neoliberal fantasy (Washington Consensus) and the dogmatic leftist notion of “delinking global capitalist system”, Latin American socialist parties demonstrated very pragmatic reformist socialist politics in the 1990s.​[76]​  Advocates of the laissez-faire utopian project deteriorated due to the failure of economic development in the 1970s and 1980s (with the exception of Chile) and criticism from left-of-centre governments and popular movements.  The Washington Consensus based economic reforms resulted in deepened social inequality with the exception of a few states, such as Chile.  Concomitantly, the neoliberal prescription failed to cure the social problems of poverty and social unrest (social disunity).

As Sandbrook et al. (2007) show, in South America “public revenues were low while poverty and inequality were usually severe; the heterogeneous poor were found mainly outside the ranks of organised labour in the rural areas and the informal sector, where they enjoyed few, if any, effective rights; economic elites often prospered by extracting rents; and economies depended on a handful of industrial countries for investment, many imports and export markets”​[77]​  As poverty has become the key issue in the post-Washington Consensus era, the social democrats in the global periphery steered a course toward a society without widespread poverty or social exclusion.​[78]​  In developing countries, without sustainable growth, no sufficient social welfare can be formed and the moderate socialist parties’ leaders clearly understood the statement of Sandbrook et al. outlined below:

Economic growth is good in developing countries.  “Economic growth is a key because growth not only provides jobs and thereby reduces poverty and increases resources available to social programs, but also makes business interests more amenable to increased taxation and the expansion of welfare program.​[79]​

Despite the fragility of social cohesion and lack of unity, the socialists in South America employed essential conventional social democrat principles, such as moderation and class compromise to develop new strategies on the Left.  In Latin America, economic austerity resulted in a zero-sum situation in which “disproportionate hardships on the lower classes and structural adjustment was perceived as benefiting the privileged, some sort of lower-class political backlash might have been expected” (7).  As a result, the lower classes often acted as significant voters for democratic regimes.  Concerning the lower-classes’ interests and their voting power, democratic regimes often had to adopt so-called, “populist politics”.  But in many cases, the populist political practices caused macro-economic instability and social disagreement between lower, middle and upper classes.

Second, Latin American socialists in the post-Cold War period rejected another utopian project, “delinking” from global capitalism with emphasis on “localisation” which calls for self-contained communities and reductions in production and long-distance trade.​[80]​  As Robothan points out, those who endorse unrealistic “localisation” and “post-growth” projects insufficiently explain how the funds needed to purchase goods undersupplied locally would be generated, or how communities could enforce a limit on firm size and long-distance commerce.​[81]​  Kenneth Roberts (1997) begins by emphasising globalisation as the most fundamental variable that rendered difficulties to social democrat politics in Latin America.  Roberts adds that even in Europe, an individual state’s macroeconomic management policies which were effectively used by social democrat governments in the past have undermined its independency in the internationalisation of capital markets.​[82]​  Przeworski also states that intensifying capital internationalisation challenges class compromise in individual states’ domestic politics.​[83]​

However, the transformationists’ notion that globalisation affected the deterioration of the individual state in terms of its coordinated function over markets or their other argument that intensifying globalisation jeopardises social democracy (by limiting the active role of the state in realising welfare politics) in the Third World are inconsistent with reality.  Rodrik (2003) delivered surprising data: in Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands (the most open countries) spending on income transfers has expanded the most (380–1).  Yoon (2004) also suggests that welfare states have expanded even in the developing regions of greatest trade openness, such as East Asia.  Moreover, interventionist welfare policies provide some benefits to capital in a globalising world.  Sandbrook et al. (2007) declare that “these benefits take the form of high productivity (a healthy, educated workforce, good infrastructure, an effective, legitimate state) and security of investment and profits owing to political stability (219).”

Given the background of the transition from a revolutionary socialist party to a reformist socialist party in South America, the characteristics (the key reasons for their success) of the newly revived socialist parties in South America can be summarised as follows: first, the socialists saw the possibility of a peaceful revolution as the foundation of social democracy argued long ago; second, the socialists recognised the need for careful mobilisation of mass movements to prevent possible reactionary activities and to expand the ideal of participatory democracy.  In Venezuela, Chávez’s well-organised grassroots movement not only protected his regime from a military coup in 2002, but also backed the so-called “Twenty-First Century Socialism”.  The Chávez case contrasts with the Korean social democrat party, the PP in the 1950s.  The PP (founded by the elite socialists and the intellectuals) alienated grassroots movements (and supporting movements for socialism) and therefore were not able to mobilise in order to prevent repression.  

Third, unlike dogmatic radical socialists, the new generation of socialists accepts ideological and cultural pluralism.  In Chile, for example, the social democrats in the 1980s had to reconcile two contradictory factors; neoliberalism embedded in the socio-economic status quo (a typical historical path-dependency phenomenon) and socialist ideals (which aim to offset the shortcomings of the neoliberal prescription).  The Pinochet dictatorship shaped the country’s market society in profound ways, locking in fundamental institutional features.  The alliances backing the military included the country’s most powerful conglomerates, a considerable portion of the middle class and the orthodox economists known as the Chicago Boys.  During the military regime, the new ruling alliance suppressed the old ISI model.  The new incentive system that this dismantling entailed (tariff reductions and the weakening of labour protections in particular) did more than stimulate agricultural exports: it triggered a transformation in the country’s economic and social structure, along with the expansion of an entirely new export profile.  It was this new package of exports that led to economic growth and stimulated employment opportunities.  But the success of this economic model depended on a restrictive labour regime and resulted in intensifying social inequalities.  Based upon these socio-economic conditions, the Chilean socialists built centre-left coalitions to attain power. Concertación (1990 to present), which aims to sustain economic growth under stabilised conditions and prevent social unrest as well as reactionary counter attacks, employs “a hybrid of neoliberal economics and social democracy”.​[84]​  The Chilean social democrats in the post-Pinochet era firmly recognised the limitation of their predecessor Allende’s radical socialist redistributive reform experiments — radical economic reforms including nationalisation of means of productions in the major industries — that resulted in economic turmoil and social unrest.  In the end a very aggressive reactionary military coup led by the capitalist classes, the upper middle classes and the right-wing military tendency occurred and as in the case of socialism in Korea during the Cold War era, the Chilean socialist movements faced harsh suppression.

Fourth, the new age of Latin American socialists created and adopted participatory democratic movements to cover the shortcomings of the bourgeois democracy.  The following electoral alliances emerged: MAS and MIP in Bolivia; PT and the leftist alliances in Brazil, CONIE in Ecuador, Evo Morales and the Movement to Socialism (MAS) in Bolivia; Lula’s participatory budgeting committee and Chávez’s inhabitant-committee movements.  As Petras and Veltmeyer warned, the Latin American reformist socialists thought electoral politics often worked as a trap designed to demobilise the forces of resistance and opposition.  Within the only electoral alliance, social movements can be evolved and are being transformed into a political instrument for the purpose of influencing regime policy within the system.​[85]​

Lastly, due to the relatively small extent of democratisation and industrialisation, leadership of the socialist parties is an important element for sustained socialist progress.  As for the role of the socialists’ leadership in mass movements, Raby particularly states that “[the leadership] must respect its autonomy.”​[86]​  As Chávez and MBR 200s response to the “Caracazo” demonstrated, socialism did not feature in the initial ideology of the movement in either case, but “would come later, as and when the dynamics of the struggle and the development of popular consciousness demanded and accepted by the popular movement were able to develop and lead that movement to a qualitatively new level.”​[87]​

The Principle of Socialist International has acknowledged the divergence of the factors for the emergence of social democrat movements: “labour movement, popular liberation movements, cultural traditions of mutual assistance and communal solidarity and humanist traditions of the world.”  Latin American social democrat movement leaders in the contemporary era can be viewed as paragons of this principle as they have selected neither a dogmatised liberal (futility thesis) nor a neo-Marxist-based radical socialism.  As Bello (2003) states, the alternative reformers in South America have developed their own strategies based on consciously subordinating to the logic of the market and the pursuit of cost efficiency to the values of security, equity and social solidarity.​[88]​

Why this Shift and Ideological Conversion Did Not Occur in Korea
In contrast to their Western European and South American counterparts, the Korean socialist parties in the post-Korean War era missed an opportunity to become a major political force because of two factors.  First, regarding socialism under the authoritarian regimes’ rule, the ruling class was so repressive (the authoritarian military regime) that it did not allow the socialist tendency to develop around issues of class compromise.  As a result, revolution seemed more appropriate than evolution.  The left saw little option.  Second, adherence to revolutionary socialism thwarted the construction of a solid broad alliance for obtaining a parliamentary majority.  After the advent of democratisation in the 1980s, the Korean socialists were met with relatively advantageous circumstances for their socialist activities.  Nevertheless, the DLP never completely converted from its radical socialist ideology to moderate socialism.  And, the key reason for the failure of this conversion was that the radical nationalistic socialists seized hegemony within the DLP vis-à-vis the virtual leftist movements.

There are several reasons why the radical nationalistic socialists became a majority and the nationalistic socialist dominance decisively prevented the ideological transformation of the DLP.  Above all, consideration must be given to the continuation of the Cold War on the Korean Peninsula, although it slightly deteriorated after the collapse of the Cold War system in Europe.  Korea was divided by agreement between the U.S. and the Soviets at the Yalta Conference of 1945.​[89]​  Large numbers of leftists in the South at that time thought that the U.S. was a main contributor to the divided nation and anti-Americanism mushroomed.  The sentiment of anti-Americanism among the Left was aggravated due to the U.S.’s policy of engagement in Asia.  After the U.S. regarded South Korea as a forerunner state against the Communist bloc, the U.S. government often ignored democracy and human rights issues in South Korea.  Furthermore, the historic Kwangju massacre in 1980 ignited a nationwide sentiment of anti-Americanism.  At that time the Reagan administration supported the military coup leader, General Chun, in deploying the South Korean special army force in Kwangju City to subjugate the popular uprising.  The negative effect of the ongoing U.S. hegemony and the divided nation forced the Korean socialists to focus on national issues and the nationalistic campaign gained primacy.  In terms of the combination of the national issue with socialism, even the social democrat scholar Yu confirms that social democrats must seize their opportunity on this issue.​[90]​

Second, while state socialism-based Communist countries collapsed in the 1980s and 1990s, the North Korean state socialism system is still alive; even though the system has exposed a great degree of vulnerability.​[91]​  Thus, the South Korean nationalistic socialists do not necessarily discard their hope that the North Korean system can be an alternative to replace the problematic capitalism.  Third, Korean intellectuals were interested in Marxism-Leninism and Juche Sasang (self-reliance ideology originated by the leaders of North Korean Communist Party) rather than social democracy.​[92]​  In particular, university student activists, who became the leaders of trade unions and other Minjung Undong (people’s movement) organisations, prefer revolutionary socialism.  Moreover, nationalistic socialists comprise the majority of the university movements.  Lastly, the minority group, the moderate socialists, failed to develop a specific social democrat strategy to convince the leftists and others.  The reformist socialists are hardly backed by intellectuals in developing policies and strategy and this condition is one of the key reasons for the intellectual poverty of Korean social democrats.

Past Explanations
This section focuses on how socialism in Korea has been previously analysed and the deficiencies within those analyses.  As it became clear that the Korean socialists were unable to establish a strong and durable party, a long list of plausible explanations was developed by Marxists, nationalistic socialists and social democrats.  The radical nationalistic socialists (the majority of the DLP) stressed the affect of structural factors such as the repression by the authoritarian regimes backed by U.S. imperialists.  This isn’t to say that nationalistic socialists argue that the structural factors are the only key cause for the difficulties of the socialist movement.  Rather, they play down such party-related factors like leadership and pay attention to the internal causes such as “sectarianism”.  Choi, the leading academic of nationalistic socialists and Kang, the president of the DLP (2009–present), underscore the fact that “sectarianism” was one of the critical elements in the demise of socialism (the DLP).​[93]​  The label of “sectarianism” was employed to attack the social democrats who seceded from the DLP and founded a social democrat party, The New Progressive Party (NPP) in 2008.  Furthermore, the label was used to justify the majority’s failed leadership.  As might be expected, the Korean Marxists believe that the failure of the DLP is due in large part to “reformism” and “parliamentarism”.

Marxists
Conventional Marxists argue that the most advanced states would provide the classic case for socialism and its working class would be supporters of the radical socialist movements​[94]​  Marxists’ main prophecies such as class polarisation with a rapid reduction of the petty bourgeois, class conflict and economic catastrophe simply did not occur.​[95]​  Surprisingly, this view of socialism, as an inevitable phenomenon rooted in economic determinism revived in Korea in the twenty-first century.  The Socialist Workers’ League of Korea (SWLK) claims that “It is predicted that the capitalist system will collapse.  In order to maintain a reactionary system, the capitalists attack the working classes as their escape route.”​[96]​  Part of the DLP’s platform also exposes a common Marxist view of the capitalist system in Korea, that the “…corrupt, monopoly and comprador character of Korean capitalism incurred the rupture of financial and currency markets in the late 1990s, and, hence, the crisis of the Korean economy will soon culminate (author’s translation).”​[97]​  Like conventional Marxists’ view, the Korean Marxists and radical socialists inside the DLP count temporary economic difficulties or economic recession as harbingers of the collapse of the Korean capitalist system.  However, the reality is far different from their prophecy.  The financial crisis of the 1990s demonstrated a structural weakness in the Korean economy and thus the crisis caused the collapse of the middle class and deepened social inequality.  But it does not necessarily mean that the entire Korean economic system crumpled and that society entered a revolutionary situation.  The reality was different from the Korean Marxists’ prophesies.  The Korean capitalists surmounted constant economic challenges, two different oil crisis, economic recessions in the 1970s and 1980s and the financial crisis of the late 1990s, yet were still gaining strength.  An average annual growth rate of at about ten percent of GNP between 1965 and 1980 laid the foundations for this spectacular success.​[98]​  Korea had the fifth-highest growth rate of real GNP in the world in the 1960s and the highest in the 1970s and for some of the 1980s.​[99]​  The Korean economy in the post-war era was very different from the radical socialists’ predictions.  Concerning socialism in America, Eric Foner contends that “Probably the most straightforward approach is the contention that the failure of socialism results from the success of American capitalism.  Various aspects of the American social order have led workers to identify their interests with the socio-economic status quo.”​[100]​  The resilience of the capitalist system combined with the presence of capable capitalists, who are apparently among the winners of the intensifying global contests, always challenge the Korean Marxists.

This misunderstanding of the capitalist system and the political consciousness of the working class directly resulted in an inaccurate evaluation of socialism in Korea.  Believing that a revolutionary strategy is the only solution to overcome the shortcomings of capitalism, Korean Marxists condemn the pacts of “reformist socialism”.  A Korean Marxist, Yim criticises the DLP’s bias towards parliamentarism and electoralism and demands the party’s transform itself from a parliamentary party to a mass party:

Beyond parliamentarism, the DLP must be a revolutionary party… although the DLP represents the mass of working classes; the party has not developed various projects for the masses… (Author’s translation)​[101]​

The Korean Marxist party, the Socialist Workers’ League of Korea (SWLK) also identifies a critical element in the failure of the DLP as being the DLP’s problematical ideology of reformism:

The DLP was shipwrecked and it is entirely due to the failure of the prospect of reformism and parliamentarism.  Despite expanding propaganda and agitation for nurturing working-class consciousness and daring practices of the working-class struggles, the DLP was devoted to parliamentaristic practices.  The realisation of the working class’ political power can be achieved by regimentation of revolutionary workers along with immediate severance from “reformism” and “parliamentarism (Author’s translation)”.​[102]​

Basically, within the parliamentary democracy system, there is not much room left for the Korean socialists outside of the parliament.  In the pre-democracy era, due to the lack of an electoral democracy, the Korean socialists would have led mass movements.  But the DLP prevails in the fully functioning democracy condition.  This means that for the DLP, the activity in parliament will be the key engine to expand its political affect and realise socialist reform.  As Marxists argue, it can be said that bourgeois democracy often works as a trap to demobilise mass movements.  In relation to the shortcomings of bourgeois democracy, Chávez’s “inhabitants’ council” and Lula’s “budgetary participatory committee” can be considered as an alternative tactic to augment democracy.  According to Cho (2009), there are 15,000 grassroots committees out of 50,000 local villages in Venezuela and the committees are the final decision makers on local issues.​[103]​  This participatory democracy experiment has value for three reasons: (1) it covers the shortcomings of indirect, representative democracy; (2) it allows local people to be protagonists in the process of socialist reforms; (3) it prevents possible reactionary activities when the political formation turns to favour neoconservatives.​[104]​  These direct and participatory democracy movements can be an essential alternative to cover the limitation of liberal democracy.  This would require that the parliamentary arena be accepted as the space for politics and the Korean Marxists seem to condemn it.

In sum, the Korean Marxists explain the retreat of socialism, particularly, the failure of the DLP experiment, as a consequence of the party’s ideologies of parliamentarism and reformism, but this assessment fails to reflect the reality that there have been no such revolutionary conditions and resources since democratisation occurred in the late 1980s.  Unlike Marxists, social democrats reject the dream of utopian society.  Rather, social democrats prefer the pursuit of social equality and social citizenship.  In his well-known thesis on the “Imperfect Society”, Milovan Dijilas, a Communist Party leader in the former Yugoslavia, warns that it is “far better, then, to opt for the perpetually under-perfect society — such as those in Scandinavia — that pragmatically strives to reconcile liberty, equality and community with the demands of a market economy”.​[105]​ 

Nationalistic socialists
The new progressive movement leaders (mostly university student movement leaders) in the early era of the 1980s focused for the most part on securing civil rights and a democratic government.​[106]​  While pro-democracy movements expanded in the mid-1980s, the leaders of the democratisation movements began to call for more than democratisation; they linked democratisation to national liberation from foreign dominance, the U.S. above all.​[107]​  In the 1990s, according to Moon, anti-Americanism attributable to resurgent nationalism and a rejection of authoritarianism not only captured the attention of the mainstream leftist groups, but society as a whole.​[108]​  Socialism in Korea began and developed under Japanese rule (1910–45); thus, the situation led the Korean socialists to combine their socialist movements with anti-Japanese imperialism.  In other words, during the colonial era, nationalism set out as the dominant ideology and it easily merged with Marxism.  Since imperialism overwhelmed the Third World in the late ninetieth century, nationalism has become the dominant ideology and it easily amalgamates with Marxism.​[109]​  With respect to combining between nationalism and Marxism in the Third World, Hobsbawm points out that “Since Marxist-Leninists have recognised and analysed [nationalism’s] revolutionary historic significance and have stressed its political force… [in] the liberation movements of colonial and semi-colonial peoples and the struggle of the European nations against Fascism.”​[110]​

It seems that nationalistic socialists, including the majority of the DLP, see two factors as being key elements that affected the retreat of socialism in Korea: (1) repression and (2) sectarianism.  Above all, nationalistic socialists emphasise that the consequences of path-dependent lock-in effects are the product of exogenous shocks such as the Cold War and political, economic, military and cultural dependency on the US.  The majority of the DLP, nationalistic socialists, state that “Although Korean society apparently achieved medium-level capitalism, as a divided nation, Korean society fundamentally stands on subordinate and crony capitalism.”​[111]​  Choi, the chairman of the Department of Policy Studies, which is one of the affiliate research institutions within the DLP, also argues that a divided Korean Peninsula is the decisive factor in distorting the socio-economic structures and causing discontinuity within the Korean socialist movement.​[112]​  Building off this concept, Jung offers that in order to overcome the fundamental shortcomings of the socialist movements, the leftists have to draw attention to the reunification movement.

As nationalistic socialists argue, it is true that the reasons for the retreat of socialism in Korea cannot be understood in isolation from the outcome of the Cold War and American dominance because the socialists were victims of harsh repression during the height of the Cold War.​[113]​  Particularly due to the “engagement” policy in Asia, America backed repressive authoritarian regimes.  In light of these factors, it is not surprising that what results is the following extreme structural factor-centred assessment of socialism in Korea.  Kang Gigap, president of the DLP, states that repression and partition are the key barriers and causes for the current difficulties of the DLP.​[114]​  In short, with their dependency theory-based understanding of Korean society, nationalistic socialists place the blame on U.S.-backed authoritarian regimes and their repression of socialist movements.

Nevertheless, it cannot so simply be declared that such structural factors as repression are the critical factors for the retreat of socialism.  For instance, in the case of the PP at the height of the Cold War and repression, moderate socialist aims such as a universal health system and public education policies attracted the middle class and the lower classes — the peasants and the urban poor.​[115]​  The PP in Korea, the social democrat party (SPD) in Germany in the late nineteenth century and the social democrat party (PSOE) in Spain under the fascist Franco’s repressive rule have shown that a socialist party can be a major political force by conducting moderate socialist politics even under harsh repression.

Interestingly, nationalistic socialists pay little attention to “sectarianism” as a critical causation of the failed practice of the socialist party in the history of socialism in Korea.  Choi Gyuyeop argues that “sectarianism sentiment overwhelmed the party and under these conditions, the party failed to break through and experienced constant defeats in the 2006 local election and the 2007 presidential election… the biggest mistake in the ten years of the DLP is the partition which caused the withdrawal of the minority social democrats…”​[116]​  Throughout the history of Communism in North Korea, the state socialist Kim Ilsung and his son, Kim Jungil purged their opponents in the name of fighting sectarianism for protecting the party and socialism.  Thus, as is not surprising to the majority of the DLP, those who are known as the pro-North Korean Labour Party employ the same tactic of “sectarianism” to criticise their minority competitors, the moderate socialists.  Choi points out again and again “As the 2008 national congressional election proved that people did not discard the DLP in the 2007 presidential election.  [The people] just sent U.S. a warning sign for our partition.”​[117]​

It is true that the main cause of the serious retreat of the DLP originates not just in repression, but in its own radical socialist ideology and incompetent policy during elections.  Although the DLP decided to participate in the parliamentary democracy, the party did not discard its revolutionary strategy.  With respect to the DLP, Shin states that although the DLP states that it will overcome misguided state socialism and the shortcomings of social democracy due to its commitments in elections and its party behaviour, it can be said that the DLP is a essentially social democrat party.​[118]​  But unlike Shin’s favourable interpretation, there are some difficulties in classifying the DLP as a social democrat party.  First, the DLP’s economic reform policies including anti-conglomerate policies firmly reject the principles of the market system and democracy:

After then, based on the requirements of worldwide financial capitals and the monopolistic Chaebol (the Korean conglomerates), the Korean government has been practicing so-called neoliberal economic policies.  The neoliberal campaigns intensify economic uncertainty, inequality, dependency on foreign countries and social hardships. Thus, we expose accumulated structural contradictions and aim to bring revolutionary change in the economic system… We intend to dismantle Chaebol by force through confiscation and transfer Chaebol to democratic participatory companies, which basically belong to the people (Author’s translation).​[119]​

As the DLP’s economic policy (particularly anti-Chaebol policy) demonstrates, its policy was based on revolutionary strategies.  As Park points out, this revolutionary strategy had considerable difficulties in convincing the working class or the middle class about the viability of its approach considering the context of Korea’s political economy in the global market.​[120]​  As Park states, “Supposing that the South Korean government suppressed the Chaebol system, cancelled its foreign debts and guaranteed job security by banning massive redundancies, one would envision that the following situation would likely take place: Korea would be locked out of international financial markets; its export market would disappear as unpaid international creditors demanded sanctions against the Korean economy.”​[121]​  The DLP’s basic understanding of the Korean economy and its justification for a revolutionary transformation contrasts with the modernised socialist party in Japan in the 1960s and ’70s (the height of economic prosperity):

Japanese society at present needs a democratic revolution instead of a socialist revolution. Although these democratic reforms are realisable within the framework of capitalism, their full achievement can be made possible through a transfer of state power to the forces that represent the fundamental interests of the Japanese people from those representing Japan's monopoly capitalism and subordination to the U.S.  Success in achieving this democratic change will help solve problems that cause the people to suffer and pave the way for building an independent, democratic and peaceful Japan that safeguards the fundamental interests of the majority of the people.​[122]​

In addition, Kang’s (the leader of the NL faction) sectarianism argument is incorrect for two reasons.  First, nationalistic socialists interpret the party’s factional groups, its-related activities and their resulting tensions as sectarianism.  The two most prominent socialist groups, moderate socialists and nationalistic radical socialists, were the ones who established the DLP.  As Choi shows, since its inception the two fractional groups have been in constant conflict over a litany of issues: fundamental understanding of the characteristics of Korean society and party, ideology, alliance strategy with the centrist party (the Democratic Party), unification, North Korea including human rights issues, etc.​[123]​  Second, after their consecutive defeats in the 2007 presidential election and the 2008 local congressional election, a high degree of suspicion of the leadership mushroomed among party members.  It seems that the majority intended to avoid this challenge by conducting a sectarianism campaign.  According to a survey conducted by the party’s affiliated think-tank, the Institution of Progressive Politics, targeting the party members identified the key reasons for the crisis of the DLP is facing: the limitation of being a small party (53.3%), shortcomings of leadership and their capability (13.8%), lack of policies (13.3%), lack of progressive party identity (11.0%) and sectarianism (6.7%).  Moreover, regarding the future re-establishment of the DLP, party supporters asked that the DLP sincerely represent the interests of the workers, the peasants and the low income brackets (52.2%), enhance the ability of producing realistic policies (48.5%), nurture mass friendly politicians (38.2%), ally with the middle class (22.6%), overcome sectarianism and reform of the party (16.3%), develop progressive ideology and policies (15.0%).

This chapter presents the debate between those who argue that the major cause of socialist weakness lies in the policies of socialists themselves and those who focus exclusively on external constraints.  What must be fundamentally understood is that: (1) the integration of the structural (the Cold War and military rule and repression) and agent factors (radical socialist ideology) and; (2) party ideology and its derivative policies were the main reasons for the outcome of the socialist parties’ practices.  But this does not necessarily mean that the agent played the only role in weakening social democrats.  Rather, we acknowledge that both structural and agent factors cause relative influence.  By reviewing the traditional explanations, some gaps were exposed: first, the Marxists’ fundamentalist assessment in which the refusal to accept the validity of reformism and a preference for revolutionary socialist strategy does not adequately account for the difficulties that the PP and the DLP confronted.  As Marxist socialism proved its invalidity through the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the essentially failure of North Korean totalitarian socialist system, the Korean Marxists’ ideological attack must be ignored.  Instead, the nationalistic socialists overly focus on the factors of repression and sectarianism.  This view misinterprets the significant affect of the party’s weak leadership including its radical socialist ideology.  Paradoxically, it may well be the case that socialist strategy was important because of and not in spite of formidable external constraints.​[124]​  This thesis tries to fill these gaps in responding to the following secondary questions:
1.	How did the Cold War influence the development of socialism and are there any distinctions in the post-Cold War and post-democracy era?
2.	How did the military regime and repression affect the socialist movement and why did the socialists fail to gain hegemony despite participating in and leading anti-dictatorship and pro-democracy movements?
3.	How did the DLP leadership and ideology influence the party’s practices and fortunes?


Chapter 2: The Socialist Movements from 1945 to 1950

Introduction
This chapter covers the socialist movements in the early liberation period (1945–9), specifically examining the rise and fall of the moderate leftists.  The social democrats had a window of opportunity to become a major political force during a power vacuum in the mid-1940s.  The moderate socialist force (under the leadership of Yo Unhyung) was the only political force that constructed a nationwide organisation, “Kunkukjunbiwiwonwhoi” (the Committee for Preparation for Korean Independence: CPKI) a year before the liberation took place.  The Communist force was inactive as a result of repression by the Japanese colonial government, whereas a few right-wingers were overseas (in China or the U.S.) as they operated asylum politics.  As a matter of fact, around 1940, the majority of the Right was either betrayed or had organised non-political movements in the countryside.

The moderate socialists’ strength, however, was sustained for only a couple of months (August–September 1945).  Two factors affected the swift decline of the centre-left.  First, the CPKI was rejected by the USAMGIK (United States Army Military Government in Korea) as an official governmental institution.  Second, many communists emerged from the underground and joined the CPKI and radicalised it.  Later, the radicalised CPKI was suppressed by the USAMGIK.  The moderate socialist force was popular among the intellectuals but it did not have meaningful organisational influence among the trade unions and peasant organisations.  In contrast, the communist force had an influential authority among Junpyung (the National Trade Union Committee) and several other grassroots organisations.  The radicalised CPKI was directly targeted by the USAMGIK and suppressed.  As the centre-left lost its organisational foundation (the CPKI), the deterioration of political authority followed.

The traditional explanation for the failure of social democracy is epitomised by Park’s explanation that “the USAMGIK systematically destroyed political dissidents and the foundations of the leftist movements in the South.”​[125]​  Cumings makes a similar point that “Most of the first year of the occupation, 1945–46, was given over to suppression of many people’s committees that had emerged in the provinces.  This provoked a massive rebellion that spread over four provinces in the Autumn of 1946; after it was suppressed, radical activities developed into a significant guerrilla movement in 1948 and 1949.”​[126]​  These arguments, however, make the common error of placing the cart before the horse.  It is wrong to assume that repression was inevitable when it was the reaction of the communist leadership and the relationship with the social democrats that created the opportunity to repress socialism.  In this process, the communists’ withdrew from the LRCC (Left-Right Coalition Committee) and this undermined the process of conciliation between the Left and the Right and hence prevented the development of a ‘normal’ politics.  The communist policy of non-cooperation provided the USAMGIK the opportunity to paint the socialists as undemocratic.  Non-cooperative action by the communists delivered a clear message to the USAMGIK that, unlike the socialists in West Germany and Austria, the socialists in the Southern region of Korea were seen as an unreliable political group and a dangerous threat for the development of a democratic state in the South.  The gravitation towards repression specifically targeting the provocative communists was an inevitable outcome.

In addition, one of the problems was that democracy was being imposed from the outside before there had been any real development of the necessary preconditions.​[127]​  Until that time, Koreans rarely recognised the nature of democracy (in relation to liberalism or representative democracy as well as republicanism).  The Koreans were unfamiliar with the conditions (such as socio-economic stabilisation and the need for consolidation among divergent political groups, for instance) that cause democracy to work properly.  As Robert Scalapino emphasises, in the South the democracy planted by the USAMGIK promptly withered because of the political chaos and lack of structural and cultural conditions for democracy.​[128]​  During the liberation, the Koreans had a weak sense of democracy and most political organisations and leaders were unfamiliar with democratic political methods.  Neither was there tolerance or consensus within politics, which was further augmented by the historical handicap in Korea, “factionalism”.  Koreans contributed to the realisation of democracy much later in the 1960s and 1980s through two social movements, the April Revolution (4/19 movement) in 1961 and the June People’s Upheaval in 1987.​[129]​  Due no doubt to the extremely poor level of capitalism (Korea remained an agricultural economy until the 1960s) supporting movements (labour movements) could not be expected to rise up.  The socialist movements were carried out by the elites.  When the leadership was prevented by assassination and repression, the entire socialist force disbanded rapidly.  

The Rise of Moderate Left

The Leftist Populists
It is argued that the two factors, the Bolshevik Revolution and colonisation, pushed the Korean nationalists towards radical socialism in the colonial era.  After the success of the Russian Revolution in 1917, Bolshevism was widely accepted by the intellectuals and easily connected with nationalism.  The majority of Korean intellectuals assumed that socialism was the proper solution for national (Korea vs. Japan) and social needs (landowner vs. tenant class and capitalist vs. working class).  In particular, the revolutionary socialists thought that Korea could be liberated through revolutionary socialist movements with backing from the Soviets.​[130]​  The revolutionary solutions also captured the peasants’ attention because they were the largest victims of the feudal tenant system which the Japanese rulers were hesitant to reform.  The Japanese colonial government delayed their reform of the feudal systems that dominated Korea for over five hundred years.  The landlord class could preserve its interests through an unfair tenant status system.  Amid the increase of economic exploitation and political and cultural suppression by the Japanese imperialists, many anti-Japanese movements and organisations started to show tendencies of leaning towards the Left and were led by radical nationalists, mostly intellectuals, religious leaders, students and formal bureaucrats.​[131]​  As socialism provided a visible solution for overcoming the two strategic puzzles of colonialism and the feudal system, large numbers of Korean intellectuals became Marxist-Leninists.  In the Karakhan Manifesto (1919–20), the Bolshevik administration vowed to support any anti-imperialist national liberation struggles in colonial countries.​[132]​  In the Third World, socialism emerged as the main ideology for modernisation, agrarian reform, decolonisation and nationalisation.  For instance, socialists fought against apartheid in Africa; the socialists led resistance movements against greedy foreign multinationals or local landlords who exploited the people in South America; finally, the Chinese communists conducted the most massive peasant revolution.​[133]​  With respect to the relationship between independence movements from colonial nations and Marxist-Leninism and the powerful influence of the Bolshevik revolution, Sassoon states that:

The fight against imperialism was strongly pronounced in these Communist groups due to the Marxist-Leninist ideology they were based on.  However, although they had to face many and harsher restrictions by the Japanese Colonial Government, they managed to uphold their ideology, which finally found its climax in the division of the country in 1948.​[134]​

Another reason that the socialists enjoyed popularity among the people originated from the Koreans’ disappointment over the nationalist right-wingers who betrayed or rejected an anti-Japanese movement, unlike the nationalist right-wingers who were focused on cultural resistance, such as a campaign for enlightenment in the countryside and exile politics in Shanghai and Hawaii.  The communists were enthusiastic about military campaigns against the Japanese authority in Manchuria and some areas of Russia.  Because of this, the socialists were primary victims of the suppression by the Japanese colonial government.  The socialists’ uncompromising fighting ignited the people to nationalism and patriotism.  For suppressed Koreans, such as colonial third-class citizens, the socialists seemed heroic guerrilla warriors whose admirable leaders could lead them to the Promised Land in the near future.

The Agreement with the Japanese Colonial Government
It is fair to say that no other political leaders recognised the near-collapse of the Japanese empire, so most of the political groups were not well prepared to participate to the incoming modern state-building process actively beside the centre-leftists.  While most of the leaders were cooperating with the Japanese of their own will or another’s will, few of them were hermits or other relatively active leaders put in jail.​[135]​  While the other political groups were hibernating, the social democrats were the only political force that could properly respond to the political demands, for instance, to prepare an independent state and to maintain a social order in the midst of independence.​[136]​  When liberation was at hand, Endo, the Japanese empire’s colonial governor-general in the Korean Peninsula negotiated with Korean leaders in order to prevent unnecessary retaliation and the safe return of more than 800,000 Japanese civilians and troops.  Endo approached the leader of the democratic socialist movement, Yo Unhyung, for three reasons: (1) Yo was a well-known politician, who was distanced from extremist nationalistic sentiment.  The Japanese thought their safety could be guaranteed under Yo’s leadership; (2) The Japanese authority foresaw that the leftist tendency would resist against the newly appeared powerful states, the Soviets and the U.S.; (3) In the midst of independence, Yo and the democratic socialists were the most organised and prepared political force.  Concerning the initiative during upcoming power transition, Yo already established CPKI in 1944 at a nationwide level.  Furthermore, Yo was the most popular politician amongst the people.  For the Japanese, cooperation with the democratic socialists was a very necessary option.  In reality, not many other options were Left.

Accordingly, throughout the transition process, the democratic socialists gained official authority and CPKI and affiliate security organisation replaced the Japanese administrative and police authorities in a peaceful way.  Until the U.S. army arrived on September, the democratic socialists led the CPKI and subsidiary institutions for security for peace and social order functioned as the essentially government.​[137]​  As the moderate socialist tendency seized the initiative in the early stage of liberation, there was chance for democratic socialism.

The CPKI and the PC
A secret and underground organisation, the CPKI was established in August 1944 by the leaders of centre-leftists, Yo Unhyung, Cho Dongwo, Moon Woohyun, Whang Wun, Lee Suckgu and Kim Jinwoo.​[138]​  Yo was elected as chief executive and three principles (nothing written, no trust, no name) for protecting the organisation from Japanese repression and three major acting tenets were promulgated: (1) Independence for Korea; (2) Exclusion of reactionary rulers; (3) Construction of a new nation upon democracy.​[139]​  An affiliated organisation, the Peasant Federation (PF) was created in October 1944.  The PF covered major cities in Kyunggi provinces (Yangpyung, Yeoju, Yicheon, Kwangju and Yangyang) and the main activities of the institutions was sabotage targeted at the collection of food and young men for the Pacific War and destruction of local police stations and administrative buildings.  As independence loomed, the FPKI transitioned to the CPKI.

Through the CPKI and its nationwide affiliated institutions (The Security for a Peace, Youth Group), the social democrats unsurprisingly replaced all of the Japanese governmental institutions and functions.  The CPKI was in charge of the communications facilities including national press and radio.​[140]​  Even many right-wingers (Song Jinwoo and Kim Sungsu, for example) bolstered CPKI by providing funds.  Later, the right-wingers organised their own party, the KDP (Korean Democratic Party), but the party was based on a vague ideology and opaque tenets, supported by small numbers of large landowners and wealthy businessmen, and therefore relied heavily on the sponsorship of the foreign power, America.​[141]​ CPKI also managed and protected essential food provisions stocks and aided in the harvest of a bumper crop of fall rice.​[142]​  In the meantime, trade union leaders managed factories and enterprises, while provincial organisers assisted developing the People’s Committee (PC: the centre-left invited the centre-right and the communists to expand the CPKI into a People’s Committee to enhance its authority).  Accordingly, in the early stage of the liberation, the social democrats were the only powerful political force to successfully sustain social order and peaceful power transition until the USAMGIK replaced them.​[143]​  However, after the USAMGIK came into power the communist tendency, which had political influence among the grassroots organisations including the local branches (under Park Honyoung’s leadership), joined and became a majority faction in the CPKI.  While the CPKI radicalised under the leadership of the communists, the moderate socialist tendency markedly deteriorated.  The expelled centre-left then had to find an alternative space.

The People’s Party (PP)
While the communist tendency gained hegemony in the CPKI, the moderate socialist leader Yo thought that they needed an independent political organisation which completely differed from the communist force (a major target of the USAMGIK) in order to survive.  The first moderate socialist party (excluding both extreme right-wingers and left-wingers), the People’s Party (Inmin-Dang) was established on 11th November 1945.​[144]​  The characteristics of this party can be identified as being ideologically akin to the democratic socialists in Western Europe during the twentieth century.  The Korean moderate socialists rejected dogmatism and formalism as well as proletariat class dictatorship.  It can be argued that ultimately the centre-leftists sought a class-transcending state model which aimed at the harmony of individual liberty and planned economy.  According to Jung (2004), the moderate socialists emphasised propriety and flexibility in policy selection and unveiled "Korean democracy", as the most suitable political system.​[145]​  The People’s Party represented the entire population (except the reactionary elements) including workers, peasants, intelligentsia, petty bourgeois and conscience-stricken capitalists and landowner classes.​[146]​ Unlike the People’s Party, the Communist Party (The Chosun Communist Party: CCP) merely represented the proletariat class, whereas Korea’s Democratic Party worked for the landed classes.

In terms of ideology and tenets, the Korean centre-left was close to the reformers in Germany (SPD) in the late 1940s.  In occupied West Germany, the SPD resurfaced after thirteen years spent under the tragic reign of the Nazis.  Above all, in 1946 the SPD re-created itself as a moderate left-of-centre party.​[147]​  The SPD had a strong Keynesian tone to their economic mission and announced “a socialist planned economy as a goal in itself”.​[148]​  As the Erfurt Programme firmly demonstrated, the SPD completed its transition from a Marxist party to a social democrat party in the early stages of the post-war period.  Discussing this conversion, Sassoon describes the “Erfurt Program, the conventional language of Marxists only in the general historical analysis section.”​[149]​  Along with other leftist parties, the Communist Party and the Christian Democrat Party, during the occupation (1945–8), although the SPD lost its political influence, it focused on rebuilding the law-making process and building a welfare state.

With respect to its relationship with the Soviet-backed Communists, the leader of the SPD in 1945, Kurt Schumacher, clearly stressed that “Social Democrats must refuse to become “autocratically manipulated instrument[s] of some foreign imperial interest”.  Schumacher adds that “What divided Social Democrats from Communists was not a difference in degree of radicalism but a different way of looking at the political world, a different way of evaluating circumstances and ideas”:

Joint campaigns with the communists that had been launched in many cities in the Western zones after the war were soon dropped without provoking any major conflicts within the party.  The treatment of Social Democrats in the Soviet-occupied zone and the inevitability of their being forced into line had swiftly destroyed any lingering hopes of being able to work in partnership with communists.  In West Germany, the SPD was refounded as the “unity party” of non-communist Socialists (Miller, 1986, p152), whereas in East Germany the SPD was annexed by the Communist Party as SED, Socialist Unity Party.​[150]​

With the ideological conversion, during the Allies’ ruling period, the SPD also paid attention to the reconstruction of the relationship between the party and the labour movements.  As to the essential foundations for the re-establishment of social democrat power, Eric Ollenhauer states that:

What we need most urgently is the moral and political support of the West European labour movements and all truly democratic forces in the West.  That support is the only possible counterpoise to pressure from the East… We shall not yield and we shall pursue our course for as long as our strength lasts, because this is not about tactics and manoeuvring; what is a stake here is the existence or not of a free German labour movement and with it the survival chance of a new and viable German democracy.​[151]​

Like the social democrats in Germany in the post-war era, the Korean centre-left also firmly demonstrated their separation from the Soviet-backed revolutionary socialists.  From an ideological standpoint, after the 1910s, socialism is the political ideology that the Korean social democrats have adhered to.​[152]​  The Korean social democrats at the beginning of the liberation era endorsed “liberal democracy” and harshly criticised Lenin’s “proletariat dictatorship”.​[153]​  The enthusiasm for democracy by the Korean democratic socialists was inherited by the PP in the 1950s.  On this tenet, the PP firmly stated that “the final goal which our party wishes ultimately to achieve is a peaceful unification of our divided nation and it can only be realised through the victory of democracy.”​[154]​

Meanwhile, amid the increase of tension between the Left and the Right in the early stages of liberation, the socialists argued that a political coalition would be more important than engaging in an ideological struggle in the hope of driving forward a bourgeois democratic revolution; therefore, putting an end to the divided nation during the escalation of the Cold War on the Korean Peninsula.  The moderate socialists made increasing efforts to organise a more inclusive and united front in the first stage of their revolution, a bourgeois democratic revolution.

As to their socio-economic policy, the moderate socialists had a similar stance to that held by democratic socialists in western political history.  In addition, the centre-left pursued national independence and hated dependence on foreign powers.  They stated that an ethnic nation was the permanent solution and the national community or national common interests were possible beyond individual interests.​[155]​

But the People’s Party made a critical mistake. The social democrats opened the party’s door to the communists again while emphasising coalition and solidarity.  Record numbers of communists jointed the PP and the party gained more than 100,000 members within twenty-three months of its establishment.  The communists swiftly radicalised and concentrated on alienating the moderate socialists from the nationalistic centrist force.  The communists’ Bolshevik style politics were not welcomed among the people, which is why the peasants did not cooperate with the communist tendency’s partisan struggle later.​[156]​  In the wake of the radical communists’ dominance, the PP existed as a subsidiary party for the Communist Party (National United Front strategy).  After Yo was assassinated, the first social democrat party, the PP, collapsed and the moderate socialist tendency rapidly declined.  The communist tendency emerged as the most powerful political force in politics of Korea in the liberation period.

The Communists
After the 1930s the communists lost their hegemony among the leftist groups and their clout slowly eroded until the liberation in 1945.  Regarding the decline of communist force, three factors are considered: (1) repression; (2) the Comintern’s high-handed attitude; (3) the rapid decline in support from the Comintern in the Far East Branch; (4) factionalism inside the communist groups.  To begin with, the Communists were the key target of the repression by the Japanese colonial government.  The communists’ revolutionary idea and provocative military resistance emerged as the most challenging force for the Japanese colonial government.  The Japanese colonial government considered the Korean communists as a potentially viable political challenger.  The socialists’ fought more openly against imperialism and were more attractive to the masses due to their popular approach.  Although the cultural nationalists also had an anti-imperialistic approach, during the 1920s their voice became weaker due to their fear of abolition.  So the Japanese felt that the leftist nationalists’ anti-imperialist campaigns were more of a threat than the cultural nationalists’ resistance.  Therefore, during the colonial era, the Japanese colonial government led a repressive campaign against socialist movements.

As mentioned above, the birth of socialism in Korea was inspired by the Bolshevik Revolution and, inevitably, the origin of the construction of a socialist party is linked to international communist movements.  Large numbers of communist organisations and parties mushroomed on the Korean Peninsula and on Chinese and Russian soil after the Bolshevik Revolution.  Thus, the first communist Party began under the direct supervision of the Bolsheviks, later, the Comintern.  In fact, in 1918, the inceptions of the first communist parties in Korea were started simultaneously by the two major factions, the so-called “Shanghai” and “Irkutsk” factions.​[157]​  Hanin Sawhoi-Dang (The Korean Socialist Party: KSP) was established under the supervision of Comintern under the leadership of Yi Tongwhi in Khabarovsk, Russia in 1918, while another communist party, Gongsang-Dang Hankuk Buro (The Communist Party Korea Buro: CPKB), by the Irkutsk faction that same year in Irkutsk, Russia.​[158]​  Since its inception, the Korean communist movement was under the direct leadership of the Russian communists.  The relationship between the Korean Communists and the Russian communists were not equal, but an essentially supervisor and subordinate relationship was established.​[159]​  The other Korean leftists disliked such vertical connection.

Two factors, the doctrine of the Russian Communist Party’s “One State Socialism” and the collapse of the Kuomintang-Communist coalition and the Chinese communists’ defeat, reflected the dramatic transition of the policies of the Comintern in the Far East region.  The Russian communists desperately needed cooperation from Kuomintang’s Chang Kai-shek and Chang Zhemin, the head of the militia force in Manchuria in order to escalate socialist economic development and stabilisation of their back side.  Stalin even formed a cordial amicable relation.​[160]​  Stalin’s nationalism based on pragmatic foreign policy made the Korean leftists feel betrayed and also caused the rapid deterioration of the role of the Comintern Far East branch.​[161]​  The aid for the Korean socialist movements from the Soviets almost stopped and the Comintern Far East branch declined into a simple liaison office.

With respect to the factionalism problem among the communist groups, two incidents affected the communists’ authority: the “Jayousisabeon (Freedom City Incident)” caused by the Irkutsk factions killed large numbers of Shanghai faction communists and the suspicion of misappropriation of funds from Moscow and veering to the Right in terms of ideology by the Shanghai faction.​[162]​  Furthermore, although Lenin warned that the Comintern would withdraw its support unless the Koreans recovered their unity and cleaned up their immature factionalist behaviour, especially amongst the Korean socialists, the communists never fixed the root of the problem.​[163]​  The disunity among the communist tendency was such a noticeable characteristic among the socialists that the leaders in Moscow deemed a “Trusteeship” as a necessary procedure in order to develop a nation with any substance on the Korean Peninsula in the future.

Furthermore, in the liberation period the communists in the South showed their opportunistic attitude with respect to “Trusteeship” in which the communists demonstrated anti-trusteeship for the first time (along with a majority of political groups in Korea), but sooner or later, they turned their view 180 degrees and claimed pro-trusteeship because the Soviets’ intended to erect an independent pro-Soviet state in the North first.  Certainly, the affect of this event cannot be considered the only impetus for the weakening of the socialists, but at the very least it can be regarded as one of the key factors and its true effects were realised in the early liberation era.

The Decline of Democratic Socialism
The moderate leftists’ initiative could not be sustained and declined suddenly due to: (1) the USAMGIK’s ‘reverse course’ policy amid the intensifying Cold War; (2) the collapse of the LRCC; (3) the eruption of the civil war.  While the USGMIK adopted repressive policies against the provocative communists, the communists choose more aggressive military campaigns rather than somewhat defensive tactics, such as participation in the LRCC or coalition with the centrists.  While the democratic socialists were rapidly lost their political influence, the balance of power amongst the political groups has changed.  It is obvious that until 1946, the Left was still dominant in the South, but after the LRCC demonstrated its invalidity in the mid–1946, the proportion of power changed.  According the USAMGIK’s consultant report, in 1947, the power distribution was that: nationalists, 50 percent, the communists, 10 percent and the centrists, 40 percent.​[164]​  After the end of the civil war, the distribution of power totally changed as the right–winger’s dominance was consolidated (the communist force was destroyed, whereas the centrist force was incapacitated in politics). 

The USAMGIK and its Reverse-Course Policy
At the end of the1940s America’s Japanese policy turned to a so-called, ‘reverse course’.  Originally, in order to prevent the re-establishment of the Japanese empire, the allies were supposed to adopt the following reform policies: secularise the emperor, purge war criminals, reform land, allow trade unions, etc.  However, amid the enhancement of the Cold War in East Asia, in order to build a bastion (against the communists) for the West, the U.S. military government preferred to make a deal with the right-wingers even though they were not pro-liberal democracy and were extreme nationalists.​[165]​  This change of policy aimed at the communists (mostly) was developed in the South after two incidents: (1) Yo Unhyung, the leading social democrat movements was assassinated in July 1947; (2) Chang Kai-shek was defeated by the Chinese communists and the strength of the Chinese Red Army reached 20 million.  The USAMGIK undertook a mass arrest of communists.​[166]​  Although the USAMGIK did not repress the moderate socialists directly, such witch hunts against the communists resulted in a strong anti-socialist sentiment in the Korean society as a whole.  It was difficult for the democratic left to flourish in these conditions.

The Dismantling of the CPIK and the PC
The democratic socialist-led CPIK successfully maintained social order and peace for a couple of months.  But, as the CPIK consisted only of the centre-left, it had a weak influence among the grassroots organisations and could hardly be treated as an official leading institution.  Thus, between 1945 and 1946 the People’s Committee was established by the coalition of social democrats, communists and centrists in almost every single province, city and even small villages and replaced the Japanese as the government agent.  The PC covered the entire Korean Peninsula and at different levels; provinces, cities, counties and villages.  Roughly half of all South Korean counties were at one time governed by PCs.  The provinces in order of PC strengths are: (1) South Kyongsang, (2) South Cholla/North Kyongsang, (3) North Cholla/South Chungchong/Kyonggi, (4) Kangwon and (5) North Chungchung.  In addition, PCs dominated Cheju Island throughout the three-year tenure of the American Military Government.  The PCs are essentially a unique Korean-style form of locally rooted and responsive organisation.​[167]​  On Jeju Island, for example, for a year after the PC was established on 23rd September, five days before the U.S. Army landed, it was the only legitimate political institution until the PC and the USAMGIK became adversaries and the USAMGIK suppressed them.​[168]​  The public opinion polls had enough evidence to prove the superiority of the Left.  “The public opinion poll by the U.S. Military Government in 1946 determined that 70% of 8,000 people supported socialism, 10% Communism and 13% capitalism.​[169]​  According to the Korean Journalist Association polled public opinion on 3rd July 1947, 70% of 2,495 people supported the People's Republic that was widely used by Communists, as the name for the new nation. From this same poll, 71% preferred the People's Committee led by the KCP to the existing administration created by the U.S. Military Government (Jayu Sinmun — Liberty Newspaper, 3rd July 1947).

The presence and powerful influence of communists in the PC seemed a serious challenge to the USAMGIK.  The communist-controlled PC and provocative campaigns threatened social order and political instability.  The USAMGIK selectively suppressed the revolutionary left (Communists) and tried to dismantle the communist-controlled PC.  And, at the same time, the USAMGIK utilised the centrist force (both centre-left and centre-right force) to deter the Communists.  This background explains the reason why the USAMGIK endorsed the centrist force founded Left-Right Coalition Committee (LRCC).​[170]​  The USAMGIK’s consolidation tool intended to separate moderate socialists from the Communists. In other words, the U.S. specifically aimed to isolate the provocative Communists and the LRCC, completely replaced the function of the PC.  Of course, as long as the LRCC was managed by the centrists, two sides of the extreme forces, the communist and the extreme nationalist forces did not participate into the consolidation tool.

The Collapse of the LRCC
From September 1945, the USAMGIK refused to recognise any of the local organisations as official authorities and announced that the USAMGIK was the only ruling institution.  While the USAMGIK tried to replace the Japanese colonial government functions, tension between the Left and the Right had intensified although the USAMGIK and the centrist force tried to minimise the conflicts through the vitalisation of the Left-Right Committee.​[171]​  Despite public opinion polarising around the extreme Left and Right, the centre-left and the moderate socialists constructed so-called “The Left–Right Coalition Committee (LRCC)” with the USAMGIK’s approval.​[172]​  Indeed, the origin of the establishment of the LRCC was that the centrist forces (both centre-right and centre-left) aimed to respond to the U.S.-Soviet Joint Committee: USJC.  The committee was called to resolve the Korean Peninsula issue and institute a modern state-building process after the withdrawal of the Japanese troops.

The pragmatic socialists believed the nation would be divided unless the leaders (leftists and right-wingers) maintained unity and developed a legitimate state-building program that could satisfy the U.S. and the Soviets as well as the Left and the Right.​[173]​  Thus, the centre-leftists emphasised the need to unify themselves between the Left and the Right to prevent a divided nation which was being imposed by the conflict between U.S. and the Soviets in their fight for hegemony.  The moderate socialists focused on avoiding a divided nation and offered two principles: (1) the need for cooperation between the Left and the Right in building a modern state; (2) maintaining national self-determination for unification.  Under the pretence of national self-determination, the social democrats urged the withdrawal of the U.S. Army from South Korea and the Soviet force from North Korea.

In the meantime, the USAMGIK preferred to utilise the centrists led “LRCC” because the main goal of the USAMGIK was isolation of the communist force from the Left.  In fact, the U.S. had intentions to isolate the communists by promoting Yo’s faction within this committee and to make reforms through the Interim Legislative Body.  The LRCC formalised an exclusive middle of the road led by Yo Unhyung (centre-leftist) and Kim Gyusik (centre-right-wing).

In contrast, both the communists and extreme conservative (like Rhee) nationalists rejected the possibility of building a modern state within the coalition of the Left and the Right.  While the communists seized absolute power in the North, the communist movement leader in the South, Park Hunyoung, planned a communist revolution.  More significantly, the communists in the South always checked the growing power of the moderate socialist force (the key force on the LRCC).  Park and his fellow communists were dissatisfied with the centrist force led LRCC.  In addition, like the Bolsheviks who considered social democrats as a betrayed right-wing group, the Korean communists fundamentally maintained antagonism against centre-leftism.  Thus, the Korean communists saw no reason to cooperate with the centrists.

The USJC offered five years of UN Trusteeship, but the proposal faced fierce resistance by almost all political forces on the peninsula beside the Soviet-backed Communist tendency in the South.  With Soviet guidance, the Communists supported the idea of two separate independent states in the North and south.  The background for the Communists’ surprising decision was that: (1) the Communists already established a state in the North; (2) the Communist tendency was a majority in the Left in the South (confidence on election); and lastly, the Korean Communists in the South were encouraged by the Chinese Communist success in the civil war (the Red Army was reinforced in Manchuria and the final victory of the Communist Party against Kuomintang was just a matter of time).  But all of these positive backgrounds provided a burden to the USAMGIK in the South.  The U.S. handed the Korean Peninsula issue to the United Nation and the USJC committee was wrecked.  Basically, the two superpowers neither synchronised their interests on the peninsula nor reconciled the mounting domestic tension between the Left and the Right.  As the USJC terminated, the LRCC inevitably collapsed and the political influence of the centrist force began to decline.​[174]​  The USAMGIK enhanced anti-Communist policies and began to repress the Communist tendency.

The USAMGIK selectively suppressed several PCs in specific provinces where the Communists were the dominant force.  In certain areas like the south-eastern regions where starvation and famine were severe, the Communists’ land reform slogan “confiscation of lands from the landlord without compensation and distribution of the land to peasant without payment” persuaded the majority of poor peasants.  In addition, although the leadership of the Communist movements collapsed as a result of the constant repression by the Japanese colonial government, the Communist tendency still maintained mid-level leadership channels among trade unions and peasant organisations in several provinces like Kyunggi and Kyungsang provinces (where heavy and light industry were relatively well developed).

There was a desperate need for a coalition between the moderate and revolutionary socialist tendency as the USAMGIK supported the right-wing tendency and reinforcement of repressive policies against the Left as the Cold War began on the peninsula.  The USAMGIK had to respond to the fact that the Soviet-backed Communist tendency in the North established a revolutionary dominance in politics and intended to repress the nationalist right-wing force.  Unlike the socialist party which was the consequential coalition between the moderate (Rasalle) and the revolutionary tendency (Marxists) under the Weimar Republic, the Korean socialists failed to maintain unity, and could not therefore utilise such repression for expansion of political influence.  In the case of the German Social democrat Party (SPD) under the “Law of Suppression of Socialists” (Sozialistengesets), two major factions, the moderate and revolutionary socialist, maintained unity by erecting unified socialist party (in Gotha in 1874), then reinforced socialist movements.  The two German factions conciliated different political ideas by taking both of them into its platform and announced that: “the SPD aims to build a democratic state and socialist society to use all sorts of legal methods; to abolish a wage-working system, exploitation, social and political inequality (Marxist goal); to build a state-backed, worker’s democratic control, socialist producer management-based “cooperative association” (Lasalle’s goal).​[175]​  Several resources, sustaining unit of the Left and active mobilisation of legal methods including active organisation of the struggle for a right to universal suffrage and elections caused the SPD to become a more powerful political organisation.  The SPD gained 100,200 of the votes in the 1871 election; 35,200 of votes in the 1874 election; and 490,300 of votes in the 1877 election.  Later in 1890 the SPD gained 1,500,000 of votes and Sozialistengesets was abandoned.​[176]​

Taking into consideration this benchmark from the successful German SPD in the late nineteenth century, it can be argued that repression should not be considered as an absolute negative factor for the development of socialism.  In fact, suppression was not the common policy adopted by the U.S. military authority in the occupied countries.  In West Germany and Austria, the U.S. barely pressed the socialists due to the fact that the leftist movement in those countries was controlled by democratic socialists who clearly spilt off from revolutionary Communists.  The Korean socialists in the mid-1940s had to maintain unity first, then more actively utilise the LRCC (backed by the USAMGIK, which means it was an effective legal tool) to expand their political influence.  But the consequence was that the socialist tendency neither succeeded in maintaining unity nor performed powerful legal politics because of the Communist tendency (overconfidence in a revolutionary solution).

Meanwhile, the extreme Right was also wary of the activities of the LRCC.  In April 1947, at the welcoming rally for Rhee’s homecoming from the U.S., Rhee vowed, “I never counted on the LRCC.  As long as the USAMGIK announced a containment policy against the Soviets, we could solve our own problem with them.  We no longer stick to the tradition (i.e. coalition between the Left and the Right) of the Provisional Government.  Dr. Kim Gyusik, the representative of the centre-right, already gave up such coalition with the Left and decided to work with me.” ​[177]​  Rhee, a stubborn, power-hungry anti-Communist recognised that the USAMGIK failed to find an appropriate partner who could fight with them against the Communists.  For the USAMGIK, both Kim Gyusik and Kim Gu (the leaders of centre-right groups) were strongly nationalistic and anti-Communist to the extent that they rejected the idea that the popular and charismatic politician Yo Unhyung could be a partner because of this democratic socialism.  Hence, the actions of the Right provide a strong indication of the way political agency shaped the fate of the Left.  The nationalism of the Right, supported by the U.S. meant that they did not see the need to incorporate the Left and hence they rejected moderate as well as revolutionary left-wing politics.  As Rhee foresaw, amid the intensifying of the Cold War, the USAMGIK selected Rhee Sungman as the head of the new state in the South.  Accordingly, both the Communists and the extreme conservatives rejected the idea of working through the more consensual LRCC.  Unfortunately for the centre-left, class compromise was rejected by the extremists on both sides, though this was not an inevitable outcome of Korean geopolitical realities but of decisions by political leaders.

After the withdrawal of the Communists and the Right, a series of assassinations of the centrist leaders including the centrist nationalists Kim Gu and Kim Gyusik and Yo Unhyung, the key leader of the moderate socialist movement followed.​[178]​  Yo was assassinated by an extreme right-winger before he headed to Washington.  The leaders of the U.S. seriously considered Yo as a potential partner in the modern state-building process because the nationalist Rhee often exposed extreme nationalistic tendencies and invited Yo to be interrogated, whereas Kim Gu was killed by his bodyguard (a radical nationalistic right-winger) after Kim rejected Rhee’s attempt at building an independent state in the South. ​[179]​  Losing charismatic centrist leaders sharply damaged such consolidation (between Left and Right) efforts.  Moreover, the U.S.-Soviet Joint Committee turned into an obsolete tool as the Truman administration officially discarded engagement strategy and adopted containment strategy against the Soviets.  The USAMGIK was no longer keen on the LRCC and hurried to construct an independent state in the South.  Under these circumstances, the structure of the LRCC unravelled.

Regarding the failure of the LRCC, the revisionists often argue that the USAMGIK is to blame because they interrupted the Committee and suppressed the Communists after the committee’s termination. But this view misses the fact that the USAMGIK did not frequently adopt such repressive policies against the Left including Communists within the regions where they shared occupation.  It is argued that two factors, the withdrawal of the extreme right-wingers group (Rhee faction) and the Communists (Park Honyoung) from the committee and the Communists’ provocative revolts caused the committee’s irrelevance.  Of course, we admit that the USAMGIK always tried to diminish the Communists’ power.  The policy of repression towards the Left was not the only difficult factor for the LRCC.  Again, it is argued that a lack of a consensus among the extreme Left (Communists) and the Right (orthodox right-wingers) and their withdrawal from the committee were the main causes of the failure of the LRCC.








In the period between 1946 and 1949 there is a confluence of internal and external events which pushed Korean politics away from a rule-based democratic system towards a more extreme and conflict-driven approach.  Externally there was the hardening of the Cold War which was made even more threatening by the victory of the communists in China.  Domestically there was the growing radicalisation of the peasants and the working class and the political chaos that was exacerbated by the failure of the LRCC.  The growing chaos of internal politics and polarisation, as a result of the Cold War, created an opportunity for communist revolts in the 1940s.  Moreover, the strength of the Communists in the context of the Cold War resulted in a growing polarisation between Left and Right.

The Soviet expansionist policy synchronised with the ambition of the communists in the South and the North to move towards more aggressive armed struggle to complete a communist revolution on the peninsula.  In tandem, the Soviet’s methods of expansionism inevitably clashed with the U.S. in the Far East.  In the Korean Peninsula, Soviet influence ruled in the Northern peninsula during the early stages of the liberation period through its puppet regime under Kim Ilsung, whereas the U.S. was in the middle of a struggle with the populist Left in the South.  For the US, the communists were a major threat to starting a wave of communisation in the Southern region of the peninsula as well as Japan.  Therefore, this endless contest with high tensions between the U.S. and Soviets resulted in the failure of the US-Soviet Committee.​[180]​

The Chinese communists’ victory in the Chinese Civil War stimulated and encouraged the Korean communists to an overly optimistic view of their ongoing revolution.  Historically, the Chinese communists and the Korean communists were close.  The Chinese communists during the period of 1945–8 urgently needed the Korean Communist Party’s aid to grab the initiative in Manchuria against the Kuomintang force.  Hundreds and thousands of Korean Communists participated directly in the Civil War in China (particularly in Manchuria).  Moreover, during the Manchurian campaign, the Chinese communists received strategically significant materials such as rice and other minerals from the North Korean Communist Party.​[181]​  Throughout their participation of the Chinese Civil War, the Korean Communists had confidence in armed struggles, including guerrilla war.

Meanwhile, under USAMGIK rule, the lower classes faced miserable living conditions and were radicalised.  The working class and the peasant class were the biggest victims of Japanese colonial rule.  The Japanese imperialists colonised Korea based upon the “core-periphery strategy” in which it aimed to build colonial Korea as a supplemental base for continuous imperialist war.

The peasant classes supported radical socialism​[182]​ for two reasons: (1) the problematic land relationship​[183]​, a core exploited resource of the tenant system; (2) the wretched living conditions of subservient tenants.​[184]​  The communists recognised the conditions that the Korean peasants faced and used them to galvanise the communist party’s activities.  The party planted many significant middle-level leaders in the peasant unions.  On the consciousness of the peasants, Cumings comments that:

The peasant only acts as a class in the analytical sense — in other words, as a force for social change — when they become aware of their collective interests and perceive the chance for change.

The Korean peasants suffered from the tenant system and the exploitation by the Japanese predators, whereas the working classes were forced to live at lower levels due to the Japanese colonial government’s industrial policy to make Korea a supply base for the war with China.​[185]​  So the Japanese empire left a totally destroyed economy in the peninsula.​[186]​  

Furthermore, as the peninsula was divided by the Soviets ruling the North and the U.S. dominating the South, entire economic exchanges and activities were distorted.  In 1945, there was hyper-inflation and unemployment ratios reached over 50 percent and there was a food shortage.  In the South, U.S. policy on the distribution of foods failed in the wake of hyper-inflation.​[187]​  Second, as soon as the peasants in the South heard of the land reform in the North, they demanded (on the street) land reform like that in the North.  Third, South Korea received a steady stream of refugees from the North (northern part of Korea and Manchuria) during the first year of its liberation period.  Dreadful agricultural or food conditions in the North prompted higher rates of flow in certain months.  These returning diasporas resulted in social disorder with three outcomes: (1) class diversification in the South along with the influx of the refugees who were peasants and higher classes; landowners, merchants, doctors, lawyers, teachers, engineers and government officials; (2) as an consequence of the first, there were more complicated and more varieties of social demands; (3) the refugee flow caused the occurrence of the aggrieved lower class due mainly to strained southern food supplies in addition to the dispossessed peasants right after the returned landowners claim their rights.​[188]​  

Politically chaotic conditions continued throughout the trusteeship issue and tensions between the Left and Right continued to soar.  Above all the Right was divided into two factions, the Kim Gu group (which focused on the unity of the nation) and the Rhee Shungman led faction (which emphasised the imperative necessity of an anti-communist state in the South).  But both of the right-wing factions agreed to campaign for a so-called “anti-trusteeship”.  The first fruit of the anti-trusteeship movements was a series of work stoppages and demonstrations led by Kim Gu, the guru of nationalistic right-wing, culminating in an attempted coup in the South.  On 29th December 1946 Kim Gu called a nationwide strike telling all employees to take orders from him and urged all political parties to dissolve and demand immediate recognition of the KPG as the government of Korea.  Large street demonstrations ensued in Seoul and in a few other cities.  On 31st December Kim Gu issued a series of proclamations that amounted to a direct attempt to take over the government in the South.​[189]​  Kim Gu’s KDP failed in “its attempt to advertise its narrow interests as universal ones, to transcend the appearance and reality of its nature as the representative of minority concerns.”​[190]​  In the outcome of Kim Gu’s failed efforts, the anti-trusteeship struggle passed to Syngman Rhee and the KDP (Korean Democratic Party) and the movement became indistinguishable from its anti-Communist and anti-Soviet agenda.​[191]​  As a key figure of the Right, Rhee strongly asserted that the establishment of “a separate government” would be the most realistic and desirable device to secure South Korea’s independence and democracy.  The development of political circumstances in Korea forced the U.S. ultimately to accept Rhee’s claim because Washington had no other alternatives.​[192]​ Regarding the process of the establishment of the Republic of Korea in South Korea, after Korea was liberated from Japanese colonial rule, Rhee Shungman suggested five principles for making a new Korean state.  They were the integration of political forces, national self-determination, free elections, national unification and the realisation of a democratic welfare state.  Rhee’s principles of state-making were prevented by America and Soviet Russia which occupied separate halves of the Korean Peninsula.  America and Soviet Russia desired to impose an international trusteeship upon Korea which stood in direct opposition to the call for national self-determination by the Korean people.  The Communists in South and North Korea challenged Rhee’s principles more critically.  The right-wingers seized the initiative on the anti-trusteeship movement.  On January 3, 1946, the Communist groups expressed opposition to trusteeship but abruptly switched their stand.​[193]​

Given this background, the leader of the SCWP, Park Honyoung ordered them to organise and agitate the peasant and the lower classes because the Communists believed that Korean society stood on the eve of revolution.​[194]​  The Communists were so over-confident of their leadership that they also misunderstood the people’s political consciousness.​[195]​  On behalf of the North Korean Communist party, the Chosun Worker’s Party (CWP), which was deeply connected with the Chinese Communist Party​[196]​ and the Comintern, the South Korean Communist leaders, who were the devotees of dogmatic and unrealistic Marxist revolutionary strategy, had over-confidence in their political and military capability.  Soviet expansionism and the success of the Communists in China through the civil war caused the Korean Communists to be more aggressive and optimistic of revolution.


The Autumn and October Uprisings

The Autumn upheavals consisted of general strikes organised by the railroad workers in Pusan in September, mass demonstrations in Taegu on October and a wave of disorder in the Kyongsang, South Chungchong, Kyonggi, Kangwon and South Cholla province.  According to Cumings, the key factors for most of the peasant rebels and the workers who participated in the general strikes in the period between 1946–8 was an incomplete landlord reform, poor working conditions and issues of survival instead of revolutionary consciousness.​[197]​  One of the formal Communist leaders during the liberation period, Lee, testifies that “In February 1946, there was a total food shortage; there was no market to buy foods; the black market was the only distribution channel. After the September strikes, the rice price soared to sixty times higher than what it had been before.  In Taegu, people marched on the street for food.”  Lee continues by saying that “On 1st October 1946, while demonstrations occurred in front of the provincial office, the other demonstrators marched on the slum streets and called for food supply.  They shouted Rice or Death!!!  The city mayor ran away and the city was in the middle of anarchy.  The USAMIK announced martial law.”​[198]​  

However, the costs of the autumn uprising were staggering.  More than 200 policemen and about 800 civilians and rioters were killed.  Property damage was extensive and much of the rice crop was lost.​[199]​  On the one hand, for the Korean peasants the serious loss in the outcome of the uprising was the demise of local organisations, such as the people’s committees and peasant unions, which had defended their interests.​[200]​  On the other hand, throughout the uprising and the upheavals that followed the leaders of significant organisations of the Left on national and local levels wound up dead, in jail, hunted, or in hiding.  “Thousands of their supporters were either forced to quit politics or were deeply radicalised.  The authentic claims of the Democratic National Front — the Communists’ strategy to enhance their hegemony — to be an all-embracing coalition of the Left were shattered, which resulted in a dire loss of mass support and the emergence of a more extreme and less inclusive organisation, the South Korean Worker’s Party, the Communist Party”.​[201]​  The greatest loss to the Korean peasants in the outcome of the uprising was “the effective demise of the local organs that had defended their interests. The death knell of most people’s committees and peasant unions rang throughout southern Korea.”​[202]​  

Between 1948 and 1950, the defeated remnant of Communists was organised into five local partisan battalions in the southwest, southeast, Taebak Mountain, Jiri Mountain and Jeju Island.  The partisan struggles worked as a bridge between the Jeju Island and Yeosu revolts and the nationwide civil war, the Korean War. While the Communists were operating military revolts and partisan struggles (the first social democrat party, the PT (the Communists’ dominance took place) was forcefully suppressed (by the USAMGIK).  Then, the moderate socialists (without their leader, Yo who was assassinated in 1948), erected a small party like Sawhoinodong-Dang (Socialist Worker’s Party) and Gunroinmin-Dang (Working People’s Party).  Those centrist parties (backed by weak forces dissipated in the wake of subjugating the Communist revolts) were suppressed after the failure of the 1949 national congressional elections (according to the law, if a party does not have a seat in congress, the party must be suppressed).​[203]​

Therefore, it is argued that the Autumn and October upheavals resulted from the Communists’ miscalculations: (1) leadership’s over-confidence on military campaigns and positive revolution consensus from the working and peasant classes; (2) unrealistic optimism of the situations by judging a revolutionary circumstance was about to occur; and (3) under-estimation of the right-wingers’ U.S.-backed influences among the people and its counter-attacks.

Evaluation of the Revolts
After the revolts were suppressed, the Left was shattered which resulted in a loss of mass support and the emergence of more extreme and less inclusive organisations like the SKWP.  In fact, it can be said that after the upheavals the entire socialist movement in the South was fatally wounded.  The defeated Communist-led general strikes in September 1946 along with the failure of the Geonpyeng-guided (the largest trade union) labour movements (from 1946–8), affected not only the remains of the militant labour movements, but also resulted in the trade unions moving away from politics. ​[204]​  In the outcome of the revolt, the Left’s dominance ended and it created an opportunity for the Right to win political control.​[205]​  After the uprising, the USAMIK banned Communist activity and outlawed the SKWP (the Communist Party in South Korea).  As Jung (2001) points out, a great reverse transition of hegemony from left to right in the society had occurred (“The Dynamism of Democracy and Social Movements in Korea”) after the end of the war.  The socialist movements were forced to move underground.​[206]​

It is questioned whether sufficient conditions prevailed for the emergence of a revolution during the liberation period.​[207]​  Although the peasants were eager to change the problematic tenant system, this does not necessarily mean that they supported a revolutionary change.  The critical reason why the Korean peasant preferred gradual change rather than revolutionary change is that the USAMGIK had already reformed the landlord-favoured system in the wake of the completion of the North Korean Communists’ land reform.  The USAMGIK also witnessed the delayed land reform and its consequence as the support of the Chinese peasants’ Communist Party.  Such revolutionary demand among the Korean peasants was not inevitable or a sufficient option.  

The leaders of the South Chosun Worker’s Party (SCWP), however, thought the uprising was a harbinger of the people’s revolution.  As aforementioned, the uprising was not the anticipated revolution, but just a conventional rebellion of the peasant and the lower classes in the cities.  More importantly, what the Communists failed to consider was that a revolution could not succeed as long as the U.S. supported the right-wing government.  The uprisings were fomented by the local committee leaders and their supporters driven by deep grievances and life-and-death interests.”​[208]​  When Park encouraged the Autumn and October revolts, numerous other socialist leaders opposed these due to the following reasons: (1) the SKWP was still weak; (2) the possibility of negotiation with the U.N. Election Observers.  But Park refused to heed the dissenters and sought to overthrow the Southern government through aggressive tactics. ​[209]​  Even the CWP (the Chosun Worker’s Party) in North Korea criticised Park’s risky revolts.  The leader of the CWP, Kim Ilsung, was critical of the February Strike which was conducted under Park’s order on Jeju Island, which was penetrated because of inappropriate leadership.​[210]​  At this time, the working class lacked the population​[211]​, unionisation and the level of political consciousness to exercise a full-fledged revolution.

The Communists in the South during the liberation period had an overly optimistic view of the revolutionary consciousness of the working class and the peasant class.  The SKWP’s leaders had a positive view on the U.S. and the Soviet Union thought the two hegemons would support democracy and the process of making peace with states.  Hence, the Communists thought that they could build a socialist state on the peninsula with the support of the two superpower states because during World War II the two allies fought against the Fascist forces and the U.S. had officially demonstrated its strong support for the development of a liberal democracy.​[212]​  It is important to take a close look at Park Honyoung, the leader of the South Korean Worker’s Party (SKWP) in the South and his leadership.  Whether his leadership led to failure or success, Park’s charisma was a key factor in encouraging the activities of the SKWP during the liberation period.  In particular, Park’s “August Thesis” was strongly influenced by Communist activities including the sabotage of the Left-Right Committee and the August and October Revolts.  Thus, in the early stages of the liberation period (August 1945–October 1946), before the October revolts and the general strikes occurred, the SKWP adopted some cooperative tactics that were aimed at the USAMGIK, but this optimism was not well thought out.  The leaders of the SKWP failed to understand the U.S. perspective on the construction of an independent Korean state which included the following premises: (1) above all, the U.S. had a very negative view of the independence movement groups due to their disunity and in ability to manage a state; (2) the U.S. was suspicious of the Leftist groups who were strongly influenced by the Soviets.​[213]​  Thus, the SKWP could not properly respond when the USAMGIK turned aggressive to the Left and initiated repression.​[214]​  In essence, under the suppression of socialists by the USAMGIK, the SKWP’s peaceful revolutionary strategy was unrealistic.

Although the interpretation above holds some validity, after the repression against Communists was a huge factor in the withering of socialism, those who focus on the structural aspects (in particular the role of America in the Cold War) reluctantly recognise that: (1) the Communists’ lacked leadership (erroneous understanding on the socio-political situations and unrealistic optimism); (2) the political groups failed to maintain unity (unlike Austria where the three officially recognised parties cooperated in the process of state building).​[215]​
Concerning the revolts, Cumings argues that the USAMGIK and its puppet Rhee regime were one of the key causes for the retreat of socialism in the 1940s (for instance, inappropriate U.S. policies caused several life or death upheavals).​[216]​  This view contains a serious shortcoming in that it over-emphasises the factors, such as repression by the USAMGIK and its puppet Rhee regime.  In fact, the USAMGIK’s consolidation effort with the entire leftist forces failed because of the Communists’ disruptive behaviour.  The South Korean Communists often demonstrated that their actions were radical, unrealistic and unpredictable.  After several incidents the USAMGIK was very disappointed with Park, the leader of the SCLP.  In West Germany the U.S. worked with the SPD.  Furthermore, according to Comings, inappropriate policies carried out by the USAMGIK (delayed of the demands for a full reconstruction of colonial legacies) caused the upheavals and the revolts.​[217]​  However, this argument contrasts with the fact that the USAMGIK (after the Rhee administration succeeded) adopted land-reform policies.  The USAMGIK and the Rhee puppet regime learnt significant lessons from the Chinese Civil War — the defeat of the Kuomintang and the victory of the Chinese Communists.  According to Jung Taeyoung (2006), there were two reasons why the U.S. military government actively participated in land reform.  First, revolutionary land reforms were completed in North Korea in March 1946.  Second, the Chinese Communists gained absolute support from the peasant classes through the Communists’ revolutionary “forceful confiscation/free distribution” policy.  The U.S. interim government worried about possible revolution which could be supported by the South Korean peasants.​[218]​  Thus, with U.S. support, the Rhee administration tried a revolutionary land reform in the 1950s.  Whereas the landlord classes became a powerful political force in many countries in South America and opposed the development of bourgeois democracy,​[219]​ in Korea, the landlord classes were dramatically weakened by the following factors: during the Korean War, the landlord classes were destroyed by North Korean Communists; furthermore, the Rhee regime’s land reform weakened the landlord classes’ political and economic influence.  Peter Evans states that “Korean landlords managed to survive World War II with considerable political power intact, but the Korean War produced revolutionary land reform during the brief North Korean occupation and then American-sponsored land reform carried out by the Rhee regime… the rural power of the landlord class was eliminated.”​[220]​ 

There is a similar case to that of the Korean Communists in the 1940s.  Unlike the Western Europeans, the vast majority of American socialists opposed the First World War.  This position gave the administration a justifiable reason for their harsh repression, which was done in the name of national security and under the slogan of patriotism.  As James Weinstein describes, “most socialist publications and a good many Party locals had been destroyed or disrupted during the war by the actions of the federal government and of local vigilantes.”​[221]​  At that time, the socialist party as well as entire socialist movements lost their political influence and were rapidly alienated from the people.

There are commonalities in terms of political conditions between Austria and Korea during the period of 1945–8.  First, while the two countries faced new rulers, the domestic (or local) political forces noticeably limited their political influences.  Secondly, the Cold War-style contests between the U.S. and the Soviets discernibly emerged as the dominant external factor in politics in the two countries.  Third, the two hegemonic states, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, proposed the divided-nation policy in both states.  But there were a few political differences too.  Whereas the party system in Austria reflected class struggle and party competition, there was no such party system in Korea.  Koreans never experienced democracy and the development of capitalism was distorted by the Japanese colonial government for four decades.  Secondly, in terms of political situations, Austria was a lot more stable than Korea.  Only three major parties were represented in Austria, but in Korea many small parties (not ideologically organised) mushroomed.  Lastly, the Korean Communists were much more bellicose (inspired by the success of the Chinese Communists) than the Austrian Communists.

Consequently, the activities of the social democrats in Austria are far more encouraging than that of their South Korean counterparts.  Austria was ruled by four allies at the end of World War II, but established an independent, unified, neutral state within ten years.  In Austria, according to Bae (2005), three factors ensured the quick and peaceful establishment of the interim government: (1) unity among people who experienced Nazi rule; (2) before the war, there were three representative parties; the Christian Social Party, the People’s Party and the Communist Party; (3) there was an effective device known as ‘The Great Coalition Government’ which rooted itself upon the principle of proportion for the successful agreement among divergent political forces.​[222]​  In addition, the Austrian people maintained unity under the strong leadership of Karl Lennar.





The centre-left was the only political force with organisational power, true leadership and a pragmatic political strategy among all political groups in the very early stage of the liberation period.  While the centre-left constructed “Gunjun” on a nationwide level almost a year before the liberation took place under the leadership of Yo Unhyung, who was a symbol of democratic socialism and an uncompromising anti-Japanese imperialist movement, other political forces either resided overseas or barely had their own organisation.  The powerful socialists were requested to enhance the “National United Front”, which was constructed by all the political forces during the colonial era against the Japanese imperialists and employed the organisational power to erect an autonomous state (to prevent a divided nation).

However, light is usually followed by darkness.  For the socialists in the South the window of opportunity was easily shattered.  As the entire Korean Peninsula reflected the international power contests known as the Cold War system, the socialists in the US-occupied southern region found it difficult to promote their own politics.  The USAMGIK was not favourable to leftist movements and, as mainstream scholarship maintains, this structural factor should be considered as a key variable to elaborate the failure of socialism in the late 1940s.  But it is just a necessary factor, not a sufficient factor.  Actually, regarding the U.S. policy, the totally different backgrounds between West Germany, Austria and Korea must be considered.  The communists emerged as a most dangerous and powerful adversary of the U.S. authority in South Korea amid the intensifying the Cold War conflict.  In the North, the Soviet-backed communists seized a rigid hegemony.  In contrast, in the South, the USAMGIK faced an influx of proactive Communists’ revolt and essentially political chaos — more than 200 infant political parties sprang up and the tension between the Left and Right was seriously augmented.​[224]​  America had more difficulties stabilising politics than the Soviets had in the North.  The USAMGIK (1945–8) and its puppet Rhee administration (1948–61), confronted the troubling dilemma of dealing with the commingled dual mission of the U.S., the deterrence of communist threats (from the Soviet Union, China and the North and the South) and the establishment of a democratic state in the South.  In particular, it was imperative that the ruling authorities stabilise the democratic government amid increasing communist revolts.​[225]​  In order to deter the communist and their challenges, some of the democratic principles needed to be sacrificed in the name of national security.  The outbreak of Korean communist revolts provided an ideal opportunity to justify the USAMGIK witch hunts and in the wake of the repression the other socialists, like the moderate socialists, inevitably withered.






Beginning with the establishment of the First Republic in the South in 1948, the division of the nation and the politics on the Korean Peninsula developed within the Cold War system.  At the domestic level, three years (1945–8) of political tumult ended with the victory of the Right.  The communist revolts and guerrilla war campaigns failed, whereas the moderate leftist force was widely excluded from the right-wing dominated modern state-building process.  The right-wing ruling party and the extreme nationalistic conservative Rhee government lacked legitimacy.​[226]​  Thus, the vulnerable Rhee government set up an “anti-communist” campaign and focused on a very aggressive military-based unification policy to cover its weakness.  This propaganda attack pushed the cornered communist force to initiate more active guerrilla war campaigns.  There was a high possibility of essentially civil war developing into a full-scale war because politics in both Koreas lacked a legitimate institution or norms to negotiate a compromise between the Left and Right.  Meanwhile, the social democrat force was divided and scattered and it continued to exist as a very weak political force until it completely failed in the first election, the Constitutional Assembly Election in 1948.

This chapter looks at the link between two critical variables: the socialist movements (1950s–60s) and the Cold War system.​[227]​  Two research questions are explored in this chapter.  The first is how the Korean War — the most significant by-product of the Cold War — affected politics in general as well as the socialist movement?  The second question is how did the social democrats respond to the structural barriers, such as a conservative cartel politics and repression?  

With respect to these questions, this chapter identifies two sets of preliminary findings.  First that the Korean War and the institutionalisation of the Cold War created the opportunity for dominance of the Right and made the development of the centre left very difficult.  Eventually the right-wing government (The First Republic: the Sungman Rhee administration) which had lost its legitimacy in the immediate post-Second World War period became a dominant political force.  The authoritarian Rhee regime was able to use national security as a justification for limiting freedom of speech and suppressing the Left.  The National Security Law that was quickly instituted after the communists’ Yeosu-Suncheon Military Revolts (regardless of the negative outcome presented by the possibility of abuse of power or repression of dissidents) was the main tool of suppression.

Moreover, as long as the authoritarian regime mobilised anti-communism in the name of national security, this national issue emerged as a dominant political agenda and class-based politics could hardly be established.  The Cold War created nationalist politics that limited and restrained the usual class-based politics of other industrialised countries.  

However, it does not necessarily mean the Cold War (and the effect of the Korean War) is the only factor that caused the demise of socialism in the 1950s and 1960s.  Above all, two critical conditions for the development of socialism, “right dominance (by anti-leftism)” and “dictatorship” were changed by the April Revolution in 1960.​[228]​  The liberal Chang Myun government (centre-right wing tendency) replaced the authoritarian Rhee regime and liberal democracy developed.  The centre-leftist tendency had a window of opportunity again.  Therefore, at least during the Chang administration (1960–2), the negative effect of the Cold War was no longer a critical factor that caused the difficulties for socialism.  

Moreover, two contrasting cases, the successful Progressive Party (PP: 1956–9) and the failure of progressive socialist parties (1962–72) would explain why the Cold War effect was no longer a critical factor for socialism in the post-Rhee administration (1960–1).  Although the moderate socialists were not the main force of the democratisation wave and the April Revolution in 1960, the moderate socialist tendency (under Cho Bongam’s leadership) in the mid-1950s was one of the important political forces.  In particular, the major moderate socialist party, the PP’s leadership, functioned as a bridge between authoritarianism and the April Revolution.  The PP united the entire left and established a powerful front with the centrist parties against the Rhee dictatorship.  But the PP was suppressed by the Rhee regime and Cho Bongam failed to use the powerful democratisation wave (the April Revolution) in the development of social democrat campaigns.

Contrary to the PP, the moderate socialists in the post-PP period (1959–62) was not so successful in demonstrating social democrat politics.  Jung Taeyoung, a political scientist and one of the surviving PP members, states that four key internal factors affected the difficulty of the social democrat party’s campaigns in the post-PP era: (1) failure to establish a practical ideology; (2) failure to sustain a sound organisational tradition; (3) sectarianism with hegemonic conflict among the factions; (4) the party became isolated from the people as the consequence of the previous factors.​[229]​

In addition, the moderate socialist tendency was backed by the radical student movement and the teacher’s unions.  When the two radical supporters pressed the socialist tendency to accept their ideal (unrealistic) unification campaigns aimed at negotiating with the Communists in the North for a peaceful unification, the moderate socialist tendency, known as the “progressive socialist tendency” had no other option but join them.  The progressive tendency and the radical students and trade unions’ constant street demonstrations created a sharp conflict with the Right and political chaos and social disorder increased.  Power-hungry military juntas did not miss the great chance of carrying out a military coup and after the 5/16 military coups the entire progressive party was suppressed.

The Effect of the Cold War in Politics

General Effects
In general, the Cold War system​[230]​ resulted in the following: (1) it established the structure of “the impossible peace”; (2) it constructed an international regime, which prevented the transformation of the Cold War into a hot war (in the field of domestic politics).​[231]​  The Cold War caused two strategically significant outcomes in Korea as the nation was divided into the Communist-dominated North and the extreme right-wing dominated South and a severe conflict between Left and Right in the South.  The new contest between the two hegemons, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, was not the ordinary geographical means of conflicts (continent versus oceanic powers), but an ideologically-based geopolitical crash.  As to geopolitical aspects, Zbigniew Brzezinski states that:

Geopolitically the struggle, in the first stance, was for control over the Eurasian landmass and, eventually, even for global preponderance.  Each side understood that either the successful ejection of the one from the western and eastern fingers of Eurasia or the effective containment of the other would ultimately determine the geo-strategic outcome of the contest.​[232]​

In respect to the Brzezinski’s statement, it is argued that politics in the divided two Koreas was confined to the two hegemons’ interests.  In the southern region of the peninsula, the fate of the socialists was completely tied with the U.S.’s polices against the Soviets and the Chinese Communists after 1949.  The zero-sum contests between the two superpowers were further enhanced by the decisive victory of the Communists in the Chinese Civil War.  All these sharp chasms negatively influenced an ideologically and geographically divided Korea.

Such geopolitical interest caused a very cruel and uncompromising struggle compared to that of simple geographical conflicts.  As the Cold War system divided the world into two camps, any attempt to weaken one of the two blocks ‘objectively’ helped the other side.  It was a ‘zero-sum’ game — one’s loss became the opponent’s gain.​[233]​  The Cold War was trapped in this type of logic and there was almost nothing the Left could do to disentangle itself.  

Polarisation of Ideology
As to the detailed effects of the Cold War system in the politics of Korea, there was a complete evaporation of the advantageous conditions for the development of socialism.  For the revolutionary socialist tendency, the Cold War directly affected them as the U.S.-backed authoritarian regime in the South proscribed the Communists.  While the Cold War created a polarised ideological conflict, centrism (in general) could barely exist and the same was true for social democracy.  As mentioned earlier, the stabilised authoritarian regime enhanced anti-Communist campaigns through ideological attack and the conservative party cartel system.  In terms of the ideological aspect, polarised ideological conflicts and the ensuing establishment of anti-Communist sentiment in the society resulted in the condemnation of a neutral-zone.  A variety of ideological spectrums were missing and political choice among the people was restricted.​[234]​  In a debate on “orthodox” and “unorthodox” dissent, Huntington and Brzezinski claim that “orthodox dissent” intends to reform the prevailing system in respect of underlying ideological values, whereas “unorthodox dissent” questions underlying ideological values themselves.​[235]​  Han (1974) argues that “One distinguishing characteristic of liberal democracy is that much unorthodox dissent is legal and tolerated; it becomes illegal only when it constitutes a clear and present danger.”​[236]​  But in a society like South Korea, “unorthodox dissent becomes socially dangerous and any regime that attempts to tolerate such dissent would come under severe threat from either the opponents or supporters of the status quo.”​[237]​  Social democracy became the biggest victim of this distorted socio-political condition.

The condition of ideological poverty worsened while the nationalistic issue (cast as imperative to national security) overwhelmed politics.  There is a similar case to that of the Korean socialists, the Labour Party in Ireland.  It is very unusual that the Irish Labour Party failed to become a major political force, whereas the social democrat parties or other socialist parties emerged a major political force in the post-war era in Western Europe.  Unlike the rest of Western European countries, in Ireland the “Left and Right rivalry” couldn’t settle down in the party system and eroded class leverage-rooted party politics which also prevented the Labour Party from growing.  However, it does not necessarily mean that the national issue always influenced the socialist movements negatively.  In the case of the PP, the party effectively utilised the unification issue (typical national issue) by introducing a better solution, a peaceful unification by engaging the North, rather than the authoritarian regime (which supported a forceful unification and disregarded the North as a negotiating partner).  What we would like to address is that unless socialists unveil a proper solution that can reconcile national interests to the goals of socialism, socialist movements and-related campaigns can be overwhelmed by nationalistic sentiment.  As a matter of fact, the Korean case was worse than that of Irish socialists for the following reason: in Korea, nationalism was equated with anti-Communism and was transformed into a statism that favoured anti-Communism over unification.​[238]​

The Conservative Party Cartel Systems
The authoritarian regime also poured their efforts into intensifying the conservative cartel in the party system.  The two conservative parties never allowed a third party (whether a socialist party or centrist party), so there was no such party system as in Western Europe in which there is a marriage between class and its representatives as a party.​[239]​  It could be said that there was not much room left for the socialists (social democrats while the Communists ignored parliamentary politics) within the party system.  Politics was limited for the socialists or any progressive politicians in Korea in the 1950s.  This intolerance of the Left was a further pressure for a radical rather than reformist socialism.  Despite developing a parliamentary approach, increasing numbers of Communists went to the mountains for partisan resistance and some of them organised underground activities.

The Communists’ partisan campaigns (1948–56) were thoroughly subjugated and the Communists became an extinct force in the late 1950s.  The surviving Communists tried to rebuild revolutionary underground socialist parties, but such efforts were uncovered and crushed by the authoritarian regimes.  For the moderate socialist tendency, as mentioned so far, anti-leftist campaigns, polarised ideology, and the conservative cartel party system (the aftermath of the Cold War) brought challenges for the socialist democratic force in legal politics.  At last, after the Korean War, the social democrat tendency failed to develop into a major opposition.

The Korean War and Socialism

The Korean War and the End of Revolutionary socialism
It is argued that as long as the Korean Peninsula reflects the Cold War system, there will be “impossible peace and “improbable war”.  In respect of this statement, the Korean War originated from three factors: (1) the division of the Korean Peninsula by the two occupiers, the U.S. in the South and the Soviet Union in the North; (2) the outcome of this first factor was intensified tension between the Left and the Right.​[240]​  Like any other regions where the nation is divided by Left and Right during the height of the Cold War, it was just a matter of time before that Cold War turned into nationwide hot civil war on the Korean Peninsula.  It is worthwhile to review the origins of the Korea War because it is deeply-related to the failure of the leadership of the communist force.  Unlike the revisionist’s view, the war was started by communist attacks.  The statement that repression (anti-communist campaigns) created a great degree of difficulty for the communist force in South Korea is not a sufficient explanation, but a necessary part of it.  The truth is that after the Korean War, the communist movements in the South were completely destroyed, but ironically, the war was started by the communists (from three countries: North Korea, China and the Soviet Union).  The revisionist view opposes the point that a full-scale war broke out in Korea on the 25th June 1950.  With respect to the inception of the civil war, Cumings claims that “the Korean War was inconceivable before the division of Korea in August 1945.  Because of that division, it has been conceivable ever since — right down to the still-volatile present.”​[241]​  As the newly released secret documents from Russia and China prove, this revisionist view in which the war was conceivable because of the Left/Right-rooted South/North conflict is an inadequate explanation.  Above all, such revisionist explanations miss the fact that the provocative communists from North Korea, China and Russia were eager to start full-scale military assaults on the South for many reasons.  The North Korean communist leader Kim Ilsung thought that there was a revolutionary situation in the South based on the report from the leader of the Communist Party in the South, Park.  According to David Chui, Mao badly needed military and economic aid from the Soviet Union to modernise the Red Army and recover the economy destroyed during the civil war.​[242]​  Mao obtained 156 items (weapon) of aid from Stalin for a “State Rebuilding Project”.  Mao executed the trade off in which as long as Stalin supports the modernization project in military and ecnomy, the Chinese Red Army would participate into the imminent war on the Korean peninsular.​[243]​  Meanshile, Stalin wanted a victorious achievement of the Cold War on the Korean Peninsula.  

According to Chui, “the three leaders from the communist countries miscalculated the military tactics of the U.S. on the Korean Peninsula.  They thought the U.S. wouldn’t deploy the army from the mainland to the peninsula.  They predicted that the U.S. would only use its navy and air force.  If the Communists had realised the more active military intention of the U.S. on the peninsula they would have supported the South Korean communist force to carry out a “people’s war” in the territory of South Korea rather than directly initiating a nationwide full-scale war.”​[244]​






While quoting Heraclitus’ claims that “War is a king and it created slavery and freemen”, Kim Dongchun, a political scientist declares that war is the most critical phenomena in human civilisation since it controls the fundamental order of politics and influences a formation of ruler and subject.​[245]​  In the South, during and after the Korean War, the right-wing force as the ruler thoroughly suppressed the once popular and powerful political group, the Left.  The Communists in the South who were one of the main causations of the Korean Civil War were the main target of the repression.  As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Communist revolts (including the trade union strikes of 1948) were suppressed and the majority of the leaders of the Communist Party were either arrested or killed.  The defeated Communists escaped to the mountains in the south-west to establish a partisan resistance.  But such partisan fighting was not a proper solution for the Communists to regain power.  Unlike Vietnam, there are no jungles in the south for armed guerrilla campaigns.  During the winter season, the Communist partisans had to fight plagued by such challenges as starvation, malnutrition, adverse weather and several diseases.  And, more seriously, the peasants in the mountain area did not readily welcome the Communist partisans.  Ultimately, persistent subjugation and operations by the punitive force resulted in the impossibility of the partisan activities.  See the chronicles of the partisan movements below:

	April 1948: The Communist-led revolts on Jeju Island against the establishment of an independent state in the South
	October 1948: The rebellion accompanied by the 4th (army) Battalion in Yeosu-Suncheon: The 4th battalion was supposed to deploy to Jeju Island to subjugate the revolts 
	Both the Jeju Island and Yeosu-Suncheon revolts were suppressed and in 1949 the legendary partisan leader Lee Hyunsang from the North joined the partisan resistance and regrouped the remnants of the partisan force in Jiri mountain 
	In January 1950 most of the partisan groups were annihilated by the punitive force
	In the early 1951, in the wake of the Korean War, the partisans regrouped under Lee Hyunsang’s leadership once again
	During the fourth suppressive operations from 1951–2, the majority of the partisan movements collapsed and in 1955, after the end of the last suppressive joint military–police operation, the Communist partisan movement ended

The Social Democrats
While the Communists were completely destroyed, the moderate socialists and the rest of the leftists were also suppressed (particularly the leadership).  Before the war ignited, the Rhee government organised so-called “Bodoyeonmang” (The Federation of Guidance to provide a conversion opportunity for the radical Left.  It is obvious that the real purpose of the proposal was to deter or repel the Left.  As soon as the Korean War started, more than 20,000 members were carried out nationwide by the police or Army Intelligence Agency.  According to the latest report from “The Committee for Truth and Reconciliation”, an institution organised by the Ro Muhyn administration (2002–7) to uncover the legacy of the authoritarian regimes, Bodoyeonmang-related appeals account for 34.2 percent (2,576 events) of the total.​[246]​

Meanwhile, many social democrat movement leaders, leftist intellectuals including, artists, religious leaders, lawyers and trade union leaders were kidnapped by North Korean Communists during the war.  According to the Democratic Party congressman, Kim Sungho in 2006, more than 7,034 intellectuals and leaders from numerous organisations including the well-known novelist Lee Kwangsu, the nationalist right-winger Cho Soang, the Chancellor of Korea University Hyun Sangyoon, the editor of Donga Daily Chang Ingap, doctors and professors were kidnapped to the North during the Korean War.​[247]​  Interestingly, according to Lee (2009), before they were carried out, the North Korean Communists made a list of the people, normally intellectuals and leaders from all of society and conducted this inhumane kidnapping systematically.  These are the numbers of the kidnapped people by occupation: politicians (169), lawyers (190), civil servants (2,919), police (1,613), professors and college faculty (863), engineers (2,836), doctors and nurses (582), top-level managers from private companies (388) and artists (107).​[248]​

Therefore, the Communists were not the only suppressed force, but the entire Left (particularly the leadership) was destroyed by murdering, kidnapping, forceful or voluntary conversion from Left to Right, silencing, imprisonment and so on.​[249]​  At the end of the war there were not many leaders of the socialist movement Left.  This lack of leadership directly influenced the weak leadership of the socialist movements in the post-Korean War period.  After the Busan Political Crisis and Sassaoib Incident (see the previous chapter), the consolidated Rhee regime and the conservative cartel party system barely provided any opportunity for opponents including the social democrats.

Power Transition from Left to Right
Anti-Communism was not only a useful tool for the authoritarian regime that was weakened before the Korean War to obtain legitimacy, but was also an excellent political method to justify tight control of civil society.  As mentioned earlier, before the Korean War took place, the First Republic was very weak and barely deserved its legitimacy.  But the situation dramatically reversed throughout the Korean Civil War (1946–53).  As Lee (2007) notes, “anti-Communism was equated with national security, making it a deeply and thoroughly internalised experience for many rather than just a state-imposed doctrine or policy.”​[250]​
As Choi mentions, “anti-Communism” as promulgated by the state became the most useful tool for penetrating civil society and consolidating the state’s legitimacy among the people.​[251]​  In fact, until the end of the Korean War, the conservative Rhee administration​[252]​ failed to overcome its shortcomings: (1) the ruling party (KDP: Korean Democratic Party) was a minority in the Constitutional Assembly before becoming the first National Assembly; (2) the Rhee administration lacked popularity amongst the people due to the following reasons: corruption in the bureaucratic systems, most of the KDP leaders were ex-high ranking officers that served for the Japanese colonial government and Rhee’s dogmatic leadership — during the liberation period, Rhee barely cooperated with other factions including the centre-left.​[253]​  As the Rhee regime faced mounting challenges and difficulties, the authoritarian government mobilised increasingly harsh suppression using a cruel and merciless police force — most of the high-ranking police officers were veterans of the Japanese colonial government.​[254]​  When necessary, key principles of liberal democracy such as a fair contest among a variety of parties within a congressional institution, were often ignored or discarded in the name of national security (security for the West, too).  For the Rhee administration regardless of its liberal ways, anything could be compromised as long as it could stop the challenges from the Communists and the national security that would be guaranteed.  A full-scale witch hunt that was aimed specifically at the Communists (or any progressive politicians) was adopted by the Rhee regime.  However, such anti-democratic campaigns and inhumane practices did not work properly while the Communist threat augmented (1946–8) rather than reduced the uprisings (by angry peasants and starved urban poor).  Later, the fragile conservative government obtained power throughout the Korean War (1950–3).  During the war, the conservative Rhee administration cracked down on the entire Communist party through the successful mobilisation of an anti-Communist movement and established a rigid authoritarian regime. 

Over-Developed State, Weak Civil Society​[255]​
The Korean War resulted in an over-developed state and concomitantly caused a severely weakened civil society.​[256]​  Under a politically demobilised civil society, the foundational organisations for the socialist movements rapidly deteriorated.  Throughout the Korean War, there was a dramatic reversal for the vulnerable authoritarian government.  According to Choi (2002), the war brought a windfall for the once-weakened authoritarian Rhee regime in the pre-war period of 1948–50.  Throughout the war, the Rhee regime unravelled what Gramsci calls, a ‘crisis of authority’.​[257]​  Thus, the system of political representation in the South during the 1950s prevailed for only the conservatives and the extreme right-wingers.​[258]​  

In order to explain the newly emerged state after the Korean War, Choi (2002) uses the notion of an “overly-developed state”.  The notion of an “overly-developed state” was introduced by the Pakistani political economist H. Alavi who argues that “For colonial rule, an imperialist state planted a well-developed state system in the colonial society (quoted from Choi, 2002, p45).”  As a result, even after liberation took place in colonies, a strong state played a more pivotal role than a foundation of economy or social structure.  In the wake of the Cold War, the state in Korea enjoyed a dominant position over the foundation of economy and society (typical phenomenon of path dependency).​[259]​  Actually, there has been a long history of the over-development of the state in Korea.  During the Chosun dynasty (1392–1910), with the state ideology as Confucianism, Koreans experienced a strong centralised bureaucratic rule.  Moreover, the Japanese imperialists adopted a powerful state system in the colony of Korea (1910–45) and which lasted even in the post-colonial era.  Koo (1993) argues that the inception of a strong state in Korea should be understood within Japanese colonialism.​[260]​  Regardless of the origin of a strong state, during the Japanese colonial era, a strong state was sustained through subsidiary forces; military, police, prosecutor, right-wing youth groups, mobsters and intelligence agents.

As to the civil society, the Korean War brought tremendous suffering and psychological shock by the ferocity of war for every individual.​[261]​  Kim Dong-Chun (2000) offers this definition for the Korean society after the Korean War.  A ”refugee society” in which according to Kim, everyone is always ready to leave when the necessity comes and also treats each other in a way they meet each other in the refugee camp.  In a refugee society, people believe they live in what Thomas Hobbes described as “a war of all against all”.​[262]​ Therefore, everyone only cares about self-preservation and their own interests rather than respecting social order or rules.​[263]​  In addition, Choi (1993) clearly addresses the cause-and-effect relationship between the strong state and weak civil society: 

The wartime experience and the suffering left in its wake were articulated and rearticulated through the ideological apparatuses of the state to control the language, to set the parameters of common discourse and to produce and reproduce an anti-Communist world view that was immediate and real.  The political terrain was rearranged by the terror of war and anti-Communism achieved a hegemonic hold over civil society (Author’s translation).​[264]​

Some social democrat scholars like Sandbrook et al (2006) focus on the affinity of the relationship between socialism and civil society and insist that the affinity exists through two mechanisms: first, the nature of civil society shapes the form of subordinate-class self-organisation; second, civil society can also pave the way for social democracy by facilitating inter-class coordination.​[265]​  It is argued that since civil society was extremely weakened in Korea in the 1950s, the socialists had to organise their activities without a necessary support, a maturely formed civil society.  

Under a weak civil society (a politically demobilised civil society), foundational organisations for socialist movements rapidly deteriorated.  In the 1950s, due to less development the working class was a weak force in terms of size and institutionalisation.  In 1955, the working-class population accounted for 7.8 percent of the total although it increased to 10.3 percent in 1960.​[266]​  The trade unions were subordinated to the state.  The largest trade union, The Federation of Grand National Trade Unions for Korean Independence (Daehan Dokryb Choksung Nodong Chongyeonmang) was founded not to represent worker’s interests, but for the propagandising of anti-Communism and it prevailed as one of the subordinated organisations of the ruling party, The Liberty Party.  The trade union movements were definitely under control of the government amid some repressive regulations for the workers such as The Law of Trade Union, The Law of Labour Dispute and the Law of Committee of Labour.  These anti-labour laws were enhanced during the anti-Communism campaigns.​[267]​

Meanwhile, in the 1950s, Korea was an agricultural society and the proportion that comprised the various classes as follows: capitalist class 0.3 percent, middle class 8.1 percent, peasant and fishery classes 70.6 percent, industrial working class 8.3 percent and others including urban white collar, 3.3 percent.​[268]​  The major class, the peasant class, was the most alienated class under the Rhee government.  With respect to politics, the peasants expressed either ignorance or adaptation while the radical peasant movement diminished due mainly to the extreme inequality of the relatively effective land reform and its outcome as the expansion of a small farming.  Political conservatism proliferated among the peasants, whereas the majority of the leftist peasant movements vanished.  Accordingly, it can be said that in the 1950s, there was no great resistance to the state and its tyranny from the working and peasant classes.  

The Socialist Movements in the Post–Rhee Regime (1960–1962)

The Collapse of Authoritarianism
So far, we have mentioned that the Korean War resulted in the devastation of the Communist tendency and difficulties for the social democrat tendency while right-wing dominance in politics was established along with the reinforcement of a strong state/weak civil society.  The Korean War provided a windfall to the Right to become a dominant political force by eliminating the powerful opponent political force, the Communist tendency.  But, in economic and social terms, the Right was not the winner, but rather the loser as the majority of Koreans were starving and their children were malnourished as children were in the North in the late 1990s.  The corrupt central and local bureaucrats failed to respond to such difficulties.  More significantly, the series of rigged elections ignited and intensified anti-Rhee regime mood in the society as a whole.  In particular, after the two incidents, the Busan Political Crisis and Sassaoip Incident, some of the members of the ruling party deserted and with the opposition parties (liberals and centre-leftists) called for the construction of “The Anti–Rhee Coalition” that began in 1954.

The Busan Crisis (1952) and the Sassaoip Incident (1954)
Throughout the two incidents, the Busan Crisis and the Sassoip Incident, the Rhee government successfully intensified its authoritarian regime.  But ultimately the authoritarian regime failed to embed itself due to the massive resistance.  The 5/30 election (​http:​/​​/​ko.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​%EB%8C%80%ED%95%9C%EB%AF%BC%EA%B5%AD_2%EB%8C%80_%EC%B4%9D%EC%84%A0" \o "대한민국 2대 총선​) made it impossible for Rhee Shungman to become president because the opposition parties won by a huge margin.  On 30th November 1951, the Rhee administration submitted a constitutional amendment in which it would allow a direct election of president.  However, on 18 (​http:​/​​/​ko.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​1%EC%9B%94_18%EC%9D%BC" \o "1월 18일​)th January 1952, the National Assembly rejected it and the tension between the government and the parliament intensified.  In order to dismiss the parliament, the Rhee administration declared martial law in Busan, the temporary capital city, Gyeongsang Namdo, South Jeolla and North Jeolla Provinces.  On 26 (​http:​/​​/​ko.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​5%EC%9B%94_26%EC%9D%BC" \o "5월 26일​)th of May, the MP arrested fifty opposition party congressmen for rejecting the direct presidential election.  Later, twelve congressmen were indicted for being Communists.  Amid the uproar, on 29th May the vice president, Kim (​http:​/​​/​ko.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​%EA%B9%80%EC%84%B1%EC%88%98_(1891%EB%85%84)" \o "김성수 (1891년)​) Sungsu (the leader of centre-right wing) endorsed the impeachment of the president and resigned.  

The Busan Political Crisis resulted in the following: (1) the collapse of opposition parties, in particular, the majority Democratic People’s Party was diminished and most of the independents either joined the ruling party or became pro-Rhee government (no institution to check administration).  The proportion of the seats on December 1952 clearly shows the result of Rhee’s victory: the Liberty Party, 97; Sinlawhoi, 21; Independent, 20; the Democratic People’s Party, 31.  With the pro ruling party independents, the Liberty Party gained two-thirds of the seats which meant that the Rhee administration could amend the constitution when the time came.  A huge power reverse between the conservatives and the progressive tendency occurred throughout the Busan Political Crisis. 

The institutional characteristics under the first republic can be identified as the fragile coexistence of democracy and authoritarianism.​[269]​  The following incidents show how the Rhee administration destroyed constitutional democracy: Sassaoip Political Crisis (1954): Rhee was anxious to run for a third term in office.  But, the Korean constitution did not allow for a third term as president.  Rhee tried to amend the constitution.  In 1954, along with the independent congressmen who supported the Rhee regime, Rhee’s essentially personal political organisation, the Liberty Party called for a vote on the amendment.  The result was 135 yeas, 60 nays and 7 abstentions out of 203 registered.  This was a one vote shortage because 135 yeas failed to satisfy the two-thirds registered (must be 136 registers).  The vice chairman of the parliament Cho Sunju announced the amendment defeated.  But the Liberty Party and the followers of Rhee refused to admit the result, arguing that two-thirds of those registered meant 135.333 and below 0.5 point vote could not be considered as one vote, therefore 135 yea satisfied the two-thirds of those registered rule.  The next day (28th November), the Liberal Party without the opposition parties’ congressmen, passed the amendment and promulgated the new constitution.  Finally, Rhee could run for a third presidential term.

Corruption
Since its inception, the Rhee regime failed to gain popularity​[270]​ due mainly to the fact that there were constant illegal elections that encouraged corruption in the entire bureaucratic system.  In addition, frustrations with the Rhee regime’s forceful reunification policy, the failure of economic development with intensified social inequality, oppression against pro-democracy people through mobilising rampaging police forces, ​[271]​ etc. were some other key factors in their lack of popularity.  Particularly after 1945, the Korean national police was dominated throughout the Rhee administration by former Japanese police officers.​[272]​  According to the Donga Daily (7th May 1960), approximately 33,000 policemen throughout the nation, about 20 percent of the detectives and 10 percent of the uniformed policemen had served in the Japanese police.  The Rhee government heavily relied on the police force that worked for the Japanese to repress the Communists.​[273]​  Bureaucracy was another reliable protector of the Rhee regime.  As is often the case in new-born governments in the Third World, corrupt bureaucrat officers in government organisations frustrated Koreans.  

Economic turmoil
As for the economy, economic difficulties in the 1950s were aggravated and the Rhee regime failed to improve the economic structure that relied heavily on U.S. aid and Rhee’s doctrine of a full-blown, self-reliant industry or Import Substitute Industry (ISI).​[274]​  It is important to address that without aid from the U.S., the South Korean economy could not be sustained.  According to Haggard & Moon, “Aid financed nearly 70 percent of total imports between 1953 and 1961 and 75 percent of total fixed capital formation.”​[275]​  One of the conservative figures also confirms that more than $15 million in economic and military aid was provided by the U.S. and Japan from 1946 to 1976 ​[276]​ and this figure is considerably higher than that for all of Europe and four times that for all of Latin America.​[277]​  But contrary to America’s expectations, Rhee used the money from America and Japan to thwart America’s ideological preference for creating a sound liberal and democratic government.​[278]​  All the money was used for effective arrangements to enrich cabinet officials, political friends of Rhee and his cronies (patron and client relationship). 

Furthermore, with the misuse of aid and corruption during the early 1950s, Rhee’s principle of self-reliance based economic strategy caused serious inflation, the crippling fever of the business cycle and it directly affected the living conditions of the lower classes.  Even the US State Department was complaining about the spike in inflation considering the living conditions of troops who were redeployed from the guerrilla zones to the thirty-eighth parallel.​[279]​  Actually, the most worrying threat to Koreans after liberation was rampant inflation.  From 1945 to 1948, the price of goods soared and in 1951 (after the Korean War began) the price jumped up to 814 percent.​[280]​  In the meantime, Rhee’s ISI-rooted economic development policies were determined: South Korea was on its way to becoming another Japan.  Rhee wanted a full-blown industrial economy (as North Korea successfully operated a full-blown, self-reliant industrial base with steel, chemicals, machine tools and the electric energy to run them) with young industries incubated behind a wall of protection.  But Rhee’s wishes did not come to fruition.  The ISI was based on an overhauled exchange rate for the South Korean currency, hwan (later renamed won), which increased the value of U.S. dollars received and maximised aid imports, while keeping the cost of imported capital and intermediate goods low.​[281]​  Thus, while ordinary people suffered from inflation and devalued Korean currency against the dollar, only a few Chaebols (conglomerates) like Samsung and Hanjin (both had a monopoly on receiving aid and the markets) gained the windfall benefits.  Under the so-called, “patron-client relationship”, the newly-born Korean Chaebol enjoyed favourable purchase prices on former Japanese industries, such as sugar and textile industries.  Moreover, GNP growth peaked at 7.7 percent in 1957, but declined to 5.2 percent in 1958, 3.9 percent in 1959 and 1.9 percent in 1960.  As a result of the economic turmoil, the peasant class was forced to endure miserable living conditions.  

The Anti-Dictatorship Coalition
As mentioned, several political crises such as the Busan Political calamity and the Sasaohip Incident provided an excellent opportunity for dissidents including the sleeping centre-leftist groups.  While the Rhee government was facing these political ordeals; Cho Bongam was confined in his home.  “The Association of Comrades for the Defence of the Constitution” had the slogan of “Anti-dictatorship-Protect-Democracy” and was comprised of congressmen who defected from the Minkuk-dang (The Democratic People’s Party: centre-right) and the Jayou-Dang (The Liberty Party: right-wing) and independent.  The association called for Cho to join at the front of this anti-Rhee/ Liberty Party movement.  All these events propelled the construction of a new democratic party included the DPP under the leadership of Dr. Cho Byungok (centre-right) and Hungsadan under the leadership of Dr. Chang Myun who became a prime minister of the Second Republic.

However, after the sudden death of the leader of the Hohundongjihoi (The Association of Comrades for the Defence of the Constitution: ACDC), Kim Sungsu who strongly supported the need for a coalition with Cho Bongam, the ACDC was sharply divided by two groups, the Conservative group (liberal democratic faction) and Renovation group (United in Democracy faction).  On 9th September 1955, the DPP-led Democratic Party seceded and the UD faction was not invited because the UD officially pointed to social democracy as a main party ideology.​[282]​  In January 1956, the UD faction (renovation faction) established The Projection Committee for the Progressive Party (PCPP).  The PCPP proclaimed that the party would represent the progressive working intelligentsia, small and medium-size commercial and industrial entrepreneurs and conscientious religious leaders.​[283]​  

In contrast, the PP’s economic strategy pursued the construction of an autonomous economy through the nationalisation of means of production in the major industries and this planned economy gained the attention of the peasants.  The PP’s anti–plundering and protection of the peasants’ policies for instance resulted in financial support with moratorium of the peasant’ previous debts, prohibiting the tenant system, encouragement of a side job, supporting high skills for efficient cultivation and providing a good breed of livestock brought enormous amounts of support.​[284]​ 

The Progressive Party (1956–9)
In the wake of the Rhee government’s political ordeals, the surviving social democrats constructed a social democrat party, the PP.  Under Cho Bongam’s remarkable leadership, the PP proved that the social democrat party could become a meaningful political force even under unfavourable conditions, such as a lack of materials and repression.  However, it is also very important to admit that the PP experiment demonstrated a genuine shortcoming in the way the party failed to sustain itself.  The limited material conditions, democracy and capitalism and unrelenting interruptions and repression against the socialists by the tyrannical Rhee regime were huge obstacles that the budding PP could hardly overcome in the short time it had.  

During the presidential election of 1956, the PP proposed three principle tenets: (1) realisation of responsible politics; (2) establishment of an exploitation-free economic system; (3) accomplishment of a peaceful unification.​[285]​  Out of the electoral slogans, the agricultural, economic and unification-related tenets of the PP captured the regions of dense peasant population (strategically significant in election as Korea was still an agricultural state) such as Kyunsang Province and intellectuals and the newly appearing middle class dense big cities.  As the below table shown, Cho Bongam was almost caught up to Rhee in Kyungsang Province (the rebellion region during the Communist-led revolts in the late 1940s) and the capital city, Seoul.













Source: Central Election Committee, The History of Elections in the Republic of Korea, p1012

Without doubt, the PP’s sensational tenets were not only accepted by the centrist opposition parties, but also captured the imagination of hundreds of thousands of constituents who were anxious for tranquillity and a fair society.  In particular, the PP attracted many through their offer of a ‘peaceful unification’, which was rooted in two principles: (1) the need of a realistic recognition that the influence of the rivalry between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in Korea was an irreversible condition, so Koreans had to aim at sustaining of balance in terms of the two hegemons’ interests; (2) endorsement of democratic and peaceful methods.​[286]​  In fact, Koreans in the 1950s were frustrated by the Rhee regime’s provocative campaign for re-unification.  After the Korean War, Koreans vividly witnessed the miserable consequences of that war and were eager to maintain peace.  Many peasants, workers, progressive intellectuals, small and medium-size entrepreneurs and religious leaders demonstrated their enthusiasm for the democratic socialists’ peaceful unification policy.​[287]​  Whereas the PP emphasises that the need of deterrence of any extreme right-wingers and leftists along with a peaceful unification through the democratic process under the monitoring of the United Nations, the liberals claimed that state must be empowered first, then, pursue unification within the coalition of the democratic force.  As usual, the ruling party (LP) underscored forceful unification with the doctrine of anti-Communism.  

On the economic issue, the PP’s social democrat vision which emphasised the need for a planned economy along with a fair contest appealed to the poor in urban regions.  The DP’s market-based package which was targeted at supporting small and medium-size industry gained less popularity than the PP’s state-centred plan because it was unclear how the party would construct a small and medium-size companies centred economic structure under the most inefficient and unfair market system in Korea.  Without government’s strong intervention in the markets through a macroeconomic development and regulation to deter the monopolistic entrepreneurs, such economic proposals would fail.  The voters recognised this reality.  Meanwhile, the LP’s incongruous economic tenet in which it heavily relies on foreign aid but intends to build a self-reliant economy already proved its invalidity, so it inevitably failed to capture the voters’ attention.  On the economic issue, the PP unveiled the most effective tenets which were rooted in the clear recognition of the fundamental problems of the Korean economy in the 1950s (monopoly, cronyism and unfair capitalist system) and, at the same time, it shows a clear vision of how to consolidate both economic growth and social democrat means fair distribution.  The following is the main economic tenets in the 1956 presidential election from the three major parties, the PP, the DP (centre-right) and the LP (extreme right):

PP  established a planned economy which can guarantee the establishment of a wealthy nation and can abolish previous exploitive policies while adopting a stimulating policy for the fast growth of industry;
DP effective mobilisation of the aid by building basic industry and supporting small and medium-size industry
LP balance of development and invite further foreign aid and investment to enhance a self-reliant economy

It is necessary to emphasise Cho Bongam’s pivotal role in the success of the PP.  Cho Bongam was known as the warrior of the liberation struggle against the Japanese empire and also known as an excellent politician who was elected as a congressman in the Constitutional Assembly and was the first minister of the Department of Agriculture in the First Republic.  As Cho enjoyed endless popularity with the people, it often threatened the dictator, Rhee’s position.  In particular, Cho’s nationalistic political line, “no US, no Soviet” and a clear centrist mind persuaded the once-scattered and defeated to join in the building process of the socialist party, the PP.  According to Jung (2006), in the wake of high tension between the Left and the Right in 1948, Cho paid attention to the centrist party and factions that were excluded politically socially and economically between the two extremes of Left and Right.  Cho tried to construct a people’s party which included radical leftists who were excluded from the South Korean Communist Party, the factions from the Handog-dang (The Korean Liberation Party) and Minjokjajuyeonmang (The Federation of National Autonomous Group), workers, peasants and lower classes who were not being represent by any party.​[288]​  Jung states that for the unity of leftists and the construction of the people’s party, Cho often willingly discarded initiative and hegemony and even compromised his own political beliefs.​[289]​  It is fair to say that Cho seemed free from one of the genuine handicaps of the Korean leftist movements, factionalism.

Positivity
Although the Korean socialists experienced various forms of repression, the surviving socialists never ceased attempting to drill through the frozen wall.  The PP was established in 1956 at the height of the Cold War.  The few moderate socialists who survived the witch hunts established the PP in 1956 and proved that even in a relatively disadvantageous environment — a lack of material conditions and harsh repression by the authoritarian regime — the socialist party can become a meaningful force by obtaining the voters’ (the peasants and the intellectuals) support.  It is believed that this successful PP case study will enhance one of our thesis assumptions that the agent factor, party leadership and ideology are the main reasons for the failure of socialism in Korea. 

The PP was the first social democrat party in the history of socialism in Korea (inspired by the Labour Party’s success in 1945 and emulating the SPD in Germany; Jung Taeyoung, 1991).  Furthermore, the leadership party’s policies and the electoral manifestos including the PP's “Peaceful Unification” policy attracted the people who were victims of the Korean War. In the case of Western Europe, socialists seized power through fighting to obtain a universal voting right (with industry-based trade unions).  This campaign brought a windfall for the socialist party and negatively affected the conservatives.  The “Peaceful Unification” policy pressed the Rhee regime's Bukjintongil (unification by force) and the PP obtained widespread popularity. Interestingly, the PP leaders thought the need for peaceful unification not only a political or national issue, but also an economic reason (unified markets and cooperation between the rich natural resources of the North and South).  However, unlike Jung’s overly pessimistic assessment, the PP’s revisionist socialism reflected the real word and the-related policies were highly persuasive.  That is why the PP gained a surprisingly large number of votes in the 1957 presidential election.  Regarding the fourth factor, the failure of connecting with the people, Jung misses the fundamental structural shortcomings.  

The PP proved that democratic socialist movements can flourish even under harsh conditions — lack of industrialisation, stagnation of democratisation and repression of the socialists.  There were a few advantageous conditions for the remaining socialists.  The principles of reformist socialism that gained support from intellectuals, effective electoral tenets and a great leadership were the main contributors to the PP’s success.  It can be said that the PP’s experiment is the role model for the current Korean socialists, who constantly fail to build a major political party.  The Korean War caused the Koreans to expedite their desire for peace and a stable economy.  The moderate socialists firmly emphasised the people’s demands to politicians and quickly introduced two types of strategies.  The first strategy was a “peaceful unification”​[290]​ and the second was the need for the establishment of a “national economy”.​[291]​  The former’s policy clearly contrasted with the Rhee regime’s forceful unification strategy.  The policy was aimed at the shortcomings of the Rhee regime’s comprador capitalism-based economic policies.  As the 1956 presidential election proved, the social democrats and their two tenets helped gain the support of the masses.

The Shortcomings
Although the PP achieved remarkable success, ultimately the party failed to sustain itself beyond three years.  The Rhee administration systematically and constantly suppressed the party.  The police force continuously intervened in the process of the construction by arresting several key leaders with underlying political reasons.  Furthermore, the tyrannical government mobilised extreme right-wingers, mobs and gangsters to terrorise the party members.  The PP was suppressed in 1959 by the authoritarian Rhee regime after the party’s leader; Cho Bongam was executed in 1958.  After the 1956 presidential election, the PP under the leadership of Cho became a visible threat for Rhee who was eager to preserve his presidency permanently.  The right-wing ruling party and the dictator, Rhee often disregarded the very basic principles of liberal democracy and the death of Cho and the dismantling of powerful opponent party, the PP, were an inevitable process.  Several more external conditions, such as reinforced anti-leftist laws and embedded anti-leftist sentiment in society and the dominant national security issue prevented the possibility of class-based politics (a main concept of social democrat politics) and also caused a great deal of difficulties for the PP.  

In the meantime, several internal factors also caused difficulties for the PP.  The PP lacked backing; thus, the party was not only strained in electoral campaigns, but it was also troubled in routine party activity.​[292]​  Moreover, while Rhee intended to carry out Cho, there were no political or social organisation which tried to stop such injustice and inhumane cruelty.  More seriously, as the party did not have solid political influence among the working and peasant classes, generally, the party could not mobilise the major classes in politics.  As mentioned earlier, while the parliament was failing (the Rhee government often holds or sabotaged the activities of parliament), the only space for practicing social democrat politics was the street.  But the PP had very few allies with whom they could conduct such street struggles.  

There were several reasons why the PP failed to establish leadership among the trade unions.  Above all, the majority of trade unions in the 1950s were pro-government unions.​[293]​  And, the Rhee government did not allow the basic rights of trade unions (the right to strike) and all of the political characteristics of trade unions (politically motivated gathering, strike and so on were prohibited).  Furthermore, the Rhee government tightly controlled the yellow unions and often mobilised anti-Communist campaigns.  The largest trade union association, Daehannpchong (Korea’s Federation of Trade Unions) was often employed by the government to support anti-Communist demonstrations or pro-business labour policy.  

Without a doubt, the above external conditions prevented the PP from gaining political influence among the working class.  However, it does not necessarily mean the party did not have any leadership-related shortcomings in relation to workers and trade unions.  Indeed, the PP did not have detailed and fluent labour policies beside generalised doctrines.  According to the PP’s detailed policies which were unveiled on their founding day (22nd December 1956), with respect to several major issues, labour and trade union-related policies were covered by the short remarks listed below in an abstract way:

The following conditions must be changed: Working-class movements are manipulated by corrupt public servants and greedy capitalist and trade unions turned pro-government organisation.  The worker’s right of organisation and collective bargaining must be allowed to increase worker welfare and at the same time decrease the unemployment ratio.  We support worker participation in management and claim equal share of profit (Author’s translation).​[294]​

The daily life of workers was miserable while the South Korean economy faced severe inflation and unemployment problems.  The workers suffered from lacked the autonomy in trade union activities.  According to Jung (2006), ordinary workers in the 1950s demanded that the worker’s party assist them in managing “delayed payments” or “betrayed yellow union leaders”.​[295]​  While the PP failed to set up accurate and detailed agenda (unpaid payment or corrupt unions), the party could hardly gain the support of union members.​[296]​

The party was founded under very special conditions: (1) a lack of industrialisation (weak working class and trade unions) and a vulnerable democracy (missing class politics and the conservative cartel was completely embedded, thus there was no room for the socialist party to be established within the legal system); (2) due to the first reason, the PP had difficulties connecting the working classes to other classes.

Interestingly, a Korean political scientist named Choi Jangjib (2002) explains the shortcomings of the PP’s challenge by pointing out the existence of an ideologically confined party system and the two conservative party cartels.  In this respect, it can be said that there was a so-called, “freezing effect” in Korean politics.​[297]​  As a matter of fact, a strong bureaucratic state and a weak representative democracy are both linked to each other.  A weak representative democratic system produces a party system that is ideologically narrow (conservative cartel) and is characterised by the divorce between class cleavage and party system.​[298]​  Moreover, under a two-party system (the dominance of two conservative parties), three characteristics emerge: (1) the ruling party and opposition party compete against each other within the same ideology; (2) both of the parties are influenced by party leaders and elites rather than the masses; (3) the interests of class, profession and craft unions are poorly represented by political parties.​[299]​  Actually, all these conditional shortcomings prevented the PP becoming a major political force and as history demonstrates, overall the leadership was so limited that the party only existed for three years (1956–9).

Moreover, another important factor in the failure of the PP’s politics is that it failed to build a solid coalition front against the dictatorship with the centrist or the centre-right wingers.  Above all, the centre-right wingers demonstrated an antagonistic attitude towards to the social democrats.  While the main centre–right-wing party, the Democratic Party stated that “We would rather negotiate with Kim Il-sung than allow Cho Bongam to become president”, the social democrat party did not have proper alternative policy to ease such aggressive challenge.​[300]​  The centrists’ hostile manner over the moderate socialist reached its peak in the presidential election in 1956.  When the centrist party’s presidential candidate, Shin Ikhee, suddenly died of cancer, the possibility of government transition was intensified as the only running opposition party’s candidate, Cho Bongam (the PP’s presidential candidate), gained remarkable support.  But, the Democratic Party (the DP centrist party) hesitated to endorse Cho.  Moreover, it was an open secret that some of the DP leaders encouraged pro-DP voters to elect Rhee Shungman rather than the leftist Cho.  As the poll showed, even the dead Shin obtained 21 percent of votes, whereas Cho earned 23 percent of votes. If the DP had cooperated in supporting Cho more actively, Rhee would have been defeated by Cho in the election.  





The Social democrat Parties in the post–PP Era
The moderate socialist tendency (“progressive tendency”) in the post-PP period (1959–61) represents the last of the first generation of socialists in Korea.  The progressive socialist parties were forcibly suppressed by the military dictatorship in 1962 and suppressed.  Then the socialist tendency did not have an opportunity to revive until the military dictatorship was replaced by democratic government in the 1980s.  But, the revived socialists were not socialists in the 1950s and ’60s (most of the key leaders were either actually or politically dead).  The newly emerged socialists of the 1980s came from the student activists and radical liberals (who converted to Marxist-Leninists).  

Several factors should be considered for the failure of the “progressive tendency”.  First and foremost, the moderate socialist tendency failed to maintain unity among the Left.  Too many social democrat parties emerged in the national congressional elections, but only two parties gained five seats in the 1960 election.  This disunity is a main difference with the PP which successfully united the entire Left.  Second, the moderate socialist tendency contributed in increase the conflict between the Left and Right.  Constant street demonstrations and sabotage mainly conducted by the progressive parties resulted in its isolation from the masses who felt frustrated at the ongoing social disorder and political chaos.  The moderate socialist parties failed to manage the wrongful street demonstrations, radical student and teacher’s unions.  After the collapse of the PP in 1958, the surviving moderate socialists failed to maintain unity as well.  Lastly, the Park military government suppressed all of the progressive parties and prohibited any of the leftist organisations’ political activity in the early 1960s.

Social Disorder and Political Chaos
It is argued that along with the extreme right-wingers, the social democrats in the late 1950s were a critical factor in the collapse of the short-lived liberal Chang administration (1960–1); the Second Republic was overthrown by the military coup in 1961.  Along with the purist students and the radical teacher’s unions, the social democrats organised constant street demonstrations and agitation to press the liberal government to accept further action for reunification with the North.  The right-wingers counter-attacked and the Chang administration completely lost its governing power (and raison d'etre (​http:​/​​/​small.dic.daum.net​/​search.do?dic=eng&q=raison+d%27etre" \o "raison d'etre 로 검색하기​)).  Amid the social disorder, the Park military junta triggered a coup under the justification that they only wished to bring social order back to the country.  The progressive socialist tendency’s inappropriate street demonstration campaigns provided political chaos and this condition was an excellent chance for the power-hungry military leaders.  The progressive socialist tendency’s failure of leadership played a significant part in creating the difficulties for social democracy.  

There are several different views on the crucial contributors that frustrated democracy and caused the failure of institutionalising democracy.  Some emphasise the existence of politically-motivated ambitious military officers and their coup as the key factor to the backlash in politics.  Several Korean scholars utilise one of the Western social scientists’ theory which states the profound relationship between economic conditions (certain level of wealth) and democracy to explain the retreat of democracy in Korean in the 1960s.  And, lastly, some progressive scholars point to the sharp ideological divide that existed in society and tensions were mounting between right-wing and leftist tendencies.  In other words, there was a traditional lack of consensus in politics and society as a whole.

The prime minister, Chang, himself attributed his failure to the fact that it was hard for the democratic government to survive due to the naked force (Park’s coup).​[302]​  This argument contains an inaccurate analysis on the nature of the Korean military.  The characteristics of the Korean military since its inception in 1948 can be defined as: non-ideological, non-political, and America-dependent.​[303]​  This non-ideological and non-political tendency among the top military leaders originated from the mores of the U.S. military officers.  The South Korean military was born with the supervision and aid from the U.S. military.  Therefore, the following affected the non-ideological characteristic of the Korean military: the American officers’ anti-ideological outlook, dictated by professional mores, their apprehension concerning the true motives of the defence minister and their extraordinarily protective attitude toward the senior officers within the Korean Constabulary.​[304]​ Although the military was away from politics, they were capable of preventing a radical change in the status quo, suppressing the leftists’ challenges and assisting basically conservative politicians to take over the government and maintain the existing political structure.​[305]​  

Huber and Reuschemeyer claim that “The level of economic development is causally related to the development of political democracy in a way that capitalist development transforms the class structure, enlarging the working and middle classes and facilitating their self-organisation, thus making it more difficult for elites to exclude them politically.”​[306]​  According to Huber and Reuschemeyer, economic development, in this case, is not just simply the increase of income per capita, but means that economic development resulted in dynamism in the class structure in which the rising working class contribute to the development of democracy.  It is fair to assume that a certain degree of wealth or level of capitalism was considered a prerequisite of democracy.​[307]​  In lieu of this, Korea was not ready for democracy because the country lacked of capitalism, the proper pluralistic social base, a concept of political culture; that is, the system of beliefs and values in which political action is embedded and given meaning and had an overly centralised institutional structure.  Democracy occurred after a protracted economic boom and proved its validity in Brazil in the 1980s –– but does not work in the case of Peru, whose democratic transition was characterised by stagnant growth, extreme foreign debt, persistent balance of payments problems and a regressive distribution of income.​[308]​  India also experienced smaller-scale economic growth while the country was recognised as the largest democratic state on the planet.  As Karl argues, such economic, political and cultural preconditions for democracy needed to be instilled with specific domestic historical conditions and configurations.  

However, the argument which emphasises the cause-and-effect relationship between economic development and democracy contains some problems.  It overstates the economic factor and fails to recognise the political and cultural factors.  Democratisation or the transition from authoritarianism to democracy is not structurally determined, but contingent upon the result of class conflicts or pro-democracy political agents’ achievements.​[309]​  It means that the class structure and the role of either the capitalist class or the working class are necessary factors, not sufficient.  

There was a sharp Ideological crash between the Left and the Right with respect to national unification policy.  In the Korean case, the presence of an acute ideological and social polarisation can be considered one of the main conditions for the failure of democracy.​[310]​  The former deals with the disputes between the Left and the Right and its negative consequences as democratic backlash, whereas the latter states the deficiency of the Koreans’ understanding of democracy.  Ideological polarisation between the socialists (reformists) and the conservatives: Two socialist parties, SMP and USP paid excessive attention to the unification issue and were pressured to accept the liberal government or to accept their unrealistic and idealistic unification policy; the need of negotiation between the North and South for unification based upon two principles, self-determination and neutralisation (like Austria in 1954).  But the offer ignored the realities: (1) a sharp difference between the North and the South; (2) North Korea cannot accept the idea of neutralisation; (3) the majority of the South Korean people had experienced Communism throughout the Korean Civil War.  There was a very strong anti-Communist sentiment among the people regardless of the precedent Rhee regime’s anti-Communist campaigns and its effects.  In addition, the socialists opposed the economic and technological agreement issue, which was an agreement between South Korea and the U.S.  But the socialists’ view also reluctantly considered the reality that without aid from America, the Korean economy could not be sustained.  Therefore, the U.S. had to ask the South Korean government to provide “full and complete information concerning the aid programs and other relevant information which U.S. officials may need”.​[311]​  The opposing socialists thought that agreement and request as shameful and charged that it was intended to give the U.S. more power to oversee the functioning of the South Korean economy.​[312]​  

In fact, there are a lot more factors that contributed to the collapse of the democracy in 1960.  The military power and lack of capitalism are just part of the problem.  Additional problems included a weak executive branch in a parliamentary system, the problematic economic policies and the failure to control (or persuade) the radical dissidents, students, trade unions and centre-leftist parties.

The failure of the liberal government’s economic policies and economic difficulties (inflation and low growth directly harmed the urban poor and the peasants) also caused a deterioration of the Chang administration’s authority. In particular, peasants and urban workers suffering under hyperinflation distrusted the ability of the liberal administration.  While modernisation, particularly economic modernisation, was seriously delayed, some of the young military leaders who had political ambition and were inspired by the Egyptian military coup and the patriotic modernisation experiment thought that they had a window of opportunity to intervene in politics.

More significantly, the Chang administration faced mounting pressure from radical groups such as students, trade unions and social democrat parties.  The Chang administration was not only prevented by the socialists’ sabotage in the parliament, but also faced massive demonstrations in the street that were mainly conducted by the socialist opponents which prevented the centre-right government from carry out its policies.  In the policies of unification, economic development and the position of legislation branch, the socialists clearly opposed the liberal government in the parliament.​[313]​  The radical Left (including the social democrats) main protest against the liberal government included the need of conference between the government in the South and the North for discussions of a peaceful unification and opposition to the economic agreement between South Korea and the U.S.  Throughout the chaotic leftists’ demonstrations and the counter demonstrations and several episodes of violence by the extreme right-wingers (mostly youths and political motivated right-wing gangsters), the Chang administration entirely lost its governmental authority and society was confronted by a essentially anarchic situation.  Concerning the situation, one of the military junta, Park convinced himself to initiate military action and when the coup occurred, according to the Dong-A daily newspaper, a majority of the intellectuals and citizens were supportive.​[314]​  Those leftists’ agitation brought the right-wingers’ reaction and turned into a chaotic situation.  Thus, when the Park military junta subverted the Chang government, ironically, the coup gained surprising support from the majority of citizens (intellectuals). 

The Radical Students and the Teacher’s Unions
One of the important backgrounds for the social democrat parties to join the series of street demonstrations that caused political chaos and weakened the liberal Chang administration was that the social democrat parties heavily relied on radical supporters, such as the student movement and the militant teacher’s unions.  The radical tendency’s unification-related claim was unrealistic because it contained the need for negotiation with the North in order to realise peaceful unification.  But this idea was a ridiculous solution as the North never discarded its traditional forceful unification (communisation) strategy.  The social democrat parties’ unification policies in the post-PP era were not much different from the radicals.

In the legacy of the Chang administration, beside the moderate socialists, there were two more main leftist groups: the radical labour movement, represented by the Teachers’ Labour Union; and the radical nationalistic student movement.  These two major forces pressed the progressive (revolutionary innovative) socialist parties to join their unrealistic unification campaigns (main claim is the need for including the North as a partner in negotiation for a peaceful unification).  While the moderate socialist parties confronted the national congressional election, they could hardly ignore the powerful supporters’ demand.  This background explains why the progressive socialist parties took a somewhat unrealistic unification platform and participated in the street demonstrations that were lead by the radical student activists and teacher’s unions.

The trade union movements revived after the Rhee regime collapsed.  NTU (National Teachers’ Unions) was the most powerful trade union during the Second Republic.  With respect to the issue that the liberal government illegalised NSTU due to its radical characteristic, NTU utilised that as an ideological struggle.  But it failed to attract people including their own union members.  Moreover, it brought reactions from the right-wingers.  The conservatives opposed the leftists’ radical propaganda that was aimed at rapid social change and national unification through accommodation with the North Korean Communists.​[315]​

Radical students: Student Unification League (SUL) was the symbolic organisation of the student activities during the Second Republic.  The students shared the views of the social democrats in terms of the unification project, but the Chang administration rejected it immediately.  The SUL organised anti-government street demonstrations in connection with the US-Korean economic agreement in February and the security legislation in March.  The social democrats joined the wave of resistance.  Along with such demonstrations and agitation from the Left, on 23rd March a right-wing organisation, “Preparatory Committee for the Mobilisation of Right-Wing Organisations against Pro-Communist Elements” emerged.  The member organisations were veterans’ groups, religious groups, associations of North Korean refugees, associations of the survivors of deceased police and military personnel, athletic groups, commercial groups and other socio-cultural groups.​[316]​  The tension between the Left and the Right soared and reflected the acute ideological division of South Korean society, in which what Huntington and Brzezinski argued is the main characteristic of a liberal democratic society became unworkable.  This main characteristic of a liberal democratic society is that in society, even unorthodox dissent is legal and tolerated and becomes illegal only when it constitutes a clear and present danger.

Consequently, the teacher’s union and the radical student activists, all of the players’ unrealistic unification issue and their orthodox nationalism sentiment based opposition on economic and security-related agreements with the U.S. were deficient in gaining the support of the people.  The unease which prevailed among the population during the latter days of the Chang administration was attributable to the extreme polarisation of ideological orientations between “A Sector”, the police, military and conservative politicians and “B Sector”, social democrats, student activists, intellectuals and the trade union leaders.  This situation provided a great opportunity for the military leaders to carry out their own military coup.  Han summarises the leftists, the teacher’s trade union and the students’ negative affect on the demise of the Second Republic as follows:

Having already lost much of its support from the moderate liberal sectors of the society, the Chang government found it difficult to defend itself from the secret and determined scheme in the armed forces to replace it with a government which would be able to bring about social order and restore government supremacy through destruction of the leftist tendencies.​[317]​

Factionalism, Disunity and Unrealistic Policies
There is a Korean proverb that says that the Left collapses due to division, whereas the Right’s demise comes from corruption.  The Korean social democrat tendency in the post-PP period (1959–61) is an example of this statement.  Without Cho Bongam, before the July election (national parliament election) the Socialist People’s Party (SPP) was established mainly through the regrouping of PP members, ex-members of the Workers Democratic faction and ex-members of the Democratic Federation faction.  In terms of the ideological aspect, the SPP was close to conventional socialism rather than social democracy and Seo Sangil, one of the stubborn revolutionary socialists, became the new party leader.

During the election, the SMP showed its shortcomings: lack of electoral experience and funds, and more importantly disunity and factionalism. ​[318]​  Factionalism proved to be a serious problem for the leftist parties during their period of growth after the July election.​[319]​  The marginalization of Cho Bongam and his leadership proved bigger than expected.  The party gained 5 percent of votes from the election. Later, the SSP were suppressed and the socialists scattered.  At that time the PP faction was also divided into two groups, the pro-Democratic Renovation (DR) faction and the anti-DR faction.  The rest of the members organised under a new faction under the leadership of Jang Gunsang (Gunmindang faction) amid distrust of the leadership of Yoon Giljung and Kim Dalho.  Below is the genealogy of the Socialist People’s Party​[320]​:

(1) The PP faction  Kim Dalgho  Remaining People’s Party
		Yoon Giljung faction  The United Socialist Party
		(Coalition with the Democratic Renovation Party)
(2) Non–PP faction  The DRP faction
		Jang Gunsang faction Renovation Party
		Choi Gunwoo faction  The Socialist Party

The coalition front divided into the Social People’s Party (under Lee Dongwhoi), the remaining faction of the Social People’s Party (Kim Dalho), The Progressive Party (RT: Jang Gunsang), The Socialist Party (Choi Gunwoo) and independent defectors.  It is a common phenomenon for factionalism to emerge at an infant level of socialist movements like the Korean socialists.  In particular, when leaders fail to provide an appropriate strategy and policies (based on an accurate theoretical explanation), factionalism mushroomed.  Under these conditions, each group or faction could hardly persuade one another.  The unification policy that was pursued by the socialists in the late 1950s is an example of this.  The scattered progressive socialist tendency regrouped as two parties: the Unification Socialist Party (U.S.P), which was organised by the moderate social democrats and the radical pro-North Korean Communists and the SP (Socialist Party).  The USP proposed the withdrawal of all foreign powers from the Korean Peninsula; the need for economic, cultural and political exchange between North and South Korea; and the achievement of national unification on the basis of the principle of permanent neutrality.​[321]​  Then, the party called for a South–North leaders’ conference as well as the resignation of Kim Ilsung, the leader of the North Korean Communist Party, the CWP.​[322]​  The USP’s unification policy has its validity (as the Austrian socialists proved) because neutralisation is one of the solutions to overcome the negative affect of the Cold War system in the Korean Peninsula.  But the suggestion was not only badly timed, but also very unrealistic.  The Cold War sentiment had already reached its peak in the Korean Peninsula and the divided nation was cemented.  Furthermore, due to the Korean War the tension between the South and the North soared and seemed unrecoverable within a short period of time.  Under these circumstances, as in the Austrian case, where the Cold War sentiment just initiated and yet rigidly embedded in the society, could not occur.  In addition, Kim Ilsung would not resign.  The pro-North Korean SP’s unification policy supported a national liberation strategy that was established and agitated by the North Korean Communists.  These leftists’ unification and economic polices sharply contrasted with those of the right-wingers and their policies that were rooted in anti-Communism.  Clashes between the Left and the Right overwhelmed the society until the military coup occurred.  The second disagreement between the social democrats and the Chang administration was the economic and technological agreement between the U.S. and South Korea.​[323]​

The above factors (disunity and factionalism) caused the socialist tendency to fail in gaining the support from students, urban middle class, and intellectuals and even the working and peasant classes. The social democrats gained seven seats (in total) in both the upper and lower houses.  One of the daily newspapers, Donga Ilbo depicts the split between the Progressive and non-Progressive factions as “each attempting to eliminate the hardcore members of the other factions, claiming that it was impossible to work with the rival faction within the same party”.​[324]​  This characteristic disunity continued among the defeated socialists.  After a severe defeat​[325]​ in the National Assembly election of July 1960, the major social democrat party, Social Mass Party (SMP) divided into two major paths.  One was split between the Progressive and anti-Progressive faction, the other was for the overall realignment of moderate socialists and radical groups.​[326]​  Such factionalism was not cured and it affected the deterioration of the progressive tendency. With this the social democrat tendency was completely excluded from politics after the 5/16 military coup and the leaders suppressed any leftist parties.





The Korean War brought a dramatic power reversal that took the once-weakened Right and made it a dominant force, whereas the political influence of the centrists (both the centre-leftists and the centre-right wingers) noticeably deteriorated.  However, with the Rhee regime confronted a serious political and economic ordeal as hyperinflation resulted in economic turmoil and mass resistance against the corrupt government, the social democrats had another window of opportunity to become a meaningful political force.

The social democrats established the social democrat party, the PP under the leadership of Cho Bongam.  Above all, Cho and his followers kept themselves from falling into the typical leftist trap of factionalism.  Moreover, Cho led the PP in successfully creating the coalition with the centre-right wingers against Rhee’s dictatorship.  The PP’s tenets on unification (the manifesto of a peaceful unification contrasted with Rhee’s forceful unification) and the peasant and urban poor social welfare policies captured the attention and the support of the people.  The PP chased the ruling party in several strategically significant regions, Kyungsang Province and the capital city, Seoul.  Consequently, the PP proved that a social democrat party could be a meaningful party even under the harsh structural barriers such as anti-socialist repression and the lack of materials.  In the long run, the PP and its experiment demonstrated that such obstacles — a lack of democracy​[327]​ and the low level of capitalism which means weak working-class support — were not simple barriers that the infant social democrats could overcome within a short period of time.  Regarding the nature of politics in the 1950s, Choi states that constitutional democracy and Caesarism​[328]​ were living in the same house, the First Republic.​[329]​  There was democracy (at least institutionally), but in reality Rhee (with the conservative party cartel party system) dominated politics.  Structurally there was a very little room left for opposition parties.

After the PP deteriorated in 1959, the successors of the PP tried to rebuild a social democrat party, but they were not so successful.  The social democrats fell apart due to serious factionalism and constant disposition towards disunity.  This condition was critical to the failure of electoral campaigns (in 1960).  Furthermore, the so-called, “progressive parties” in the late 1950s adopted unrealistic unification and economic polices and organised countless street demonstrations and agitated cynical perceptions of the liberal government.  Along with the radical student activists and teachers’ unions, the social democrats brought serious counter-attacks from the extreme right-wingers.  The society turned chaotic and the ambitious young military leaders like Park Junghee recognised that they could easily justify a coup in the name of patriotism.

The social democrats in the late 1950s failed to employ the April Revolution (it is characterised by the movements for pursuing liberal democracy) as an opportunity to resurrect the force of social democrats.  The social democrats in the late 1950s not only failed to become a major force, but they contributed to the backlash against democracy.







The thesis so far has demonstrated that the Left in Korea has always developed in conditions which have made it difficult for a gradualist, electorally based, social democratic party to develop.  The combination of authoritarian government and the Cold War (which allowed the regime to justify repression over socialism) and the failure to develop class compromise led to the Left adopting a revolutionary posture.  This in turn isolated the Left in political terms and rendered it incapable of challenging the regime.  The newly emerged military regime led to further repression of the Left.  The Communist Party was still illegal, whereas the social democrat parties were forced to become a government-sponsored party or pressed to evolve non-political campaigns, such as enlighten activity (they were not allowed to undertake political activity).  During the military dictatorship, along with the extinct Communist tendency, the moderate socialist tendency gradually vanished and the main factor for the termination of the socialist movements was repression and disadvantageous socio-political conditions.

However, as the military dictatorship collapsed and democracy revived in Korea in the 1980s, the destroyed socialist movements had an opportunity to be revived.  The revival of the Left occurred as the liberal dissident tendency became leftist in the wake of the democratisation wave.  Along with the military dictatorship, the democratisation movement in Korea proceeded for more than two decades and the power of the pro-democracy movement surpassed the military dictator in the last stage of the authoritarian rule (1972–9).​[330]​  And such massive growth conducted mainly by the student and labour movement centred on the minjung-undong (people’s movement). ​[331]​  Thus, democratisation in Korea can be identified as “democratisation by the movement” and importantly, the movement mainly led by “Undongkwon” (pro-democracy activist groups in the 1970s and ’80s). ​[332]​

The dissident liberal tendency, “undongkwon” (radical student activists as the key force) radicalised and the second generation of the socialist tendency emerged.  The following factors should be considered as the key causes of the radicalisation of “undongkwon” in the ’80s: (1) Increased anti-American sentiment after the Kwangju massacre and the U.S. pressure on the open market; (2) exacerbated socio-economic problems, such as social inequality and the negative role of the conglomerates; (3) the dissident tendency was mainly led by radical student activists; (4) the influence of the intellectuals who introduced and encouraged Marxism–Leninism to “undongkwon”.  Thus, the majority of “undongkwon” recognised that liberal democracy could not simply be an alternative to cure all sorts of contradictions that were embedded within Korean society.  Therefore, they turned to socialist revolution and Marxist–Leninist (and Juche Sasang) instead.  But as the retreated of the socialist force in the 1990s has proven, there was no space to practice such radical socialist campaigns, no room for the revolutionary socialist tendency within a liberal democratic system and no opportunity to obtain the support of the majority voters (mainly the working class and middle class) as the Korean economy remained dynamic and experienced growth. 

Therefore, such context (repression or lack of backing) can no longer be considered a central reason for the failure of the socialist movements in the late 1980s.  There were no critical obstacles for the implementation of moderate socialist politics amid the newly elected Rho Taewoo administration (1988–92), which respected some of the paramount principles of liberal democracy.  The changed political and economic circumstances (functioning democracy plus prosperous and dynamic capitalism) required the new Left to adopt legal parliamentary politics with reformist socialist ideology.  However, the new Left demonstrated revolutionary politics, whereas the centre-right seized power (the Democratic Party became a ruling party in 1998).  The revived leftist tendency quickly declined in the late 1980s (within 5 years) because they believed in an unrealistic revolutionary ideology with inappropriate underground vanguard party tactics.  This was reflected in both the historical development of the Left in Korea.  

The Military Regime and the Socialist Tendency

The Rise of the Military Dictatorship
This section covers the socio-economic and political background of the rise of the military dictatorship, a tyranny which suppressed all socialist forces including the socialist party and trade unions to prevent resistance to the military coup.  As a result, the Communist and social democrat forces were further repressed and devastated.  

Socio-Economic Conditions
As explained in the previous chapter, the conflict between the Left and the Right (in terms of ideological conflict) was aggravated by the teachers unions and the student-led street demonstrations and the barbarity of counterattacks from the right-wingers that overwhelmed society.  Consequently, the social unrest and political chaos brought: (1) a dramatic decline of the authority of the liberal government; (2) increased social demands for the stabilisation of society and politics as well as a demand for charismatic leadership; (3) and finally, a politically motivated military coup in the name of patriotism.  There are several examples of the high degree of social demand for stabilisation on the eve of the military coup.  The statement below shows how even one of the leading pro-democracy magazines, Sasanggae (“World of Thought”) whose editor-in-chief was Junha Chang (a leading academic of the pro-democracy intelligentsia), clearly embraced the military coup: 

Fundamentally, the Democratic Party is no different from the LP (the ruling party under the Rhee administration).  The DP has been wasting time with factional struggles and grasping for a concession.  As a result, extravagance, corruption, defeatism mushroomed and the Communists in the North tried to take advantage of this situation.  While the April Revolution was a democratic revolution, the 5/16 Coup is a nationalistic military coup which aimed to deflect the Communist threat and overcome incompetency and social disorder (Author’s translation).​[333]​

Ironically, two years after the coup, the student associations at Seoul National University and Korea University (leading universities of the student movement in the 1960s) announced that “both the April Revolution and the 16th May military revolution are similar in terms of their foundational ideology as nationalism with the ultimate goal of the construction of a modern nation.”​[334]​  Society was frustrated by the social disorder and chaotic political situation under the Chang administration.

In fact, the Chang administration (which only lasted eight months) did not have enough time to repair the damage left in the outcome of the failure of its predecessor, the Rhee administration’s self-reliant economic plan.  In 1958 the Rhee administration brought the economy back to a similar level of growth to that in 1949 (4.9 percent), but the ratio was not sufficient to escape the vicious cycle of poverty (in which even the growth that was previously experienced could not be sustained).  While the Chang administration paid attention to political reform, the liberal government largely neglected socio–-economic issues (peasant debt, poverty and an unstable macroeconomic system).  The liberal government failed to carry out a special economic policy that could eliminate the genuine trap of “low growth/intensifying poverty”.  There was no reform of the public education system​[335]​ nor was there any special government financial aid for the poor (i.e., forgiving peasant debt; the PP adopted this policy and gained fervent support from the peasants and urban poor) under the Chang regime.  All of these issues frustrated the people and made them suspicious of the capability of the liberal government.​[336]​

Political Conditions and the U.S. Effect
One of the key reasons for the success of the military coup was that there were no meaningful political forces or organisations with sufficient strength to thwart the military.  The authority of the liberal Chang administration deteriorated noticeably, whereas the social democrats were losing popularity among the people due mainly to constant street demonstrations that caused social unrest.  While the only remaining dissident power, the student movement, was hesitating (later some of the students even endorsed the coup), the only prevailing power that could possibly restrain the military junta’s inappropriate political ambition at that time was the U.S. (see the last chapter for details of political conditions on the eve of the 5/16 military coup in 1961).

At the height of the Cold War, in order to gain the support of the U.S., any ruling political force needed to demonstrate a strong ‘anti-Communist’ sentiment.  The primary concern of the U.S. on the Korean Peninsula, however, was neither ‘regime change’ nor democratisation.  The U.S. was only interested in sustaining the status quo (the divided nation) on the Korean Peninsula as it related to its response to the Communists in China and North Korea and the fluctuating political situation in the South.​[337]​  With these favourable conditions, Park, with his military junta, completed his coup without bloodshed​[338]​ and promulgated the following six public pledges: (1) a state policy of anti-Communism; (2) respect for the UN resolution; (3) enhance Korea’s relationship with its allies; (4) make a clean sweep of the old evil and re-establish the nation’s pride; (5) improve their ability to compete with the Communists for future unification; and lastly, (6) transfer power to conscientious politicians.  In sum, the leaders of the 5/16 military coup demonstrated their resilient anti-Communism and enthusiasm for the role of the U.S. on the Korean Peninsula.  The U.S. was unlikely to reject the rise of this military power.

Park’s Achilles Heel
In the early stage of the coup, the U.S. opposed it because such an unconstitutional action could jeopardise the stability of the status quo in the Far East.  Furthermore, as far as the U.S. was concerned, Park was a former Communist (Park was a member of the underground Communist Party, Namro–Dang, or South Korean Labour Party) and a main leader of the military cell.  Park was a member of the 17th Battalion of the South Korean Army in Yeosu-Suncheon region in October 1948.​[339]​  After the rebellion was stopped, Park was arrested and sentenced to capital punishment.  Park subsequently recanted and handed over significant internal information about the South Korean Communist Party including a list of key leaders.  Park was amnestied and returned to the army later.  Given this background, the U.S. hesitated to endorse Park’s coup in the early stages even though Park clearly demonstrated his eagerness to support anti-Communism.  But for the U.S., there was not much opportunity left to oppose the coup as Park seized power and the coup likely to succeed without bloodshed.  A year after the coup the Kennedy administration invited Park to Washington, and Park’s military coup and military government obtained U.S. recognition.

The Park Regime’s Policies toward the Left
The Park government lacked legitimacy in the early stage of its rule (1961–70); therefore, it would not have survived without recourse to the national security law, martial law and garrison law and other tools like the KCIA, police and military intelligence agents (See Appendix 1).  The Park regime tended to rule through the use of exceptional means (martial law declared three times lasting thirty-one months, garrison act decreed three times lasting five months and declaring states of emergency nine times lasting sixty-nine months).  As mentioned earlier, democracy is one of the main preconditions for the development of social democracy.  With respect to this statement, social democrats under Park’s dictatorship did not have much space in politics.

Indeed, the military dictators’ repression of the socialist tendency in Korea was similar to the Latin American military in the 1960s and was infused with a highly developed anti-Communist ideology that served as an effective means of suppressing dissent.  The military dictatorships in South America sought to repress civil society by severely restricting liberties and abusing basic human rights.  The military regime in Korea was similar to the authoritarian regimes in Latin America in that the regime mobilised anti-leftist campaigns, suppressed civil society, discouraged public participation in politics and established a very powerful state.  Contrary to the dictatorships of Korea and South America, the Communist parties in Eastern and Central Europe sought public participation in the political process.​[340]​  Because of this condition and because the citizens were well trained politically, the process of regime transition occurred in a relatively easy way (so called, “orange revolution”) in the Eastern Block, while in South America and Korea democratisation happened “abruptly or convulsively”.​[341]​

The Park regime’s repressive policies toward the Left were aimed at the leadership (socialist party leaders) and the major supporters (trade unions) of the socialist movements.  The leaders were unable to organise any activities in a legal arena and at the same time they could not expect backing by the trade unions because the military government suppressed the grassroots of the working-class movements.  Under the Park regime, real means for a socialist party (not pseudo-socialist party) could therefore only exist as an underground vanguard party.​[342]​  The socialist movements were either forced to go underground (Communist tendency) or existed within pseudo-social democrat parties: The People’s Party, Social Party, or The Unification Social Party.  All of them were fake parties.​[343]​

The Communists
It is argued that because of the decisions made by leaders on the Left, there was no way for “normal” leftist politics to develop. The Left responded to a harsh environment by looking to North Korea and a revolutionary solution.  The isolation caused by this revolutionary strategy meant that the Left failed to develop wider legitimacy.  To address the communist force, the military government, with the support of the U.S., adopted further cruel policies as the communist threat reached its highest level in Asia (primarily based upon the rapid communisation in South-East Asia).  With the National Security Law, the military dictatorship outlawed the establishment of a Communist Party and any communist activity.

The communists developed two underground parties, Inminhyukmeong-Dang (People’s Revolutionary Party: PRP) and Tongilhyukmeong-Dang (The Unification Revolutionary Party: URP) during the military dictatorship.  Most of the underground activities were connected with the North Korean Communist Party’s anti-South campaigns (including guerrilla war) and the parties were essentially under the direct leadership of the Communists in the North.  In terms of party ideology, the underground party promulgated “Kimilsungism” (Kim Ilsung is the founder of the North Korean Communist state) as an official party ideology.  For the tenth anniversary of the URP, the vice chairman of the central committee, Kim Kwangchun, states on his pamphlet​[344]​ that “the great ideology of Kimilsungism is the party’s only ideology that can teach U.S. a perfect theory of revolution and leadership; therefore, our party is an undefeatable party (Author’s translation).” 

Actually, the main reason why the underground revolutionary parties in the South agreed to the direct leadership of the North Korean Communist Party was due to two tactics, “Minju Gijioron” (the Doctrine of Democratic Base)​[345]​ and “Tongiljunsunjunsul” (The United Front Tactic).  To realise communisation of the South, the Communists in the North thought that as long the Communist tendency in the South is enhanced through the completion of communisation, another communisation in the South can be effectively assisted by the Communist tendency in the North.  Moreover, due to this Minjugijiron tactic a Communist Party (or socialist party) in the South does not necessarily have to become a powerful party that is independent from the North (the North Korean Communist Party could be the only party in the Korean Peninsula).​[346]​  Therefore, the construction and activity of the socialist party does not have to be legally recognised under the context of Tongiljunsunjunsul.  This tradition was endorsed by the pro-North Korean Communist (nationalistic) socialists in the post-democratic period and that is why nationalistic socialists were pessimistic about constructing an independent working-class party (sometimes, the nationalistic socialists maintain a very generous demeanour towards the centrist party in the name of “unity” (against the conservative force), which is in other words “Tongiljunsunjunsul”.

Meanwhile, the main activities (see below on the Communist activities in the South in the 1960s and ’70s) of the two Communist parties were directly connected with the North Korean Communists’ espionage lines and armed guerrilla campaigns.  In particular, during the height of the Vietnam War the North Korean Communists increased espionage activities and guerrilla campaigns which targeted the Park regime to reduce the number of South Korean troops in Southern Vietnam in the name of international Communist brotherhood.

Major Operations to Reconstruct the URP (from the Superintendence of North Korea by the Institute for the Study of North Korea)
A. 29th September 1969, Kyungnam Region Underground Party: 12 North Korean spies: Tried to rebuild the URP in the south-eastern region (Kyungnam); opposed the amendment of constitution and spread false rumours
B. 8th October 1969, Chunbuk region Underground Party: 10 North Korean spies * Organise underground organisation and agitate anti-government upheaval
C. 16th October 1969, the incident of reconstruction of the URP: 19 North Korean armed spies including HanYoungsik; connotation of student officials at Seoul National University, Korea University; opposition to the amendment of constitution and reconstruction of the URP
D. 12th October 1971, the incident of Honam (Southwest region) URP re–construction: 11 South Korean communists with the North Korean spy, Yoo Rakjin; construct Honam region party branch; establish cell in mine and other industrial factories upon the direct order from the North Korean Communist Party
E. 12th October 1971, the incident of reconstruction of three cell of the URP: 10 North Korean spies and the South Korean Communist, Yoo Jongin; establish cell in Yeonse University and assassination of a pivot man
F. 11th April 1972, the spy incident and the underground URP: Yoo Wieha and 32 Communists; expansion of the underground organisation, tried to reconstruct the URP and crossing over into the connotation people

However, for several reasons such campaigns were not successful.  First, as the guerrilla campaigns in the 1950s firmly proved, such armed resistance is definitely not a proper tactic in the South where there are long cold winters and no appropriate sanctuary for guerrillas like the jungle in Vietnam.​[347]​  Second, the geographical environment in the South was disadvantageous for armed resistance and was not the only external option for the Korean communists.  The more paramount external handicap for the communists was that they were not supported by the people (the peasants and workers).  Because the communists had no connection with the people, there were no sanctuaries for the communists.  Given this background, the underground communist organisations were easily exposed and suppressed by the South Korean intelligence forces, such as the KCIA (Korean Central Intelligence Agency) or military and police anti-communist agencies.  

The Social Democrats
After the collapse of the PP in 1959, the moderate socialists were divided into several parties and this condition created a inappropriate response from the socialist democrats on the eve of democratisation in 1960 (the April Revolution brought democracy).  After the April Revolution, the liberal Chang administration created advantageous conditions for the moderate socialist movement as the government respected constitutional democracy and allowed socialist activity.  But this spring quickly turned into winter as the military coup cracked down on the liberal government and prohibited any socialist activity.  Later, in order to deter the surviving socialist tendencies effectively, the military regime adopted two tactics.  First, the military regime completely demolished the defiant revolutionary or radical socialist groups.  Under the “Jungchijungwhabub” (The Law of Purification of Politics), record numbers of moderate socialist leaders were forcefully retried, whereas other social democrat movement leaders were forced to join the government-controlled pseudo-social democrat party.  For the leftist movements, things were getting worse as the military government turned to an absolute authoritarian regime after the “Yushin Referendum” occurred in 1972.  The military regime suppressed the parliament and increased their repression of the very few remaining socialists by sending them to jail or pressing them to convert from socialists to liberals.  [출처] [펌] 한국 혁신정당의 통일정책 (​http:​/​​/​blog.naver.com​/​016705473_​/​20012889402" \t "_blank​)|작성자 아멜리에 (​http:​/​​/​blog.naver.com​/​016705473_" \t "_blank​)

Second, the military government allowed for the formation of a pseudo-social democrat party targeting the traitors among the moderate socialist groups.  Unlike the Communist Party, the military government did not make the social democrat party illegal because the military authority intended to use this party to display their respect for the principles of liberal democracy out of concern for how they would be perceived by the West and particularly the U.S.  During the Park administration, two pseudo-social democrat parties, Daejung-Dang (People’s Party) and Tongilsawhoi-Dang (Unification Social Party: TSP), were set up with the backing of the Park regime.  The Park regime employed the pseudo-social democrat parties for political propaganda into which the regime respects a multi-party system which is one of the main components of liberal democracy.​[348]​

In the first year after the military coup, the military regime suppressed the prevailing social democrat parties, such as Sawhoi Daejung-Dang (Social People’s Party) and Tongil Sawhoi-Dang (Unified Socialist Party) using the Decree of article 6, promulgated by the Committee of National Security established by the Park interim military government.  Later, the Park government legalised (with an extremely limited rights and autonomy) a moderate socialist tendency in consideration for increased political pressure from the West (the U.S.).  This gesture, however, was a fake action as the Park government only allowed a pseudo-socialist party.  

Sawhoi Daejung-Dang (The Social Mass Party: SMP)
The SMP was established on November 1959 under the leadership of Yoon Giljung (earlier a leader of the PP).  The SMP emerged as a major moderate socialist party, but the party was not very powerful as the party gained four seats in the lower house and one seat in the upper house in the July national congressional election in 1960.  After the election, the SMP was reconstructed by the leadership of Kim Dalho (once the key leader of the PP in the 1950s) and his fellow social democrats (mostly the surviving PP members).  

The SMP was similar to the social democrat parties in Western Europe as the party aimed to adopt welfare state politics and clearly represented the interests of the peasant, working, intelligentsia as well as small- and medium-size entrepreneurs.  In its declaration, the SMP claimed that “(the party) intends to fight the opportunistic conservatives who aim to deter the completion of the April Revolution” and “emphasised the realisation of democratic revolution, peaceful unification and a welfare state (Author’s translation)”.​[349]​  Importantly, the party was not so successful in expanding its political influence to the grassroots organisations, such as the trade unions and the peasant unions.  Critically, the moderate socialist parties failed to escape their genuine handicap that the party was an intelligentsia-centred party.  The party stood without a support-base.  

Tongil Sawhoi-Dang (The Unified Socialist Party)
After the SMP failed in the July congressional election in 1960 and was not successful in recovering the leadership among the entire leftist tendency, the party was divided into several small parties, for instance, Han kook Sawhoi-Dang (Korea’s Socialist Party: KSP), Hyuksin Yeonmang (The Progressive Federation: PF), Han kook Dokrip-Dang (Korea’s Independent Party) and so on.  In November 1960 under the leadership of the former leaders of the PP, Yoon Giljung, Kim Sungju (the KSP), Jung Sanggu (The FR) and Go Junghun (Sawhoi Hyuksin–Dang), Unified Socialist Party (U.S.P) was re-established.

The USP claimed the party was a people’s party (rather than class party) and announced that the party’s goal was to build a unified, autonomous and democratic welfare state.  The ultimate goal and detailed concepts of the platforms are very similar to that of the previous SMP’s.  According to Jung Youngtae (1992), the USP leaders (like Kim Cheol) intended to develop the party like the Labour Party in the U.K.  Thus, one of the key leaders of the party, Kim Cheol personally tried to gain an observer’s capacity in the Socialist International in the early 1960s.​[350]​ 

But the USP was forcefully suppressed by the Decree of article 6 that was promulgated by the military junta, Park and his military interim government (officially known as “The Committee of National Security”) in 1962.  Indeed, the military junta suppressed all existing parties and temporarily prohibited any political activities at that time.  The USP was rebuilt by Kim Cheol in 1965, but the party failed to obtain seats in the national congress in 1967and was automatically suppressed (according to the national congressional law, a certain party must be suppressed unless it gains at least a seat in the congress).  However, the USP was continuously suppressed by the Park government and the party’s key figure, Kim Cheol was arrested and put in gaol because he violated (according to the prosecutor) “The Law of Anti-Communism”.  In the court, Kim claimed that “the North Korean Communist government must be recognised as an official and legitimate government by the authority of the South in order to escalate a peaceful unification”, but the response from the court was seven years in prison.​[351]​

In addition, the military regime did not miss a chance to suppress the supporters of socialism, trade union movements.  The following section covers some anti-labour and anti-trade union policies that were adopted by the military regime.

Anti-Labour Policies
The military regime employed ideological and legal means in practicing anti-labour policies.  The Park government’s anti-labour policies served to reduce mobilisation of the working class during industrialisation in the name of state corporatism​[352]​.  The state corporatism was forcefully unveiled to the working class in clause 6 of the Trade Union Law (noted below).  The “Committee for Corporation between Capitalist and Labour (hereafter, CCCL)” replaced the previous collective bargaining channels between trade unions and management.  It is clear that the ideology of ‘state corporatism’ and related regulations were aimed at disarming trade union power. 

Trade Union Law (clause 6):
-	Capital and trade union must establish a “joint capital-labour conference” in order for improve productivity
-	Within the agreement of collective bargaining, “joint capital-labour conference” deals with the following: production, education, training, working conditions, complaints and a way to prevent capital-labour conflict

Quoting Schmitter’s norm, state corporatism is when industrial labour and labour organisations such as trade unions are forced to cooperate with the state for industrialisation,​[353]​ Choi states that the Park regime mobilised state corporatism rooted in a “dictatorial development” ideology and anti-labour policies that succeeded in immobilising labour politically and at the same time mobilising them economically in which the workforce had to accept miserable working conditions including low wages.​[354]​  The Park regime mobilised the working class economically, but completely demobilised them politically.  The military regime intended to remove a political characteristic within the trade unions by activating (pro-government) unions.  By promulgating several anti-labour and anti-trade union laws, the military government placed the trade unions on the vertical line of the state system.​[355]​  In addition, through utilising (pro-governent) unions (in many cases, the KCIA founded yellow unions), the military regime successfully controlled (like a direct top-down management system) the trade unions.​[356]​  

Anti-Trade Union law
Along with the trade union law, which was used to restrict and limit very basic rights of trade unions (such as collective action), the National Security Law was promulgated on 6th December 1972.  According to the law, the president not only has the Right to mobilise natural and human resources in the state through deliberation of a minister’s committee (the 5th clause), but also can limit basic rights of citizens including economic rights in order to protect the national interest (see regulations of the labour department below).  The president can restrict the rights of citizen’s freedom of living, moving (clause 6); freedom of demonstration and congregation (clause 7); freedom of publishing and media (clause 8); and basic rights of labour (clause 9).  According to clause 9:1, the workers’ collective bargaining and actions must be coordinated by the competent authorities and labour must obey the offices’ arbitrary decisions.  Clause 9:2 indicates that the president can restrict the workers’ collective bargaining and action in special fields, such as local and central government institutions, state-owned or invested enterprises, public projects and industries that are strategically important for the state’s economy.  The President has the Right to adjust workers’ wages, commodity prices, rental fee (clause 4) and government budget (clause 10).  Any violation would gain a minimum of one year and up to seven years’ imprisonment with hard labour.​[357]​

Labour Department Regulation
– Initiation of collective bargaining: Capital and labour must submit written application for mediation of collective bargaining to the competent authority
– Mediate organisation (the competent authority): Governor of province, major of city and minister of labour department
– Arbitration: Within 30 days after submit application
– Efficacy of arbitration: After mediation, retrial or administrative litigation are prohibited
– Collective action: until end of mediation on collective bargaining, collective action must prohibited

As shown in the above regulations, initiation of mediation was forceful and at the same time the efficacy of the mediation was also forceful; so, the mediation processes under the law was unlikely the true meaning of mediation.  Moreover, collective action of the trade unions was essentially impossible as long as the law regulates that collective action must hold until the forceful mediation reached an end.  The National Security Law not only ended the history of trade unions, but initiated “the age of no constitution”.


The Suppressed Federation of Korea’s Trade Unions (FKTU)
State interference in trade unions has a long history in Korea.  After the Korean War, the Rhee administration was sustained the largest trade union, “The Korean Federation of Trade Unions” (Hankooknochong).  The Rhee government also forced the trade union’s organisational pattern to be comprised of a mosaic of small-enterprise unions.  No wonder that this organisational character prevented horizontal solidarity among workers.  Under the Park military regime, the trade unions faced a similar fate.  The FKTU, the largest trade union in the 1960s was yellowised (forced the union to be a pro-government organisation) as their political character was removed by constant interruptions by the KCIA and several anti-union regulations.  Actually, the FKTU (unlike its appearance) was not an industrial (vertical) union; rather, it was an individual enterprise based and horizontally organised union.  Due to this horizontal type of union Korean workers could hardly maintain unity (collective bargaining or collective action were impossible) in political and economic issues.  According to the organisational construction and internal norms, each local or regional branch of the union’s membership consisted of an independent factory’s union members.  Thus, when a labour contract with a specific factory expires, the Right of membership of the FKTU branch automatically becomes invalid unless the contract is expanded.  The FKTU was barely involved in collective bargaining because industry-based collective bargaining was wholly lacking with the exception of railroad, cigarette, electricity (mostly state-owned companies), textile and mine industries.  Furthermore, as Choi (1998) aptly mentions, the yellow trade union, the FKTU, was often mobilised by the military government for political purposes.  The FKTU actively organised political rallies for justifying the Yushin system and was directly employed to lead a campaign for active participation in voting for amendments to the constitution (Yushin Constitution).​[358]​

The End of the First Generation of the Socialist Force
As I pointed out in the previous section, the military regime further suppressed the Left by claiming that the leftist tendency threatened national security and violated the “anti-Communist law” and the “law of assembly and demonstration”.  The Communist Party was made illegal.  Several underground Communist parties (like Inhyuk-Dang and Nammin Jeon) were suppressed.  Many the leftists (mostly social democrats) were arrested and put in jail (see below data):

The Court Verdicts of the public security offenders
Yoon Giljung (former PP leader), 15 years; Cho Dongsu and Cho Bakgun (revolutionary socialists) died; Song Jiyoung and Ahn Singyu, death (later life prison); the students from Mintonghakyeon (The Student Association for Democracy and Unification), 6–15 years; Tongminchung and Minminchung members, 5–7 years.​[359]​

The leaders of the social democrats were released later, but the aged leaders could no longer carry out political activities.  Social democrats disappeared in a biological sense (died or retired) and the remaining young social democrats existed as members of small clubs (but very few in numbers).  The first generation of the socialist tendency (1940s–’70s) in Korea had ended.

Social democrat parties were unable to act as normal political parties.  The dictator only allowed social democrat parties to exist for a propagandistic purpose and were barely allowed to practice the regular activities of opposition parties.  The military dictator pressed them to concentrate on educating the masses (to reduce the rate of illiteracy) or on the modernisation of culture.  Furthermore, the social democrats were often pressed by the government to educate the people about anti-Communism (ideologically and ethically) and the Saemaulundong (New Village Movement), which directly contradicted the goals of these social democrat parties.​[360]​  Under these conditions, the socialist spirit (pursuit of social equality) and goals (building a democratic socialist state) could only exist in the social democrat party’s platform and not in the real political field.

Repression as One Critical Factor among Others
So far we have mentioned that the socialist tendency faced disadvantageous conditions during the military dictatorship, so they could hardly campaign for socialist politics.  But this does not necessarily mean we should ignore the negative effects of the poor leadership among the Communists and the social democrat tendency.  We argue that poor leadership also caused the serious decline of socialism.  

Regarding the Communists, because of the decisions that were made by the leaders of the Communist tendency, there was no way for “normal” left politics to develop.  The Communist tendency responded to a harsh environment by looking to North Korea and a revolutionary solution.  The isolation of this revolutionary strategy meant that the Communist tendency failed to develop wider legitimacy.

During the liberal Chang administration, the radical student and militant teachers’ unions together concentrated on organising a series of street demonstrations along with an idealistic policy of stating a peaceful negotiation with the North for unification.  As these forces were a powerful supporter, the moderate socialist parties had to accept their agenda and joined them.  Because of this condition, the social democrat parties focused on unification campaigns.​[361]​

The SMP underscored the need for establishing a super-party organisation for managing the unification issue and offered a gradual way for unification in which the divided nations would move from partially unification by the arbitration of the UN to complete unification.  The USP unveiled more detailed and extensive unification policies as the party offered a very pragmatic (but urgent) solution: (1) exchange of letters between the separated families; (2) exchange of research and study by the scholars of the North and the South.  Interestingly, the leaders of the USP learned a useful lesson from the case of Austria (as mentioned earlier, Austria avoided the divided nation by offering a neutral state plan to the Allies after the Second World War) and offered the future unified Korea as a permanent neutral state (under the recognition of the four powerful states which surrounded the Korean Peninsula: China, Russia, Japan and the U.S.).  The main differences between the SMP and the USP in unification are that the former party states the role of the UN, whereas the latter party emphasises a mutual corporation (between the North and the South).  The USP particularly states a gradual unification process in the pragmatic view in an autonomous way (less state is placed on the role of the UN).  The USP connected with “Jaeya” (the non partisan dissident tendency during the military dictatorship) and offered autonomous and peaceful unification movements in the 1970s.  

However, there were several more priority issues that the social democrat party had to manage, for instance, economic turmoil and starvation.  First of all, as long as the military Park regime operated within anti-democratic politics (later it adopted a fascist system after 1972) and at the same time the North Korean Communists reinforced totalitarian (Stalinist strategy) anti-capitalist, anti-liberal politics, a peaceful negotiation between the North and the South was unrealistic.  Second, in the South as a result of the Rhee administration’s failure in its autonomous economic development strategy (it caused hyperinflation and an economic backlash); the daily life of the people was challenged.  Essentially, for the people, the priority issue at that time was “bread” rather than an ideal and unrealistic unification.  Lastly, the people were frustrated with social unrest (which was mainly caused by the radical liberal tendency and the progressive tendency), so such street demonstrations with a unification slogan negatively affected how the socialists were perceived by the majority of people.​[362]​  


The Collapse of the Park Regime and the Rise of the Liberal Dissident Force

This section covers two related incidents: (1) the collapse of the military dictatorship (democratisation) and the rise of the liberal dissident tendency; and (2) the emergence of the powerful radical liberal tendency and the revival of the Left.

The Difficulties of the Military Dictatorship
In Schumpeter’s definition, democracy occurs when “occupancy of the leading political positions is determined through a competitive struggle for gaining people’s votes” with the following elements (for fair competition): freedom of speech and organisation, fair and competitive elections.  However, as Carlson and Turner aptly point out, “the qualifications of free, fair and honest do not fully apply to the electoral process in such regimes (although the regime appears to be a democratic regime) and elements of these criteria are violated in a systematic manner.”​[363]​  Carson and Turner offered two different styles of regimes, “competitive authoritarian regime” and “hegemonic electoral authoritarian regime” in order to cover such dual aspects (democratic, but authoritarian).  The former regime has elections but also features “significant parliamentary opposition”, whereas hegemonic electoral authoritarian regime existed under the condition that “the ruling or dominant party wins almost all the seats”.​[364]​  The Park regime before Yushin system (1961–72) was a case in point of what Carlson and Turner define as a “competitive authoritarian regime”, even though the military government often violated democratic principles.​[365]​

Actually, as Shon (2006) states, there was a reasonable explanation for why the military regime practiced competitive authoritarian regime (not absolute authoritarian regime).  With ongoing successful industrialisation, as shown in the table below​[366]​, the Park military regime gained the support of the people and put confidence in its dictatorship:

Table 2: Proportion of Parliament: 1963–72





In the 1970s, however, the Park regime discarded somewhat lenient authoritarian politics and hurriedly carried out its fascist constitution (abolishion of presidential elections and suppression of parliament) after a shocking electoral result.  In the election, the liberal candidate, Kim Daejung, who was a guru of the democratisation movements, gained 35 percent of the votes, while the incumbent candidate, Junghee Park only earned 37 percent of the votes.  After the election, the military dictator, Park, recognised that his regime was no longer sustainable under the electoral presidential system.  The Park military regime forsook cooperation and opted for authoritarianism rather than accepting an overhaul of politics because the Park regime’s belief in its capability to control the dissident tendency was exaggerated.  The military ruler was convinced that his regime had enough intelligence and coercive power to suppress the demands (democracy and social equality) of the masses.​[367]​  In other words, the military dictatorship had confidence in the “institutionalisation of hegemonic authority in the state”.​[368]​

The continued economic growth (in the labour-intensive manufacturing sector) in the 1960s and ’70s absorbed a large number of the industrial reserves (unemployed and semi-employed surplus labourers).  In the 1963 presidential election, Park barely defeated the opposition candidate by 160, 000 votes, but in the 1967 presidential election, Park won by more than a million votes (51.4 percent) due primarily to the support of the urban popular sector.  From the late 1970s to the early ’80s, the military government faced an unprecedented economic crisis.  Big companies (in heavy and chemical industries) that led the fast-growing economy were about to collapse amid the economic depression in which there were negative growth (for the first time since the inception of industrialisation in 1962), severe inflation (parallel with the third oil crisis) and the aggravation of the trade deficit.​[369]​  This economic turmoil ultimately ignited the expansion of the grassroots struggles against the military rule.

Like the authoritarian regimes in Africa and the Middle East in the post-war era, the success of the institutionalisation of authoritarianism was expected.  Unlike the expectation, the military regime failed to institutionalise authoritarianism due mainly to a constant and very powerful dissident anti-dictatorship/pro-democracy movement.  Borrowing Im’s language, the ruling power bloc and the popular masses failed to reach a compromise solution with respect to anti-developmental strategy and the requests for the overhaul of political-economic systems.​[370]​

The “developmental dictatorship” created tension between the capitalist classes and the working classes and the ruling power block and the dissident tendency.  The policy of “economic growth first, distribution later” (which once gained the tacit approval of the masses​[371]​) became a broken promise as both social inequality and resistance from labour, the primary opponent of the military, increased during this time.  Park Noja says of the living conditions of the lower classes that: (1) lower rice price policy (aimed at sustaining low income status among the urban working class) squeezed the peasant and urban poor class; (2) amid the series of oil crisis in the 1970s, the price of goods increased by 12–54 percent (hyperinflation occurred) and it damaged the lower classes’ daily life.​[372]​  The Park regime faced the reality that unlimited supply of labour was ending and the suppression of labour required to maintain exports came into conflict with the political framework of restricted democracy.

Due to the challenges that the Left faced from the military dictatorship, it was very difficult for the Left to develop a policy of class compromise when the ruling class refused to compromise.  When faced with repression, the social democrats failed to develop an appropriate strategy.  As Jung illustrates below, this is a result of the social democrats lacking key leaders:

From 1961 to 1980, because of “the Law of Purification of Politics”, major leaders of social democrats could not practice politics.  The other leaders died or retired, whereas the rest of the social democrats were in an enervated condition (Author’s translation).​[373]​

Economic Turmoil and International Pressure
The resistance against the fascist Park regime was continuously reinforced along with other ordeals, namely economic turmoil and pressure from the international community.  International pressure hit the military regime economically as the industrialised countries (the U.S.) requested liberalised (more open) markets​[374]​ and politically (no more authoritarianism).  While the Korean political elites including the military juntas were dependent on external circumstances, great powers in the international political systems (U.S. for South Korea and the Soviet Union for North Korea) had a significant influence on political realignment.​[375]​  The author of the book Useful Adversary states the pivotal role of domestic conditions in international relations.  According to the book, the new relationship between China and the U.S. in the 1970s (under the Nixon administration in the U.S.) is a perfect example.​[376]​  It is well known that in the late 1970s, there was a tension between the Jimmy Carter administration and the Park government because of the following circumstances​[377]​: (1) The U.S. wanted to withdraw troops from the South (to reduce the budget burden which was aggravated After the Vietnam War); (2) the South Korean economy emerged as one of the leading economies, which increased a certain degree of concern among the leaders of the U.S. because they feared that they would see another Japan from the Far East; (3) therefore, the U.S. government pressed the South Korean government to open the markets further and initiated protectionist policies against the Korean goods using so-called super article 301; (4) due to the first and second reasons the Park administration felt vulnerable on national security and tried to develop nuclear weapons regardless of the US authorites’s condemnation and warnings.  

The Rise of the Dissident tendency 
So far, we pointed out the relationship between variables like the political, economic and international backgrounds and the termination of the authoritarian system.  However, those structural factors, for instance the economic crisis,​[378]​ alone are not wholly responsible for the regime change.  The Korean style of democratisation contains unique characteristics because it occurred in a massive ascendant mode (people’s consistent pro-democracy movement)​[379]​ and was mainly carried out by the active student movement (from 1985 labour movements emerged as another powerful force of the democratisation movement).​[380]​  For the former character, Kim Samsu (2003) explains that ”in general, a certain political event (motif), for instance a ruler’s poor leadership, provides an action of the first political dissident tendency, then, the first force’s action gains a wide range of sympathy among other scattered movement organisations.”  But in Korea the democratisation movement was not ignited by a separate accidental event and its counter-response as an explosion of resistance.  Again, the collapse of the Park regime cannot be adequately understood without recognising the more than two decades of the dissident tendency’s pro-democracy movement.  The crisis of the Chun regime in the 1980s is a case in point.  Under the Chun government, the economic condition was better than its predecessor’s in the late 1970s, but the new military junta, Chun and his colleagues eventually failed to sustain military dictatorship.  Above all, the foundation for the authoritarian system was weaker than expected.  For instance, the working and middle classes were no longer enthusiastic about the military government’s dictatorial development despite the fact that they enjoyed benefits from it.  The powerful challenges from the dissident tendency, undongkwon, properly represented the social demands of democratic, social and economic justice which the middle and working classes desperately desired.  Under these conditions, the Chun government could not survive on such heavy-handed measures of repression alone. ​[381]​  The collapse of the Fifth Republic (the Chun military regime) began in 1985 two years after its leaders attempted to boost its legitimacy through a series of liberalisation measures, including the lifting of the ban on political activities by purged politicians.​[382]​  As Im points out, regime change is “not structurally determined, but contingent upon the outcome of class conflict.” ​[383]​  And, in Korea, class conflict emerged from the power struggle between the ruling block and the pro-democracy movement as a whole (People’s Movement and the Leadership of Undongkwon).  

The People’s Movements (Participation of the Working and Middle Class)
In the case of the development of socialism in the main (Western Europe), as a result of industrialisation (capitalism), the working class emerged then became a main supporter for the socialist movements (socialist party as working–class party).  This traditional path for the development of socialism in the main did not occur in Korea.  In other words, industrialisation and the emergence of the working class in Korea in the 1970s did not necessary mean the socialist tendency has a powerful supporter.  Above all, the Korean socialist movements barely supported the powerful working class movements because of a lack of industrialisation.  This peculiar condition did not change even after the state-led rapid industrialisation greatly increased the size of the working class during the military dictatorship as the military regime suppressed or yellowised the trade unions.  Furthermore, the critical point is that the once destroyed socialist tendency revived and gained strength amid the dissident liberal tendency contributions to the end of military rule and became a radical leftist group.  

The military regime adopted another strategically paramount policy, “economic modernisation” which was employed to rationalise the authoritarian regime.  The industrialisation project was quite successful and due to this accomplishment the military regime seized power even within the electoral contests.  According to Taegyun Park, there were four factors that contributed to the successful execution of the military government’s state-led economic modernisation: (1) there was a strong trend on a planned and state intervening economic system among the intellectuals, politicians and journalists; (2) the U.S. strongly promoted export with a growth-oriented economic development plan.  Some of the academics from the U.S. saw that Korea had a competitive advantage in certain labour- intensive industries, such as the textile industry whose labour productivity in surpassed even the American level. (3) rapid economic recovery in North Korea (a remarkable achievement in the heavy industry sector) convinced the leaders of South Korea and America that they needed to catch up to the North within a short period.​[384]​

However, the state-led economic development model was implemented at a huge cost to Korean society.  In particular, the working class was the biggest victim.  As it was a common phenomenon in late developer countries, state-led industrialisation in Korea was carried out through repressive policies towards workers and the labour market.​[385]​  There was a trade-off between economic growth and the rights of the working class.​[386]​  The key concepts of the dictatorial development model in Korea was similar to what Algietta portrays as the “bloodshed of Tailorism-style accumulation” included long hours, low wages and exploitation of surplus value.​[387]​  Without proper compensation, the Korean labour was forced to endure the longest working hours, highest rates of industrial accident and lowest wages in comparison with other developing countries.  As the Table 3 shows, the average increase of income in the 1960s was one fifth of labour productivity.  

Table 3: The Tendency of Korea’s labour productivity in the manufacturing sector and increase of income ​[388]​





As Table 4 shows, the low-wage based industrialisation continued until the end of the 1980s and the average labour wage in Korea was far lower than other developing countries (until the late 1980s the hourly rate of pay in Korean manufacturing was 70 percent that of Taiwan and 80 percent that of Hong Kong):​[389]​

Table 4: Comparison of Income/Productivity (1975): World Bank (1983)
	Korea	Singapore	Japan	USA
Labour productivity (A)	100	233	442	614
Hourly income index (B)	100	406	914	1342
A/B	1.00	1.74	2.08	2.18

In addition, the military government’s spending on welfare policy (see Table 5 below) was even lower than that of the developing countries vis-à-vis the underdeveloped countries. 

Table 5: The Comparison Data of the Government Expenditure on Welfare System (Third-World Countries: This table originated from Cho, 1985, p263)
	1972	1983







Meanwhile, after the military government (the KCIA) suppressed the trade union and leftist movement, there were no such institutional channels that could resolve this inhumane and unjust situation.​[390]​  It is argued that without a sound cooperative relationship between the working class and capitalist class upon sharing various ideologies, the mechanism of industrial sociality could not be workable.​[391]​  The Park regime, however, simply forsook a cooperative policy in which to maintain a balance between growth and distribution of wealth.  As many welfare states in Western Europe proved, such cooperative prescriptions ensure long term and stable economic prosperity with the mood of social consolidation.

The Alliance between Intellectuals and Workers
Despite the lack of general support, the leftists, who were mostly student activists in the 1980s, became radical Marxist-Leninists (rejecting a parliamentary route to socialism) and this transformation resulted in two consequences: first, Marxist-Leninist and pro-North Korea (Juche Sasang devotees) socialists became dominant among all the leftist groups.  Second, due mainly to the first consequence, the working class and the trade union movements were controlled by the radical leadership and also radicalised (see the section, “the alliance between student and working class).  In the face of rising fascist rule in the 1980s, many student activists (mostly Marxist-Leninist or Juche idea devotees) went to the factories (in the 1980s) and helped labourers rebuild destroyed trade unions.  The emergence of militant trade unions and the radicalisation of the trade union movements followed.  

The working class’s collective consciousness increased amid the workers experiencing social shocks which originated from the growth of industrialisation: Workers were morally angry against authoritarian and inhumane management, recognition of social inequality, unfair compensation for being overworked, depression at the few that enjoyed prosperous economic boom and encouragement from the outsiders (student activists and church activists).​[392]​  With an alliance with the student activists, the Korean workers developed a strong union movement in a relatively short period of industrial.  The key reasons for this are the speed of industrialisation and the student activists’ assistance with a great degree of altruism. ​[393]​

One of the main contributions of the student activists in the history of the entire “minjungundong” is aligning with labour “in creating a counter public sphere, a sphere in which workers’ identities, interests and needs, as well as those of the intellectuals, were reformulated.”​[394]​  Actually, as Lee (2007) says, the intellectuals’ effort for the workers was a longstanding historical phenomenon.  There were countless examples of intellectual-worker alliance; the alliance tradition from the May Fourth Movement of 1919 to the Communist victory of 1949 in China, the students’ aspirations to be connected to the workers in France in 1968 and in Guinea in the late 1960s, the revolutionaries (the guru of revolutionist movements, Amilcar Cabral) exhorted intellectuals to “commit suicide as a class, be reborn as revolutionary workers.”​[395]​  In the 1970s, the alliance mainly carried out by intellectuals, university students and various Christian labour organisations raised the following issues; low wages, harsh working conditions and violations of the basic labour laws.  In the 1980s, “the alliance took the form of intellectuals becoming workers themselves.”​[396]​  

The dictator underestimated both the power of the student movement and the pivotal role played by it in the democratisation movements together with other sectors of minjung movement.​[397]​  The student movement was also a critical factor in assisting the regrouping of the trade unions​[398]​ and the labour movement as the student activists themselves became workers (known as “gongwhal”) in the major industrial cities (Incheon, Ulsan and Masan & Changwon), even so the students’ practice in the labour sector was “beset by the unrelenting tension between the intellectuals’ desire for organic fusion with the workers and the practical demands of leading the workers.”​[399]​  For the students’ endeavour for the development of the labour movement, Lee Namhee defines as “alliance between intellectuals and workers” and states that “The effort of intellectuals to remake themselves as workers remains the most distinctive as well as most problematic feature of the South Korean democratisation movement of the 1980s.”​[400]​  With regard to the pivotal role of the student activists (and the intellectuals) of the labour movement presents, Koo states that “the alliance as product of a structure of the 1980s but also in the political culture of the undongkwon in the post-Kwangju Uprising period.” ​[401]​  Thus, student activist centred “minjungundong” (people’s movement) or “jaeya-undong” (pro-democracy movement in the non-legal fields) reinforced and finally contributed to the collapse of the authoritarian rule in the late 1980s.

The suppressed working-class voice (demands for their basic economic and political rights) exploded after the June Upheaval (in 1987).  After the Chun military dictatorship officially accepted the amendment of the constitution (from fascist to liberal democratic constitution), “The Great General Strike (July–September in 1987)” followed:

	In 1987 the number of unions increased from 2,675 to 4,103, while unionisation grew up to 13.8 percent
	In 1989 the number of unions skyrocketed to 7,883 and unionisation reached 18.7 percent
	Trade unions were established in the big companies (Hyundai) and major industries (steel, heavy, chemical, automobile and so on) and office work & professional work places (white collar workers)

The workers’ upheaval of 1987 directly affected the following historical incidents.  First, the working class emerged as the largest interest group in the nationwide level of trade union organisation and the “Junnohyup” (National Worker’s Association: NWA) was established.  NWA competed with the previously existing pro-government trade union’s association, “Hankkonochon” (Korea’s Federation of Trade Unions).  Second, some progressive factions (minority) established a legal progressive party, The People’s Party and The Grand National Party (in 1988).​[402]​  Third, for the first time (since Cho Bobgam was nominated as a left-wing presidential candidate in 1956), the Left participated in the presidential election with an independent candidate (Bak Giwan) in 1992.  This meant that the Left no longer relied on the liberal party (for presidency) and was a harbinger of the development of social democratic politics (pursuit of a power in a peaceful election).  

Democratisation therefore allowed the re-establishment of the trade union movement (in the 1980s) and the militant trade unions grew more powerful and became a political force.  This newly emerged socialist tendency (the second generation), unlike its predecessor (the first generation) had a meaningful supporter.  Because of this background the DLP could be established with the backing of the major trade union, FDTU (Federation of Democratic Trade Unions).  Therefore, social democrat means of the industrialisation is that the revived trade union movements can escalate the development of the socialist movement.  

The strong alliance between the intellectuals and the working class​[403]​ therefore escalated the re-establishment of the trade union movement and the explosion of the great labour struggle in 1987.  The general strike in the Kuro Industrial Complex in 1985 was the watershed for the explosion of general strikes in 1987, the most spectacular upheaval in the history of the Korean labour movement.  

The Origin of the new Left: the Second Generation of Socialism
The revived Left does not mean a surprise return of the once completely destroyed first generation of socialist force.  Rather, some of the radical liberal dissident force among the people’s movement, so-called, “undongkwon” (the student activists as a key engine) became a Marxist-Leninist force.  From the mid-1970s, the liberal dissident tendency replaced the role of the socialist tendency as the social democrat parties were suppressed after the Park regime adopted a fascist constitution.  In 1974, student activists, church leaders and intelligentsia (mostly radical liberals) gathered and organised a nationwide anti-dictatorship dissident organisation, “Minchunghakyeon”: The Association of Democratic Youth: ADY).  This organisation covered almost all of the progressive and liberal tendencies.  It can be said that the ADYS functioned as a bridge between the first generation of socialist tendency (1945–72) and the second generation of socialist tendency in the post-democratic period.​[404]​ 

After democracy took place in 1987, the leaders and members of the ADY were scattered and selected four different paths: first, the radical student activist groups constructed underground socialist organisations and became the revolutionary Left.  Second, moderate leftists, such as Jang Gipyo, Lee Woojae and Lee Jaeoh, etc. paid attention to the important role of legal and parliament politics under the democratisation era, then they established an independent centre-leftist party, the People’s Party.  Third, some of the moderate religious leaders and intellectuals (Seo Kyungsuk, Park Saeil, Choi Yeol, etc.) started Korean civil movements by erecting two major civil movement organisations, CCEJ (Citizen’s Coalition for Economic Justice) and FEM (The Federation of Environment Movements).  Lastly, some leaders joined the prevailing liberal party, the Democratic Party (Lee Haechan, Kim Guntae, etc.) and contributed to the long-term opposition liberal party to become a ruling party (the liberal Kim Daejung and Rho Muhyun administrations established and ruled Korea for one decade (1998–2007).


“Undongkwon”: The new Left
Throughout the democratisation process, the liberal tendency did not evolve into a social democratic force; the radical liberals instead became revolutionary socialists or “undongkwon” (radical socialist activist groups).  The rise of “undongkwon” during the democratisation movement is very important because the major groups among undongkwon became a socialist tendency in the post-democratic period.  The completely destroyed socialist tendency re-emerged as a result of the triumphant undongkwon led democratisation movement in the mid-1980s.

Due to multiple differences compared to the old socialist tendency in the 1950s and ’60s, we named the newly emerged socialist tendency in the late 1980s as the new Left.  Unlike the previous socialist tendency, the new Left originated from the student movements in the 1970s and ’80s.  As Jung points out, the new Left was not likely to be connected to the socialist tendency in the 1950s and ’60s (as this force was completely destroyed by the authoritarian regimes).​[405]​  The student activists were therefore the leading force in the new Left.  There was no such socialist party or party-level leadership amid the emergence of the new Left.  In an ideological aspect, Marxist-Leninism, nationalism and Juche Sasang (or Kimilsungism) were widely accepted by the socialist tendency in the 1980s whereas social democracy was a key ideology among the socialist tendency in the 1950s.

The powerful dissident tendency, Undongkwon​[406]​ originated from the student movement in the 1960s and 70s.  The student activism has been a main engine of the development of democracy in Korea in the contemporary era.​[407]​  The student activists were the key executor of the anti-Japanese imperialist movement in the colonial period.  It is easy to imagine that the April Revolution in 1960 which ended the tyrannical Rhee government wouldn’t have occurred without the active involvement of the students.  Moreover, under the rule of the two military regimes (the Park and Chun regimes), the student movement was the only existing political dissident tendency while other opponent parties and political forces against the military regime were destroyed by the harsh repressive politics.  Actually, university campuses effectively functioned as the only opposition.​[408]​  During the military dictatorship, social (workers’ exploitation) and political (anti-democratic or anti-national politics) issues for reform were normally raised by the students.  For instance, “anti-normalisation with Japan rally” was organised by the student activists while the opponent parties, Democratic Korea Party or New Korea Democratic Party were pressed to be silent.  And the role of Korean students was quite different from others (like the student activists in Europe and U.S.) as they actively participated in the centre of politics and tried to seize the initiative on certain issues.  Unlike the student movements in Western Europe and the U.S. that noticeably deteriorated after 1968, the student activist centred “undongkwon” in Korea attempted to shift their social identity and mould the workers into revolutionaries as a counter-current against the tide of postmodern doubts and uncertainties about progress, human emancipation and class struggle.​[409]​  Like many other Third World countries, traditionally, students work to fix the injustices of politics.  It also has been a hallmark of social conflict and continues to represent pressure for social change.​[410]​  Korean students draw on an old wellspring of automatic respect for the educated and expectations that they will play an exemplary moral role.

Meanwhile, it is significant to point out that the student activists in Korea in the 1970s and ’80s were not just a passive force.  Rather, they actively created political agendas, for example, requesting the amendment of their constitution (direct vote in presidential election) and social reforms in relation to the military regime’s harsh anti-labour policies.  The role of the Korean student movement on democratisation and any other leftist and civil movement was more powerful and broad compared to that of the Latin American student movements.​[411]​  With respect to the unique contribution of the Korean student activism, Park Mi states: 

The student went to factories, the countryside and shantytowns to organise workers, farmers and the urban poor.  Most clandestine student organisations had their members working in factories and later played an instrumental role in building independent trade unions.  Although state suppression forced them to operate at the level of small clandestine cells, student activists developed innovative tactics to politicise social issues and organise the masses in order to compensate for the limited channels of political contention.​[412]​






The first generation of the socialist movement was destroyed during the military dictatorship and socialism in Korea experienced complete breakdown.  Paradoxically, the socialism revived as a result of the military regime’s industrialisation and tyrannical rule.  The dissident force against the military dictatorship obtained support from the people and replaced the position of the socialist tendency.  

However, In the midst of harsh dictatorship the student movement steadily grew into a powerful dissident tendency as an organised anti-military dictatorship/pro-democracy movement, “minjungundong” (people’s movement).  The student activists were originally a large pro-democracy movement group and the so-called undongkwon​[415]​-led minjungundong eventually terminated the Park military regime.  Later, the socialist tendency revived as the major factions of undongkwon became a radical socialist tendency throughout democratisation.  Ironically, the desperate conditions nurtured the swift growth of the pro-democracy movement and at the same time stimulated a hurried radicalisation of the dissident tendency.  The regrouped leftist tendency was not successful in demonstrating their leadership in this early stage of the post-democratic period (1987–91).

The pro-democracy movement, “undongkwon” had second thoughts on the problematic economic–political system and concluded that liberal democracy (or constitutional democracy) is not enough to cure such complicated problems, for instance, enhanced social inequality, the hypocritical attitude of the U.S. on the development of democracy and unification issue.  The radical liberal tendency became a revolutionary socialist tendency in the wake of the democratisation movements and the socialist tendency was revived.






This chapter demonstrates why the new Left failed to adapt to democratic politics and how this failure affected the development of a more moderate Left.  Two newly emerged conditions, democratisation and a prosperous economy, challenged the new Left’s strategy centred on a revolutionary underground party.  The former factor (democratisation) resulted in the parliamentary system, which became a key institutional tool in politics.  This functioning constitutional democracy required the new Left to build and activate a legal and moderate socialist party.  While parliament covered major political issues, the new Left’s underground revolutionary party was relegated to obscurity and rendered obsolete.  The new economy encouraged the working and middle class, the largest benefactors of rapid economic growth, to have a strong political preference for reform.  Specifically, the working-class demanded economic rights along with a stabilisation of job markets, whereas the middle class withdrew its support from the radical leftist and militant trade union movements.

With the collapse of the military dictatorship (in the late 1980s), democratisation brought numerous advantages for the newly emerged leftists.  Above all, democracy provided what Schumpeter emphasised as the main concept of democracy that, “occupancy of the leading political position is determined through a competitive struggle for gaining people’s vote”.  In other words, the qualifications of “free, fair and honest” elections were guaranteed by the democratic government.​[416]​  The legal system did not hinder (essentially legalised) the establishment of a leftist party (not Communist Party) even though the National Security Law still officially banned socialist parties.  In the wake of democratization, the Korean leftists faced relatively favourable circumstances to construct a leftist party.

The changing political and economic circumstances (functioning democracy and prosperous capitalism) required the new Left to adopt a new style of politics that utilised the progressive characteristics of liberal democracy.  Above all, the new Left could build an independent leftist party.  Through the party’s activity, the leftists had to create a broad alliance among the working and middle classes.  Even though the new Left faced relatively advantageous conditions in the post-democratic era, it was forgotten amidst other major political issues due to its failure to create new reformist socialist politics that embraced the newly emerging political climate.  González led the PSOE (which faced very similar social, economic, and political conditions to the Korean new Left in the 1980s in terms of democratisation and economic prosperity that resulted in the emergence of a large number of middle-income earners) in Spain in the 1970s in breaking with their Marxist traditions and successfully transitioned them into a social democrat party.  In sharp contrast, due to their revolutionary socialism the new Leftists in Korea in the 1980s-90s failed to develop a new coalition between the working class and middle class facilitated by the socialist party.  Such reformist socialist campaigns never occurred because the stubborn New Left remained an antiquated revolutionary socialist tendency.  Eventually, the newly emerged socialist tendency, once the most powerful force during the democratisation movement, was widely excluded from politics.

The Background of the Radicalisation of the new Left
It is important to understand the socio-political conditions that affected the radicalisation of the revived socialist tendency in the 1980s.  The most critical of these was the military regime’s state-led rapid economic development strategy, which suppressed the working class.  For more than two decades, the pro-democracy movement saw the injustice that was a product of the state’s economic development strategy.  Then, the student centred pro-democracy movement realised that Korean society not only needed to obtain constitutional democracy, but it also needed extensive reform of the capitalist system and the dictatorial government.  However, the military authoritarian regime never allowed for a socialist party to exist as a legal institution; this (as one of the factors) resulted in the development of a revolutionary and underground socialist parties.  This political factor, the historic Kwangju Upheaval, the enhanced social inequality and the ideological factor of traditionally-embedded radical nationalism among the Left all affected the radicalisation of the new Left.

The Military Dictatorship
The military dictatorship adopted strong anti-socialist policies and used several legal tools, such as the “National Security Law” and the “Anti-Communism Law”.  While the Park and Chun military juntas ignored some of the principles of liberal democracy such as freedom of speech, press and organisation, the party system existed within a dominance of the conservative force.  Moreover, in the wake of “indicative planning”-based industrialisation, potential resistance and ongoing obstacles were completely blocked.​[417]​  The military regime ensured that there would be no effective opposition by farmers and workers to the state economic policies.​[418]​  Later, after the collapse of the Park government (1962–79), the Chun regime (1980–7) which seized power through a second military coup in 1979) reinforced authoritarian politics after the U.S.-backed military regime cracked down on the Kwangju Upheaval in 1980.  

During the second military dictatorship when the Chun regime rejected a solution of consolidation and compromise with the powerfully emerging pro-democracy movement, the leaders of the “undongkwon” finally recognised that all the accumulated civil disobedience and petition campaigns for democracy had achieved little but the arrest and torture of student and church activists.​[419]​  In the midst of increasing tension with the dictatorship, the frustrated pro-democracy movement lost its patience.  All of these disadvantageous conditions for the socialist tendency plainly explain why the new Left in the 1980s turned into a radical socialist tendency rather than being interested in a Western European style of social democracy.​[420]​ 

Under the military dictatorship, a somewhat moderate socialist movement (like the campaign for social democracy) could not exist.  Only several revolutionary underground socialist parties continued with extremely limited conditions, but all of those parties were rooted out by the tyrannical rulers.  Thus, as Shin (2007) states, under these harsh structural conditions, moderate or pragmatic leftist ideas, such as social democracy, were almost impossible to practice.  

The Kwangju Massacre 
In 1979 (after the assassination of Park on 26th October) the second military coup was carried out by the General Chun and his fellow “Hanawhoi” (the politically-motivated military officers’ private underground organisation) members.  Then upheavals occurred against the coup in several major cities, such as Seoul and Kwangju.  Whereas the student-led resistance in Seoul did not develop into a mass movement because the student activists’ leaders adopted a “wait-and-see” tactics, the peaceful (student-led) street demonstrations in Kwangju turned into popular armed revolts after garrison troops suppressed them (under the martial law).  The week-long protests in Kwangju in May 1980 that were ruthlessly put down by the military interim government are an event that still resonates in Korean politics.  After the Kwangju Massacre, the newly emerged left thought that the new military would neither adopt a constitutional democracy nor share power with his opponents.  

In the meantime, throughout the Kwangju uprising in 1980, the activists reassessed the role of the U.S. as not being a supporter of democracy.​[421]​  The leftists recognised the negative role of the U.S. as the Reagan administration agreed with the military junta’s order to deploy several special army divisions in Kwangju to subjugate the resistance.  Later, even the U.S. authority did not check or try to stop the new military dictatorship.  Rather, the Reagan administration invited Chun to visit Washington and provided solid insurance for the military junta.  Importantly, this background (which increased the anti-American sentiment among the leftist groups) provided an ideal opportunity for the North Korean Communists to manipulate the South Korean leftist movement.  In the meantime, the pro-democracy movement activists were very sympathetic to the citizens of Kwangju (the rebellion city is located about 150 miles to the south-west of Seoul).  Actually, Undongkwon were guilty for what happened to the people in Kwangju because they did not efficiently help while Chun was butchering the innocent civilians that included the students.  There was no nationwide leadership which could mobilise the forces of anti-dictatorship.  However, the united front between Undongkwon and the opponent politicians was only constructed after the massacre occurred.  

The Kwangju Massacre of 1980​[422]​ therefore became a turning point for the Korean student movement in the sense that “revolution came to be embraced as the only viable option for redressing the situation of Korea.”​[423]​  There are no other incidents which affected the radicalisation of the new Left beside the Kwangju Massacre.  The pre-democratic era focused on a struggling non-democratic state and thereafter democratisation was equated with an anti-authoritarian state.​[424]​  But in the early 1980s the leaders of Undongkwon had a second thought that a liberal democracy would not be a sufficient alternative to cure the fundamental overhaul of Korean society.​[425]​  As Park Mi states, the Kwangju massacre of 1980 became a turning point for the Korean student movement in the sense that “revolution came to be embraced as the only viable option for redressing the situation of Korea.”​[426]​  

The Exploited Working Class and Enhanced Social Inequality
The Park regime’s two decades of repressive anti-trade union policy and forceful capital/labour corporatism (sustained under the trade-off option between the rights of the working class and rapid growth) created a high degree of resistance among the student-centred dissident tendency and the working class which was not the beneficiary of the successful industrialisation.  

As mentioned previously, industrialisation was able to grow because of the exploitation of surplus labour; atrocious working conditions (i.e. the longest working hours among the developing states and the highest ratio of industrial accidents) and a lack of autonomy in the factory.  The Korean workers under the military regime could not have their own political (labour party) and economic (restricted trade union) representatives.  However, as Im states, restricted democracy cannot be an effective framework of domination when the ruling power bloc relies exclusively on coercion, because under restricted democracy the popular masses have the potential means of changing rulers through elections.”​[427]​  As the contradictions accumulated between the dictatorship and workers and between the capitalists and the working class, the labour force eventually emerged as one of the most powerful dissidents against the military regime; see the list below of the resistance of the Korean working class against the military dictatorship:

	Chun Taeil’s self-immolation in 1972: This incident prompted the liberal dissident tendency to pay attention to ongoing social inequality (working-class conditions).  Below are parts of the Chun Taeil’s will:

I could no longer watch my fellow workers working in hell.  I will drill a tiny hole in the window.  After I die, a coalition will form between labourers and students; mom, please make a bigger hole, then, you will see more bright light for the workers.  You must fight as a single united front.  Even dividing into two will be ineffective (author’s translation).​[428]​

	 [출처] 한국 노동자 민중의 투쟁사 (​http:​/​​/​blog.naver.com​/​jhj7725​/​140038286532" \t "_blank​)|작성자 여함 (​http:​/​​/​blog.naver.com​/​jhj7725" \t "_blank​)
	Women workers struck in the small- and medium-size companies in the textile industry: Wonpungmobang, Dongilbangjukk, Y.H. Trading Co.: The Y.H. struggle caused the expulsion of the congressman, Kim Youngsam who was the leader of the major opposition party, the Democratic Party and officially supported the women workers at Y.H. and criticised the Park regime’s anti-labour policy.
	The Buma Upheavals (16th–19th October 1979): the street demonstration that were carried out by the students and citizens in the two big cities, Busan and Masan (Kim Youngsam’s political hometown) were followed just six days later by the assassination of Park and the collapse of the military regime.  


Yet the Korean workers did not make a strong collective response against the proletarianisation because of the repressive state’s control of the labour movement and the absence of a strong artisan cultural tradition.  The growth of the working class in terms of population does not necessarily mean the power of the working class increased or was enhanced.  First, the existence of huge industrial reserves (although massive numbers of rural migrants moved into industrial urban areas, but many of them were not absorbed into the industrial manufacturing sector as wage earners, but instead formed a social marginal sector).  The high proportion of semi-skilled and unskilled workers (mostly women) that could be replaced by the socially marginal at any time contributed to the weakness of working-class organisation.​[429]​  The labour unions were “initially small in number, poorly organised and threatened by a large labour reserve.”​[430]​  Lee Joohee states that “the working class in general has a relatively low class consciousness.”​[431]​  Kim and Gandhi argue that “institutionalised dictatorships provide more benefits to workers and experience lower levels of labour protest than their non-institutionalised counterparts.”​[432]​  Korean workers have not made strong collective responses to proletarianisation, largely because of repressive state control of the labour movement and the absence of a strong artisan cultural tradition.  The rapid nature of industrialisation causes the majority of workers to be still directly tied to the petty bourgeois through current family and kinship links, which might hinder socialising workers to a class culture.  Furthermore, the working class is divided in such a way that main workers are more anti-capitalistic than non core workers.  Lacking racial/ethnic or religious divisions which are more or less common in other industrialised countries, South Korean workers are less fragmented than the working class of most other places.

However, since non-core workers are much less well-organised than the main workers and are employed in less privileged sectors of the economy, the ideological cleavage and the gap in the structural power between the two sections of the working class are more likely to prevent workers from being organised as a class and from establishing political vehicles of their own.​[433]​  The success of the South Korean developmental state began to undermine the basis of its power as the industrial development gave root to the working-class movement.​[434]​  The rise of the working class and related trade union movements was ignited by their connection to the student activists centred Undongkwon.  In particular, the self-immolation of Chun Taeil in 1971 shocked student and church activists into awareness of the desperate conditions faced by the workers.  The broad alliance between intellectuals and workers revitalised the working class movement.  And the pro-democracy movement activists saw the need to expand the demand for formal political democracy to include the demands of workers and farmers for greater control of their own working conditions.

The Influence of Radical Nationalism
The marriage between radical nationalism and socialism in Korea was another factor that influenced the Korean leftist movement developing into a revolutionary socialism.  Nationalistic sentiment (as one of the critical factors of the radical socialism in Korea in the contemporary era) is a historical phenomenon.  During the period when Korea was under Japanese rule (1910–45), “nationalism” became one of the pervasive forces in Korean politics.​[435]​  It impinges on the Left and the Right.

The radically altered domestic and international situations gave birth to a militant nationalism.”​[436]​.  Therefore, “Korean nationalism has always been inward-looking, pacific and defensive in nature, but it became offensive and anti-foreign only when foreign powers threatened Korea’s safety or offended the pride of the nation and the people.​[437]​

The rise of ethnic nationalism in Korea is also profoundly related to its social construction.​[438]​  Modernity was delayed by the invasion of the West (including Japan) and eroded while Korea was colonised by the imperialist state, Japan.  On the other hand, as modernisation proceeded under the authoritarian regime, like most states in the Third World during their post-colonial periods, during Korea’s transition to the modern world, issues of individual freedom and civic rights were downplayed in favour of collectivism and national survival.  In particular during the authoritarian regime-led modernisation, nationalism came out along with collectivistic, ethnic and organic nationalism which constrained space for liberalism in the public sphere.  This historical legacy led to the poverty or shallowness of liberalism, which in turn affected the poor or distorted development of both conservatism and radicalism in Korea.  Marxism, for instance, did not develop in constructive contention with liberalism, but out of total rejection or denial of it (Shin, 2006; 231).

As Nahm aptly states, “Korean nationalism became offensive and anti-foreign only when foreign powers threatened Korea’s safety or offended the pride of the nation and the people.”​[439]​  Korean socialists were no exception to the wave of anti-foreign sentiment embedded in nationalism by the constant practice of anti-American campaigns.  Anti-Americanism should be considered as part of the influence of the Communists in the North and their agenda (see next section).  Korean socialists thought that the socialist movements in the South were destroyed by the American imperialists.​[440]​  As Leninism supported anti-imperialist and independent movements in the colonial countries, the new Left in the 1980s was inspired by such anti-imperialist-rooted revolutionary ideologies.  In general, socialism rooted in internationalism looks beyond this type of nationalistic sentiment.  Some of the radical socialist groups (like the Trotskyites) despise nationalism.  Such anti-Americanism was aggravated after the Reagan administration supported the deployment of the special South Korean Army force in the rebel city of Kwangju and suppressed the pro-democracy movement in 1980.

In the 1980s the nationalistic socialist group Chamintu (later the NL faction, the majority group among the left) sought more than the democratisation of Korean society and politics; it linked democratisation to national liberation from foreign dominance, believing the former to be unobtainable without the latter.  The nationalistic socialists also stressed that the U.S. was a main target of protest because of its historical support for highly repressive and authoritarian regimes in post-war Korea.”







The Influence of Leninism and Neo-Marxism

Leninism and the Juche Ideal
There was a great renaissance of Marxist-Leninism and a dramatic ideological transformation (from liberalism to socialism) among many student activists and small numbers of scholars in the mid-1980s.  Interestingly, the pro-Marxist (revolutionary socialism as the primary ideology) sentiment among the intellectuals in the 1980s was similar to that of the intellectuals in the colonial era.  As the article below from the magazine The Comet vividly describes, the theory of socialism during the colonial era was just a barometer of social position among the intellectuals:  

It does not matter whether somebody truly believes (or recognises) socialism.  The real matter is that intellectuals had to pretend that they are familiar with socialism in order to be an influential person in the intellectual society.  Actually, based upon the intellectuals’ strong demands, the 5th edition of this book, The Socialist Guide, was quickly published.  Therefore, those who wish to be known as popular intellectuals desperately needed to read this book (author’s translation).​[442]​

Lee states that the renaissance of Marxism on college campuses in the 1980s was similar to socialism in the colonial period.  At the time, the theory of socialism was considered as a common resource for living among the intellectuals, so non-socialist youngsters could hardly be treated as intellectuals.​[443]​  With respect to Lenin’s theory of imperialism, Lee summarises that: (1) with accumulation of production and capital, capitalism reaches its highest stage, monopolistic capitalism; (2) financial oligarchy (bank capital + industrial capital = financial capital) is a dominant force within the entire economy; (3) capital export is more important than export of conventional goods; (4) international monopolistic capitalists (imperialists) emerge and effectively partition the world’s economic territory.​[444]​  The Korean radical socialists utilised the theory of imperialism by understanding that the imperialists deter the development of capitalism in neo-colonial states (to obstruct the improvement of productivity) by creating an alliance with the reactionary power (or ruling bloc), such as landlords, comprador capitalists, militarists, etc.​[445]​

Juche Sasang
Juche Sasang (Kimilsungism), which is based on the notion that the divided nation is the essential factor in all kinds of problems for Korea, could not be a true compass under the specific condition in which neo-liberalism is embedded within society.  Juche Sasang (Kimilsungism) devotees in the 1990s stressed that anti-Americanism and unification are their primary political missions.  This can be said of the Korean radical nationalistic socialists: “To be sure, the discrepancy between what they profess and what they practice of often wide… Democratic theory tends to be presented in its conservative form with implications of legalism, parliamentary politics and hence disregard for substantive problems of social order.  That such a political theory should be inadequate to meet the needs of a transitional society is not surprising.  It is only too plain that democratic theory in its contemporary shape has very little to say about the nature of the old order which is the essence of the revolutionary problem for most developing societies.”​[446]​

Neo-Marxism: The Dependency Theory
Actually, Korea does not possess the classic features of dependencia that emerged in the colonial era of South America.​[447]​  Imperialists choose (not determine) their partnerships in the colonial state depending upon the colonial state’s political economic conditions.  In a pro-feudal system where their power is dominant, imperialists simply build a coalition network with classes such as the landlord class.  Then the development of capitalism and bourgeois democracy are hampered and delayed.  In Korea the landlord class was completely eliminated during the land reform period (1946–52), imperialists constructed their alliance with the newly emerging industrialists backed by the military juntas.  The important distinction is that the Korean landlords were weaker than their counterparts in Latin American states.

Moreover, in some cases, because of non-economic reasons, for instance military and diplomatic purposes, imperialists even actively assisted in the development of capitalism.  On the eve of the Cold War, South Korea was regarded as a symbolic model state (or front state for the West) that could prove the superiority of capitalism against the Communist bloc.  Thus, the U.S. and its allies willingly encouraged and even provided direct and indirect aid including the most favoured state position for the development of capitalism in Korea.  More importantly, imperialists can enjoy a greater surplus of profits from the neo-colonial state as long as capitalism advances in a neo-colonial state.

Unlike the NL faction’s NCSF (Neo–Colonial / Semi-Feudal system), the theory of NCSC (Neo-Colonial / State-monopolistic Capitalist system: the PD faction’s thesis) states that the dependency condition does not (automatically) result in delaying or distorting capitalism.  NCSC states that capitalism in a neo-colonial state can be further developed because the development of capitalism in a neo-colonial state better fits (actually better than less developing) with the interests of the imperialists.  NCSC argues that the imperialists profoundly connected with monopolistic capitalists backed by the state in Korea, so the interests of the imperialists are ensured through their superior technology and capital investments over the monopolistic capitalists (mingles with state).  In other words, as long as state monopolistic capitalism advanced in Korea, due to its dependency characteristic in terms of technology and capital, the Korean capitalist would lose profits.  One of the NCSC theory devotees, Yoon, explains the mechanism of exploitation by the imperialists in the neo-colonial state using the well-known thesis, “enhancement of monopoly/deepening dependency”.  Yoon adds that under a deepening dependency condition, state capitalism in Korea can barely escape the trap, “Law of the Tendency to the Rate of Profit to Fall”​[448]​  Accordingly, NCSC states that: (1) deepening dependency aggravates the crisis of capitalism in a neo-colonial state; (2) the capitalists in the neo-colonial state pass the crisis and lost surplus value to the working class and other lower classes; (3) exploitation among the people augment; (4) finally, the working class participates in revolution.

NCSC corrected some of the limitations of NCSF and states that capitalism in Korea further developed and reached a status of monopolistic capitalism even under a neo-colonial condition.  But this view also failed to escape the trap of an apocalyptic view as it states on an upcoming collapse of capitalism (different reason from NCSF).  The main argument is that the condition, deepening dependency in terms of technology and capitals, will eventually tackle the accumulation of competitive advantages of the monopoly capitalism, thus sooner or later the Korean capitalists will face a rapid decrease of productivity and efficiency.  But this prophecy simply did not occur.  This view neglects to realise that the Korean monopolistic capitalists were rapidly adapting to overcome the challenges (through becoming independent capitalists in terms of technology and investment capitals).  At the end of the 1980s, unlike the maximalist views, the Korean monopolistic capitalists emerged as reliable players in the world’s markets.

Levels of direct foreign investment are generally much lower than in Latin America although the transnational sector is big and contains many joint ventures with foreign multinationals.  In Korea there is a “big push” through foreign lending, accumulating a debt burden.  But unlike Latin America, Korea refracted this finance through a highly directive state, benefiting rising industries (heavy & chemical, electric, steel and shipbuilding industries mostly) penalising inefficient and declining ones, always with an eye towards world market competition.  Independence in terms of investment capital in the 1980s reached 71.8 percent comparing the 1960s (26.3 percent).  Foreign investment decreased while independence of investment dramatically increased (increased domestic savings as one of the critical factors).

Table 11: The Trend of Independency of investment (measurement as %)








Data from Moon Byungjik, 1987, “The Economics in Korea”, Bubmoonsa, p119

In the meantime, in industries like the electronic industry, the capitalists in Korea successfully escaped such dependency traps in terms of technology After the 1990s.  Actually, the electric industry has been one of the major industries in Korea.  After the 1980s and several electric companies like Samsung Electric Co. is a symbol of the economic miracle of Korea as well as a living proof of the inaccuracy of all the activities conducted by the radical socialists in the 1980s.

First of all, as the two tables listed below vividly illustrate, the electronic industry in Korea is a shining example of the way the Korean capitalists chased the first movers in the markets.  As the radical socialists worried, until the mid-1970s, both investment and technology in the electric industry heavily relied on Japan.  But starting from the mid-1980s (see table), the Japanese capitalists were no longer in a dominant position in the markets.  







Source: 30 Years of History of Electric Industry: Electric Archive, 1989

Moreover, the Korean electric makers emerged as a strong competitor in the export markets as they targeted the production of electric goods for export markets (68.9 percent) rather than the domestic demands in 1987 (see below).






Source: 30 Years of History of Electric Industry: Electric Archive, 1989

Capitalism in Korea therefore gained dynamism through a successful “big push” (a military government-led rapid industrialisation and its by-product as sustainable growth) and catch-up strategy (independence of technology and investment).  The Marxist-Leninist apocalyptic view of capitalism and all justifications of a revolution proved to be obsolete.  The radical Left’s prediction that capitalism in Korea would not develop in a normal way due to the exploitation by the imperialist state — Korea as a neo-colonial state for the imperialist state –– and dependency characteristic contrasted with the reality: a prosperous capitalist system.

The Emergence of the Revolutionary NL and PD faction
On May 1986 in Inchon, student and worker demonstrators were heralds in calling for the removal of U.S. troops and nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula and condemned the U.S. for supporting the military regime and perpetuating the division of Korea.​[449]​  It was marked as the first time after the 1940s that elements of the Korean opposition had openly identified themselves as anti-imperialists and represented an importance consequence of the Kwangju Massacre.  NL emerged and the new Left was sharply divided by NL​[450]​ and PD​[451]​.  The former group believed in radical nationalism and Juche Sasang, whereas conventional Marxist–Leninism was a critical ideological factor for the latter movement.

The NL (National Liberation) faction identifies Korea’s society as “neo–colonial/semi-feudal (or semi-capitalist)”: NCSF, whereas the PD (People’s Democracy) faction defines it as: NCSC.  The essential argument of NCSF is that: 

The structure of industry in Korea is overly dependent on overseas.  So, industries barely connected with each other in the name of division of work and it failed to sustain a self-reliant system.  Disparity in the traditional manufacturing industry (the gap between heavy industry and light industry) is severe and the old form of production (semi-feudal system) remains in the agricultural industry.  The militarisation of the economy (rising defence industry) which was forced by request of the U.S. aggravated this imbalance.  The heavy industry centred economic development project that was adopted in the 1970s by the Park regime resulted in the enhancement of Korea’s colonial characteristics and simultaneously disturbed the circulation of the economy (author’s translation).​[452]​

Meanwhile, Kang Hyungmin and his colleagues claim well represent NCSC and it can be summarised as follows:

The essence of a state monopolistic capitalist system is that the mechanisms by which the integration of state and monopolistic capital tend to preserve the capitalist system. In other words, it enhances a monopolistic ruling position of financial capital amidst a deepening crisis within the capitalist system as a whole (domestic and international)…  In the case of a neo-colonial state, due to its dependency characteristic the development of a capitalist system is deterred and moves forward in a destructive way (Author’s translation).​[453]​

Despite the prevailing gaps, there are several shared interpretations between NCSC and NCSF.  First, both views claim that the world’s political economic system is dominated by imperialism (financial capitalists + monopolistic manufacturing capitalists, with the former force being superior).  This recognition was actually inspired by Lenin’s “theory of imperialism” which emphasises that although naked territorial exploitation in the colonial countries disappeared after World War I, imperialism and colonial rule was sustained by a new method of economic colonisation.  Lenin claims that the imperialists create a solid alliance (with the capitalists or feudalists) in the neo-colonial states so that they can make exploitation sustainable (surplus value through unfair trade).​[454]​  Amid the rise of nationalism and liberation movements in the Third World, imperialists had to eschew territorial and political risks.

Second, neo-colonial status would negatively affect the development of capitalism.  This view is drawn from the theory of dependency, a neo-Marxist view which originated in South America.  Third, due to the first two factors, there will be an apocalyptic situation and the desperate working class (in terms of consciousness) will be revolutionised (under the vanguard socialist party’s leadership).  Therefore, socialists must be prepared for the revolutionary situation by establishing an underground, vanguard party (for the working class).​[455]​  

Given this explanation of the effect of the long term authoritarian regime which never shared its power nor legalised a socialist party, the Kwangju Upheaval and the resulting enhanced anti-American sentiment and the ideological factors (a traditionally strong radical nationalism, Leninism and neo–Marxism), it is evident how the newly emerged New Left would become a revolutionary socialist entity. But such underground socialist party centred revolutionary campaigns failed as they did not fit the changed circumstances of 1980s, which included a functioning constitutional democracy and prosperous economy which resulted in the working class becoming the middle class (who supported a gradual reform rather than a revolutionary change as they were one of the key benefactors from the successful economic modernisation).  


The Discrepancy between a Revolutionary View and the Reality

What Else Changed?
The authoritarian system changed after the great June Upheaval in 1987.  First, the Rho administration guaranteed constitutional democracy (people elect president by themselves and multi-party systems allowed).  Second, the ruling conservative party and the capitalists agreed to compromise with labourers as they allowed basic economic and political rights of the working class including several rights of trade unions.  Third, as the revitalised Korean economy (recovered from the recession in the late 1970s) brought economic prosperity, so the Korean labourers could afford a middle income earners’ life (the emergence of a large middle class).

As a result of the previous three conditions, the working and middle classes preferred gradual reform rather than revolutionary change.  In the presidential election (the first presidential election after democratisation) 99.7 percent of constituents supported either the right-wing parties’ candidates (Rho Taewoo of DJP or Kim Jongpil of the NDRP) or the centrist parties’ candidates (Kim Youngsam of UDP and Kim Daejung of PJDP).  Bak Giwan, the leftist candidate (independent), resigned in the middle of the election for two reasons; (1) extremely low approval (meaningless of popularity); (2) the need for compromise with the centrist candidate, Kim Youngsam who was the only candidate with a chance of winning (against the right-wing candidate, Rho Taewoo).  Most importantly, the Korean middle class and working class preference for reform continued until the 2000s.  In the 2002 presidential election, the DLP gained 3.9 percent of the votes from the blue collar, 5.7 from the new middle class, 2.5 percent from the self-employed, whereas the centre-leftist candidate Rho gained 54.0 percent from the new middle class and 45.4 percent from blue collar: the conservative candidate Lee gained 29.7 percent from new middle class and 30.4 percent from blue collar.​[456]​

The Constitutional Democracy and the Revolutionary Forces’ Response
It is true that underground socialist activity was a necessary option at least until the end of the Fifth Republic (1980–7) because of the authoritarian Chun military government barely allowed for some of the basic principles of democracy including legalisation of a socialist party.  But it does not necessarily mean that Korean society was on the brink of revolution.  The Chun military government, unlike its predecessor, the Park military regime, gave power to the dissident tendency and agreed to adopt a constitutional democracy.

The Boycotters vs. the Participators
The first major discontent among the new Left in the post-democratic era came with the issue of whether or not they should participate in the election argued that this would only provide a good chance for the Chun military regime to justify their tyrannical rule and to offset its genuine handicap, which was its lack of legitimacy.  Like conventional Marxist-Leninists, this radical faction, the “Boycotters” believed that election is effectively the reproductive system for the ruling classes.  Actually, a strong distrust of the opposition centrist party also influenced the boycotters’ cynical and negative viewpoint on creating a united front with the liberal opponent parties.​[457]​  The “Boycotters” (as orthodox Marxist-Leninists) stated that a parliamentary democracy will never become a genuine democracy (workers’ council) and since any state is, by its very nature, a class state, social democracy logically must fail unless it bends every effort to oppose and destroy the bourgeois state.​[458]​  They also stressed that an open-mass party would fail to overcome the lethargy of the proletariat, so it must be replaced by a vanguard party (organisational principle as democratic collectivism) which carries out ideological education for the proletariat and leads to a political struggle.  The revolutionary socialist tendency predicted that along with Marxism’s apocalyptic view on capitalism, global imperialism (as the last stage of capitalism) creates a more powerful state (for the reproduction of class exploitation demands) and this is what will signal the end of capitalism.  

Unlike the “Boycotters”, the other group, the “Participators”, understood the election was an important chance to reinforce the socialist tendency.  This group also recognised the need for a united front among all the anti-dictatorship forces including the liberal opposition party (New Democratic Party, NDP).  Thus, the Participators argued that participation in the election with the opposition parties would bring mass support.​[459]​  Like this participatory faction in Korea in the 1980s, the social democrat parties in Chile in the early 1970s and Spain in the late 1970s positively redefined liberal democracy in terms of fundamental political and economic reforms.  To preserve democratic stability and not provoke the Right, they discouraged provocative protest and encouraged institutionalised forms of participation (for peaceful transition and for obtaining sustainable democracy).​[460]​  But the largest problem for the Korean “Participators” was that they were a minority and the majority, “Boycotters” preferred underground organisation centred revolutionary activity.

The NL Factions
Such biased “pro-underground” and “pro-movement (not political activity in a legal area)” among the new Left continued into the 1990s through the majority NL faction continuing to focus on underground revolutionary activities.  The NL faction only utilised elections tactically by supporting the liberal party.  They identified their support for the liberal party as a ‘critical support’, but it was just rhetoric.  In the meantime, one of the main arguments of the NL faction for why they hesitated to support the idea of building a legalised working class centred socialist party was that it was premature because the supporters, such as trade unions and other grassroots forces were still weak and vulnerable.  However, the real reason for the NL faction, which was pro-North Korean Communist Party, was to uphold the strategy of a “Democratic Front”, for the North Koreans.  The NL faction believed there was no need to construct another socialist party in the South because the North Korean Communist Party was the only leadership needed on the Korean Peninsula.

Accordingly, the majority force among the new Left in the 1980s (Boycotters) and in the 1990s (the NL faction) both failed to capitalise on the opportunity to create a broad alliance through a legal socialist party because of their poor and erroneous interpretation of the strategically important role of liberal democracy in the development of social democracy.  As the results of the elections (from 1988 to 1997) demonstrated, the majority of constituents preferred gradual reform (not an abrupt change) within a parliamentary democracy.  In a nutshell, for the ordinary voters, the new Left in the 1980s and ’90s looked like street demonstrators (like the student activists), not a professional political force.  As one of the key leaders of Minjung movement, Chang Gipyo correctly assesses, the centrists became a successful political force and completely replaced the position of the new Left in the post-democratic era because the centrists and their party (The Democratic Party) seemed the only alternative political force which could overcome the ruling conservative force. ​[461]​ 

The Prosperous Capitalism vs. the Marxist–Leninist Campaigns
The Chun and Rho administrations quite successfully stabilised the macro economy and sustained economic growth.  Despite the temporary crises, a revolutionary situation did not occur.  Actually, as the Left argued, the Korean economy faced a crisis in the late 1970s (inflation and relatively low growth occurred) and the newly emerged military junta, Chun, enhanced fascist politics after he suppressed the Kwangju Upheaval by mobilising special forces.  In this sense, some of the political-economic conditions can be employed to justify a radical or revolutionary campaign.  The Chun administration (new military regime) inherited an economy suffering from all the side effects of Park's export-oriented development program and policy of expanding heavy and chemical industries.  The international economic environment turned harsh (three oil crisis followed shortly after by inflation, the pressure from the West to open domestic markets, the emergence of a number of new developing countries, etc.).  However, the apocalyptic view lost its credibility when the Korean capitalists, backed by the military dictatorship, surmounted this short term turmoil and promptly revitalised capitalism.  The Chun government tried to concentrate on the stabilisation of the macro economy.  After seizing power, Chun devoted his first two years in power to controlling inflation while attempting to bring about economic recovery.  Investment was redirected from the capital-intensive heavy and chemical industries towards labour-intensive light industries that produced consumer goods.  Import restrictions were lifted and as a result the economy began to improve in 1983 amidst stringent anti-inflationary measures and the upturn in the world economy.  In 1983 Korea attained an 8.1 percent growth rate as exports began to increase.​[462]​  A good harvest also helped (controlling the inflation as rice prices dropped).  “Same (three low conditions)” — low inflation, low oil prices and low interest rates (from the central bank) created a favourable climate for Korean capitalism to overcome such challenges. 

In December 1983, the Chun regime revised “the Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan” which targeted steady growth for the next three years, low inflation and sharply reduced foreign borrowing.  Exports were to rise by 15 percent a year, inflation was projected to be held at 1.8 percent and per capita GNP was to rise to US$2,325 by 1986. The annual growth rate was planned to average 7.5 percent though the actual performance was higher. The real GNP growth rate was 7 percent in 1985, but for the next three years 12.9 percent, 12.8 percent and 12.2 percent respectively.  In 1990 Korean manufacturers planned a significant shift in future production plans toward high-technology industries.  In June 1989, panels of government officials, scholars and business leaders held planning sessions on the production of such goods as new materials, mechatronics –– including industrial robotics –– bioengineering, microelectronics, fine chemistry and aerospace.​[463]​  In short, no matter what reason (according to the radical socialists, it is a dependency characteristic) was stated, capitalism in Korea in the 1980s was on an upward trajectory rather than headed towards collapse.

Consequently, the theoretical premise in which capitalism under the neo-colonial system would collapse proved its invalidity as the Korean economy did not fall.  More importantly, amid the explosion of democratisation movements in 1987, the military ruler selected a peaceful transition from an authoritarian society to a democratic state through the “6.29 Sunun (The Declaration of 29th June)” in which it mainly guarantees a constitutional democracy and the termination of repressive policies.

In Korea, the class structural change (the classical polarity of capital and labour is mediated, especially if economic decisions are based on the criteria of social responsibility, technical imperative and the emergence of the new middle strata) affects the decline of radical socialism.  According to the radical socialists in the 1980s, “the working class and the people are not able to escape from poverty because the dependency condition constantly increases the nation’s surplus profits to the imperialist state.” ​[464]​  But the reality does not fit this hypothesis.  Regarding the conditions of the working class in the 1980s, Nam Gigon (1989) explains that they were faced with: (1) unstable job markets, horrible working conditions and the pressure on austerity consumption was gradually reduced; (2) average income increased dramatically.  As the table below indicates, the average monthly income for manufacturing workers in 1986 was 261,719 won (about $260 if it is assumed that 1 U.S. dollar equals 1,000 won, the Korean currency), but it increased to 433,405 ($430) in 1989.  Almost 65.6 percent increase in average income (nominal).​[465]​ 

Table 14: Pay of Male Manufacturing Workers ($1 = 1,000 Won)








General working conditions including income improved, as the above table indicates, particularly in the factories with a size of over 500 employees and working conditions noticeably improved as working hours were reduced and income increased.

The Korean socialists faced a similar situation that the Spanish socialists were faced with after the Franco dictatorship had fallen in the 1970s.  The socialists were required to adapt to a new situation: a prosperous capitalism (working class becomes middle class income earner) along with a functioning democracy (no more repression toward socialism).  

With these changed conditions, some of the small factions among the new Left recognised the changing political climate and; tried to build a legal leftist party, such as Hangayerae-Dang (United National Party) in 1988 and Minjung Dang (People’s Party) in 1990.  But the effect of building independent leftist parties was trivial due to the fact that only small numbers of the leftists joined these parties, whereas the majority factions focused on underground and revolutionary socialist movements.​[466]​  The majority factions, the NL faction (among the new Left) were ensnared in a so-called “revolutionary syndrome”, a stubborn tendency toward underground activity with a cynical attitude toward parliament or the legal struggle.

Throughout the financial (and currency) crises in the late 1990s, the major supporter of the Left, the working-class movements (represented by the KDTU) clearly recognised the need for a working-class party after the general strike of 1996–7 mainly aimed to deter the amendment of a labour-unfriendly labour law.​[467]​  But the strike also targeted the conservative government’s austerity economic policy which directly affected the daily life of the masses.​[468]​  The general strike was quelled by the conservative government.  The leaders of the KDTU and the majority of leaders of the member trade unions of the KDTU firmly recognised the shortcomings of relying on the centrist party and finally turned their face to the fledgling working class-centred leftist party.

Most importantly, the president of the KDTU, Kwon Younggil (later he became a two-time presidential candidate of the DLP) demonstrated his personal support in building a working-class party for the first time and it played a huge part in persuading the rest of the trade union movement leaders.​[469]​  Secondly, as the Korean economy fell into an unprecedented crisis (financial and currency crises) in the late 1990s, on the request from the IMF the newly-elected centrist Kim Daejung administration had to adopt cruel austerity economic and financial policies.  But there was no single party that could object to such desperate politics for the lower income earners as well as the peasants within the legal political arena.  The demand for a third party soared amongst the lower classes. Under these imminent circumstances for the working and lower classes, the NL faction could no longer hinder or object to building an independent progressive party.  At last, the DLP was established in 2000 under an agreement between the PD and the NL faction, as well as the KDTU.  Consequently, along with the trade union movement, the majority of socialist forces (NL and PD) built the constitutional socialist party, the DLP, yet the party did not discard its revolutionary socialism.

The Moderate Leftist Force
When it became clear that capitalism in Korea would never collapse and the working class demonstrated a waning interest in a revolutionary solution, several Marxist-Leninist factions (Inminnoryeon (ALMIA), LC, and Smamin faction) finally recognised the impossibility of a revolution.  The socialists realised that; first, as the transformed structure of the industry (third and second industry-centred structure) and diversifying working classes and interest groups showed, capitalism in Korea had reached an advance level. ​[470]​  These changed conditions demanded a flexible, reformist ideology that could insure a democratic way for the diversified interests from diversified groups among income earners as well as various interest groups in society as a whole.  Second, characteristics of the state changed as the state functioning under the general principles of a liberal democracy (unlike the previously existing authoritarian governments).  It is important to acknowledge that under the functioning democracy (and state) a variety of demands from the society can be absorbed within the liberal democracy system.  Third and foremost, as the Korean working class no longer suffered from absolute poverty as a result of the successful economic modernisation, the majority of the working classes wished for gradual reform rather than rapid change (even the majority of working classes considered themselves to be middle classes).​[471]​

In addition, the external factor in the collapse of the Eastern Bloc was a critical factor for the Left who discarded a revolutionary campaign.  After the termination, the Left in Korea scattered and noticeably deteriorated in the ’90s: some remained underground as a revolutionary socialist tendency and were limited in their ability to mobilise legal politics and creating a coalition with the centrists in elections in the name of a United Front (NL), some joined civil movements, some went above ground by establishing a legal leftist party, the People’s Party (but this experiment quickly failed due to the lack of a support and the small numbers of socialist factions that joined).  By paying a huge price, the Left learned a valuable lesson from the failure of the radical socialist campaigns.

The KSLP
While the changed political and economic conditions pressed the revolutionary socialists to re-establish their strategy, three major Marxist-Leninist factions (ALMIA, LC and Sammin) merged (excluded the NL faction).  In the beginning, the “Korea’s Socialist Labour Party (the KSLP) was established in 1991 with the backing of a small number of labour movement leaders.  Yet the KSLP discarded its underground (vanguard) party-based revolutionary strategy because of the influence of those who were in charge of the regional branches and a few important thinkers.  Whereas the thinkers emphasised the changed political economic environment along with the obsolete characteristic of Marxist–Leninist ideology, the regional leaders pointed out the ineffectiveness and wastefulness of having an underground organisation.  In an interview, one of the regional leaders of the KSLP, Kim Jaedong (Kim was the head of Pohang branch cell for the KSLP) stated that “Before the KSLP took this new strategy, key leaders of the local cells were also key leaders of the local trade unions.  Every single day, we (the KSLP members) met, talked and discussed with one another at the local trade union office.  But the KSLP leaders had to meet at some other secret place to manage KSLP-related issue.  This odd situation caused the field leaders to ask why couldn’t we cover KSLP issues at the trade union office as long as we do not have as our goal (actually, the KSLP essentially discarded an armed revolt solution in the wake of the merge of the three factions).”​[472]​  The regional cell leaders’ perspective convinced many other leaders of the KSLP to reconsider the underground organisational system and its ineffectiveness. 

In December of 1991, majority leaders of the KSLP reached an agreement to discard underground tactic and entered the public sphere while omitting the word, “socialist” from the party name.  The first legal socialist party, “Korean Labour Party” was established in 1992.  The party’s strategic path is outlined by the president of the KSLP, Ju Daewhan:

As we faced the clear realities, for instance, capitalism in Korea will not collapse, working class will hardly be revolutionised, we finally recognised that building a working class-based mass socialist party like the SPD in Germany was necessary in Korea.  Then, the way that Fabian socialism based the Labour Party in the United Kingdom might fit in our circumstance as well.  We aimed to build a British-style Labour party in Korea at that time (Author’s translation).​[473]​

The converted socialists like Ju and his fellow socialists believed in what Lipset (1959; 1981) defined as a “democratic class struggle” would be possible through a legal social democrat party and within a functioning liberal democratic system.  But Ju and his fellow socialists could not make it due to genuine shortcomings and somewhat unfavourable conditions.  Above all, Ju and his fellow leaders did not have a clear program to seize power (it was supposed to mimic the British Labour Party’s developmental strategy and tactics).  The party’s platform and-related tenets were really not enough to persuade the rest of the leftist factions and the trade unions.  Although the leaders of the KSLP desired to create what Lipset (1959; 1981) called a “democratic class struggle” through a working class-centred legal socialist party (like the Labour Party in the U.K.), these attempts were unsuccessful due mainly to the sabotage of these plans by the majority faction among the leftist tendency, the NL faction.​[474]​  Moreover, like the moderate socialists in the liberation period, the KSLP basically lacked influence among the supporters, whereas the NL factions had authority in several grassroots unions, such as the teacher’s unions.  Although about twenty former and current “Junnohyup” (The National Labour Union) leaders including Park Junghun, the chairman of the Association of Mine Workers, sixty presidents of trade unions, forty high ranking officers from trade unions and twenty well known labour movement leaders supported the need for an independent working-class party and joined the KSLP, the effect was trivial compared to the influence of the NL faction in the trade union movements.​[475]​  Rather than being welcomed, the KSLP faced mounting criticisms from orthodox Marxist-Leninist factions (claimed that the KSLP betrayed ongoing revolution) and the NL faction (stated that the KSLP is premature and jeopardising the united front against the conservative ruling party).​[476]​  In an interview with the Poli News, the former leader of the KSLP and the congressman (2004–8) from the DLP, Rho Whoichan states that because of “two factors, the lack of support from the working-class movements and the sabotage from the other progressive groups, particularly the NL faction, the KSLP was unsuccessful.”​[477]​

Recognising the above vulnerable conditions, the KSLP tried to merge with the previously existing moderate leftist party, the “People’s Party (PP: the leaders of the party were former senior comrades of the ALMIA).  But the main target for the amalgamation was not right because the PP lacked of political influence and was only backed by a few intellectuals.  The PP did not have a meaningful connection with the trade unions because the trade union movements were controlled by the militant trade union leaders and revolutionary socialists (the NL faction) at that time.  Indeed, in the early 1990s, the civil movement was the most powerful potential partner or political ally (not the PP) for the converted socialists to build a moderate socialist party.


The KSLP and the Civil Movement
Regarding the development of social democracy in the periphery, Sandbrook et al. particularly emphasise the pivotal role of civil society.  According to them, “Civil societies loom large in any explanation of social democracy in the periphery because it is the terrain on which social classes are formed.”​[478]​  In a nutshell, a vigorous civil society in the periphery works as a determining factor in the democratic trajectories, but it also contributes to the empowerment of previously excluded classes, which are aided by this density that improves the chances of democratisation.’​[479]​  In the 1980s and ’90s a small number of religious leaders (Buddhist monks and Christian church ministers) and scholars were interested in reformist politics in Korea.  The centrist scholar Park Saeil (a political scientist at The Seoul National University) and a reformist minister,Seo Kyungsuk who was inspired by the American civil rights movement while he was living there for seven years, established together a centrist civil movement organisation, “The Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice”: CCEJ. At the same time one of the ex-leaders of the undongkwon, Choi Yeol and his environmentalist colleagues built “The Coalition for Environmental Movements”: (CEM) in the late 1980s.  These civil organisations filled a void left by conservative ruling party-dominated party politics, which performed very limited reforms and even adopted neoliberal politics that were unfriendly to the lower classes, as well as the undongkwon’s underground revolutionary politics, which ignored the people’s reformism rooted demands.  The CCEJ focuses on economic reform, whereas many environmental movement civil organisations, such as CEM covered environmental issues.  While the revolutionary leftist tendency was deteriorating, the civil movement gained strong support from the people.  One of the highly regarded weekly magazines in the 1990s, Shisha Pyungnon (“Current Affairs Review”) unveiled the shocking results of a survey that indicated the CCEJ is a more powerful institution than the military.​[480]​  The 1990s was the height of the civil movements and the moderate left (the KSLP) had a great window of opportunity to create an alliance with the civil movements.  However, it did not happen because the KSLP leaders did not have a clear vision and plan on how to take the moderate leftism road to power.  Some of the KSLP leaders (Chun Youngsun, Min Youngchang, Kim Jaedong, Park Sangguk, and so on) later recognised the desperate need for a coalition between the working-class movement and civil movement in the construction of a leftist party, and so joined civil movement organisations like CCEJ after the KSLP was suppressed.  As a matter of fact, there was not enough time for the newly converted moderate socialists as the Korean society in the 1990s requested a great deal of political and economic reform for the sustainable growth and further development of democracy.  

Even worse, the key leaders of the KSLP including Ju were arrested by the KCIA and put in jail for two years as soon as they announced their ideological coming out.​[481]​  In short, there was a huge gap between the dream and the reality and between the leadership and the obstacles.  A year after its inception, the KSLP was annexed by the People’s Party (which was constructed by the veteran moderate leftists in 1989).  Meanwhile, the majority faction among the leftist tendency, the NL faction still rejected joining the legal leftist party and remained a revolutionary socialist tendency until the changed conditions forced them to change.

The Spanish Socialist Party in the 1970s: PSOE
The Korean socialists faced a similar situation that the Spanish socialists were faced with after the Franco dictatorship had fallen in 1975.  The socialists were required to adapt to a new situation: a prosperous capitalism (working class becomes middle class income earner) along with a functioning democracy (no more repression toward socialism).  But the consequence for them was totally different.  It is worthwhile to compare the Korean socialists’ failure in transition (from Marxist party to a moderate socialist party) with the successfully transitioned Socialist Democratic Party (PSOE) in Spain in the late 1970s.  




During the military rule the newly emerged Left could do nothing but carry out underground party-centred revolutionary campaigns.  Hostile conditions for the development of socialism in Korea during the post-Korean War period (1953–61) were further aggravated under the military dictatorship. Basically, because of the context in which the new Left developed, these were revolutionary parties or revolutionary underground political organisations and it was very difficult for the new Left to change into constitutional parties.  In the post-democratic period, however, there were no critical obstacles for the implementation of moderate socialist politics in the newly elected Rho administration (1988–92), which respected some of the paramount principles of liberal democracy. 

The revived left had ample opportunity to build a (legal) socialist party in the post-democratic era.  Significantly, the reformist socialist party was recognised as a legal force while the Communist Party was made illegal by the National Security Law.  Thus, legal politics (parliamentary politics) covers most of the paramount political issues.  Along with the revived trade unions, the leftist tendency could have further developed leftist politics.  Significantly, the emergence of powerful civil movement organisations — more powerful than the trade unions and focused on democracy in economy and environmental issue –– backed moderate progressive politics.​[482]​  But the socialist tendency failed to utilise all of the advantageous conditions due mainly to the fact that the Left continued to support underground revolutionary campaigns based in a Marxist–Leninist perspective.  Accordingly, as power comes from voting (under a fully functioning democracy) not from muzzling, the Left in the ’80s were completely excluded from legal politics and were concomitantly isolated from the masses.  

Under a functioning constitutional democracy (which allowed for a legalised moderate socialist party), the Left was not able to fill the need for a legal party because of their revolutionary socialism.  Due to its genuine radical characteristic, the new Left inevitably missed its opportunity to build its own political bulwark, a reformist leftist party in the institutionalised liberal democratic system.  Instead of the new Left (the largest contributing force of the democratisation), the centrists (liberal democrats) enjoyed a windfall as they recaptured the support from the masses and became the ruling power block.


Chapter 6: The Democratic Labour Party (2000–7)

Introduction
This chapter explores the failure of the DLP in the 2000s and focuses on its failed leadership which included an inaccurate interpretation of the socio-economic and political conditions, an inability to develop right strategies and tactics and impotence in expanding the party’s influence among the people.  The leadership of the new Left in the early stages of the post-democratic period (1987–99) failed because the orthodox Marxist–Leninists missed their chance to employ a parliamentary democracy.  Unlike their predecessors, the leftists of the 2000s constructed a legal socialist party, the DLP in 2000.  But the majority of the leaders in the party did not discard their revolutionary socialism, so the DLP was not successful in developing parliamentary politics.  

The DLP took on a Janus face since its outward appearance looked like the social democratic parties in Western Europe while the party’s core characteristic was a radical socialism.  Indeed, the DLP’s radical socialist strategy failed to develop a social democratic strategy suited to the Korean realpolitik of dynamic capitalism within a functioning constitutional democracy.  Although Korea belongs to the periphery, Korean socialism exists under different conditions (dynamic capitalism with economic prosperity) to those that prevail elsewhere in the Third World, particularly South America where a slower growth of capitalism often presented difficulties to sustainable social democratic politics (full employment and redistribution of income).  Together with the conservative party cartel system, this made for party political conditions very different from those of Western Europe.  Eventually, like the new Left in the 1990s, the DLP failed to develop a new strategy (Korean social democratic road to power) suited to electoral politics and changed conditions: a functioning constitutional democracy and prosperous capitalism resulting in a working class preference for gradual reform.

The new Left in the ’90s was unwavering in its resolve to remain a pure socialist movement.  And this new Left’s ideological tradition was sustained by the DLP and this condition inevitably led to the DLP being relegated to the role of a tiny opposition party (2000–7).  A revolutionary socialism dominated the party as the two radical factions, the NL and PD controlled the party, whereas the social democrat tendency was a minority within the party.  The DLP’s fortunes were restricted by the pure socialism and a radical nationalistic sentiment.  The DLP states the fact that the new labour party needed to overcome the limitations of both “state socialism” and “social democracy”.​[483]​  Esping-Anderson once insisted that the program dictates parliamentary power for a radical socialist force, whereas the parliamentary condition (coalition with other parties) limits the program for a moderate socialist party.​[484]​  The DLP showed very few signs of developing a new style of socialist politics that could implement the principles of socialism to overcome the flaws of conventional socialism.  

Accordingly, as the party’s platforms, strategies, campaigns and electoral tenets have shown, the party was still enamoured with revolutionary socialism.  Due to its revolutionary socialism, the DLP also failed to develop parliamentary politics contributing in the creation of a broad alliance.  Eventually, the DLP failed to link with what Poulantzas called a people’s autonomous base (a civil society), or the party failed to create broad alliances to realise social democrat politics.​[485]​

Small Success and Rapid Decline

Achievements
The DLP stands apart from any other socialist organisation that appeared between the 1970s and ’90s as the party that escaped from the genuine handicap of being a socialist party or socialist organisation without support.  Moreover, after the National Peasant Unions (NPU) joined the party (in 2003), the DLP turned from a working-class party into a people’s party.  Thus, the socialist tendency had a very significant tool for executing socialist politics.  Like the mass socialist parties in the West, the DLP showed the possibility of developing into an ideology and class-based mass socialist party in Korea.  When the DLP appeared as the first ideologically and class-based leftist party, it was a turning point in the further progress of socialism as well as politics in general of Korea (the possibility of left–right rivalry in the party system) in Korea.  In the end, the Korean socialist was relegated to long-term frustration and humiliation.​[486]​  

The DLP’s achievements and success are quite impressive.  There are some factors that affected their success.  First of all, the proportional electoral system that was adopted by the centrist Kim Daejung administration (1999–2002) was critical in the DLP entering parliament.  Due to the proportional representation electoral system the voters who support the DLP could avoid “Sapyosimri” (voters unwilling to support a party because the party is too weak to become a ruling party; although some voters like a certain party, they won’t vote for the party because they do not want to waste their votes).  

Second, under the rule of the centrist governments (Kim and Rho administrations), there was no naked repression against the moderate socialist tendency and with the problems of state socialism a decline in a general anti-socialist feeling that had pervaded Korean society.  The Korean voters had confidence that the capitalist system was superior to the communist system during the post-Cold War era.  And, paradoxically, such self-assurance resulted in the Korean voters (the middle class) being generous towards moderate socialism.  Based upon the aforementioned conditions, the DLP successfully entered the national parliament in 2004 as the party gained 10 seats out of 299.  This monumental event took place for the first time after the military coup overturned democracy in 1961.  The DLP also gained 13.8 percent of the popular vote for the proportional election.  The DLP became the third major party.​[487]​  This historic triumph from a political standpoint meant: (1) the possibility of further development (transition) of the class cleavage based party system as the first leftist party entered the parliament; (2) the noticeable deterioration of the anti-socialist sentiment; and (3) the possibility of a working-class party becoming a ruling party as the party gained 13.3 percent of votes in the districts where the working class were the majority of the residents.​[488]​  Furthermore, according to a survey about the secondary parties in the 17th national congressional election, the DLP ranked at the top gaining 29.3 percent, whereas the ruling centrist party gained 16.6 percent and the largest conservative party, Grand National Party gained only 8.2 percent.​[489]​

Ephemeral Success
However, such achievements were small and ephemeral.  With respect to the success of the DLP’s national congressional and local governmental elections, former chairman of “The Policy Making Committee” of the DLP (2003–6), Ju Daewhan states that:

The DLP’s limited achievement in the national congressional election in 2004 was the result of the proportional electoral system which was adopted by the centrist, Daejung Kim administration.  Their relative success in the mayoral elections and local congressional elections were effectively the outcome of the coalition with the centrist party, the DP in those elections.  The DP compromised with the DLP in certain labour dense regions like the North and Central district in Ulsan City.  Therefore, fundamentally, the DLP’s electoral fortunes could not extend to other regions and as well as the key electoral contest for power, the presidential elections.  That is why the DLP only gained around 3 percent of the votes in 2002 and 2007 (Author’s translation).​[490]​ 

Ju adds that “actually, people considered the DLP to be a supplementary party, not the future ruling party.  What was exactly meant by the DLP earning 3 percent of votes was that they were not ready to seize power.  The people did not think the DLP could manage our nation.” ​[491]​  Yoo Wonil (The Creative Korean Party’s chairman of the policy making committee) also had a similar opinion to Ju: “the DLP was not successful in showing alternatives to replace neo-liberalism based austerity and deregulation solutions (towards markets), thus, people did not consider the party as their representative political force (Author’s translation).”​[492]​

Deterioration
After their popular votes reached their peak in 2004 (see the table below​[493]​), the DLP’s popularity steadily dropped and reached around 5 percent of votes in 2007 (after the party was defeated in the presidential election).  Significantly, the DLP failed to gain meaningful votes in the presidential election (which is the primary tool to control the nation because the presidential power is superior to the other branches of government).  The DLP gained 3 percent and 3.9 percent of votes in 2002 and 2007 respectably.  

Moreover, after their defeat in the 2007 presidential election, the party was divided and the PD faction along with the social democrats left the party.  Following this event, the DLP gained five seats with a 5.6 percent party supporting rate in the congressional election of 2008, whereas, Jinbosing-Dang (the New Progressive Party: NPT) gained only one seat and obtained less than 3 percent of the party.  Compared to its peak in 2004 (10 seats in the national congress with 13.8 percent supporting rate), the change was quite dramatic.  Finally, the DLP’s support rate in the proportional electoral system plummeted after 2007 and reached less than 5 percent in 2008.  The DLP failed to become a meaningful opposition party.





In an exercise of reformist (socialism) politics in parliament, according to Przeworski, social democracy confronts an ideological dilemma in which it must decide whether it should maintain pure socialism and retire into permanent opposition or compromise socialist ideologies for alliance.​[494]​  However, for the DLP in the 2000s, the party did not face this dilemma because it simply selected the first option.  The DLP did not experience a transition like the Western European social democrat parties.  This contradiction was rooted in the party’s ideology; the DLP chose to engage in a “democratic class struggle”, in other words “competition among parties”, but the majority of the leaders and the members (the majority) preferred a radical socialism (and a radical nationalistic socialism) which was a critical factor in the failure of the DLP campaign.  The majority’s preference for radical socialism vis-à-vis a radical nationalism is well expressed in the party’s platform.​[495]​

Radical Socialists as the Majority in the DLP
In the case of the DLP, as mentioned earlier, when the party was born the revolutionary socialist factions (NL and PD) were in the superior position.  Thus, the party’s platform was filled with a revolutionary socialism and a radical nationalistic characteristic.  The DLP was a legal socialist party, but this did not mean the party was a social democrat party.  Rather, the DLP from 2000–7 should be characterised as a legal radical socialist party. 

The background conditions for this incomplete conversion are the following:  first, the radical socialists, as the majority force in the party, had a stubborn bias towards a radical solution for the problem of capitalism.  This does not necessarily mean the radical force pursued a revolutionary solution; rather, they believed that they could realise such radical politics within a representative democratic system.​[496]​  Second, the majority NL faction in the party brought a radical nationalistic socialism and anti-American campaigns which played a critical role in delaying a complete conversion.  The origin of such outdated nationalistic socialism stems from the fact that the NL faction was manipulated by the North Korean Communists who mobilised the DLP for the preservation of their interests (mostly the Communist regime’s security).  There is clear evidence that the North Korean Communists and its puppet force, the NL faction, consider the DLP to be a tactical organisation (not a strategic party) for a typical United Front tactic.

A Korean social democrat scholar, Shin (2004) points out, the DLP is case in point of the statement that success or failure of the social democrat party in Korea relies on the leadership of the movement, not on external factors like globalisation.​[497]​  This view is partly right as it admits that the “leadership problem” is a main factor in the failure of the DLP experiment.  But it fails to see the paramount point of the problematical leadership, in other words, the leaders being radical socialists.  Shin says that the problematic leadership is just a tactical matter rather than a strategic problem.  Then, Shin suggests that “in order to surmount this shortcoming, the DLP needs to be more like a Western European social democrat party by developing further realistic and detailed social democrat tenets and policies.”​[498]​  However, as mentioned earlier, the key problem for the DLP is that the party remained a radical socialist party and hesitated in doing what Western European social democrat parties did in the 1950s, which is to have a complete conversion.  

During the academic conference marking the 10th anniversary of the DLP in 2010, the majority of the participants mentioned that the main factor in the disappointment of the DLP experiment was the party’s ambiguous strategy and less persuasive campaigns.  Jongbae Kim (Journalist) points out that “(the DLP) failed in its agenda, the party was also not successful in obtaining the initiative on developing policies for the vulnerable daily life of common people throughout the financial crisis.”​[499]​  Cho Sungdae (a professor from the department of political science at Hansin University), similarly to Kim, argues that “The DLP did have a clear road map to seize power… Working with the centrist party, the DP (centrist party) within the Coalition Government, they might have found better solutions than working alone”​[500]​  It seems that the key figures of the DLP agree with these critical assessments.  In an interview, Kang Gigap (the president of the DLP from 2008 to 2010) testifies that: 

Basically, the DLP was a small newly-born party and failed to persuade the people that the DLP is ready to be a ruling party or have enough capability to manage state politics by showing convincing programs and politics.  Even the voters were unconvinced that the DLP had potential (Author’s translation).​[501]​

The above criticism and self-assessment are accurate and more specific than what Shin states.  Yet these statements miss two things; first, like Shin, it misses the fact that the DLP is a radical socialist party because the majority of its party leaders belonged to radical socialist factions (NL and PD); more importantly, as the party’s platform clearly mentions, the party did not welcome the idea of social democracy. 

Second, it does not address the North Korean Communist Party’s manipulation (the North radicalised the DLP by pushing the party to focus on an anti-American campaign).  On many occasions, the North Korean Communist leader, Kim Jong-Il mobilised the DLP for his own regime security by requesting that they support lifting economic sanctions including an embargo against the North.  In 2008, while Western European progressive parties including the Labour Party in the U.K. addressed the human rights abuse in the North, paradoxically, the DLP rejected joining this campaign.  Such naked pro-North Korean policies and attitudes functioned as a catalyst to the party’s isolation from the people.  The party’s radical nationalistic and pro-North Korean campaigns ultimately resulted in the exodus of moderate socialists from the party (including the trade unions members).  Under these circumstances, the DLP could hardly practice centrism based reformist politics.

Moreover, a radical sentiment among the majority of the leaders and the members resulted in many inappropriate practices including factionalism.  In 2004 on the eve of the local mayoral election, some NL faction delegates moved their residency to Ulsan City in order to win the party’s primary election for the mayoral position.  Kang’s aforementioned self-criticism also failed to notice how the NL’s factionalism ruined the unity and the development of a sound culture and tradition within the socialist party.

Accordingly, for the DLP, a radical socialist program dictated its legal politics, whereas for social democrats, parliamentary requirements dictate the programs.  Therefore, the DLP’s practices were far from what Esping-Anderson defined as the mission of a social democrat party: “social democracy must build a broad electoral alliance of all the underprivileged strata and that the movement’s success hinges upon its ability to strengthen parliament and legislate the gradual socialisation of capitalism.”​[502]​

Incomplete Ideological Conversion
At this critical juncture when the socialists had an opportunity to build upon their success, the key leaders of the DLP held on to their radical socialist fortunes and campaigns.  In fact, this incomplete conversion is deeply rooted in the DLP’s failure to overcome their genuine handicap of being an elite socialist party that lacks a supporter.  It is essential that closer examination of this genuine handicap of the party is conducted because their failed ideological conversion originated from its fundamental limitations.  This limitation not only prevented the party becoming a working class-based mass socialist party, but it also affected their ability to create a broad alliance.  The DLP was born out of a coalition between two major radical socialist factions (NL and PD).  Although the KDTU joined them as one of the key pillars of the party, it would be a stretch to label the DLP as a working class-based mass socialist party like the German SPD, due to the withering of trade union movements (along with low unionisation rate).  Moreover, the elite socialists not only failed to ease the factionalism that existed within the party, but they also failed to develop pragmatic tactics for adapting to legal politics.

The KDTU (the largest trade union) joined the DLP, but the party’s main engine for activity was the radical elite socialists, which were the two radical factions of, the NL and PD.​[503]​  Although the KDTU was a major shareholder, the leaders of the trade unions held limited influence in the party’s decision-making process because the KDTU leaders were members of the two factions.  More importantly, the envoys from the KDTU did little in the way of acting as liaisons or providing mediation for the conflicts between the two factions.  Daewhan Ju (the former chairman of the Policy Making Committee) says this regarding the weak role of the KDTU:

The leaders of the KDTU lacked the ability to ease tension between the two radical socialist factions.  The truth is that they did not have any serious intentions of doing it (Author’s translation).​[504]​

As the table that follows indicates, from the inception of the party in 2000, there were too many officially recognised affiliate factions that emerged within the DLP:

Table16: Major Factions and Ideological Tendencies in the DLP​[505]​
Name of Faction	Establishment	Ideology	Number	Number of manifestos	Average reviewing by party members
Junjin (Moving Forward)	May 2004	Radical Socialism	400	73	3,847
Jayulkwayeondae (Autonomy and Solidarity)	July 2004	Social Democrat	330	38	194
Hyuksin (renovation) Network	September 2005	Social Democrat		10	206
Jamintong (Autonomous, democracy, unification)	2000	Radical Socialism			
Dahamggae (together)	2000	Radical Socialism			
Kyunnam Saminjuwei (Kyungnam Social Democrat)	October 2007	Social Democrat			
Nodonghaebang (Liberation Workers)	June 2005	Radical Socialism		37	4,861

As can be seen in the table above, radical socialist factions were a dominant force from 2000 to 2004 as the following groups belonged to the two major factions, the NL and PD; “Jamintong” (NL faction), “Junjin” (PD faction) and other minority factions, “Dahamggae” and “Nodonghaebang”. ​[506]​  This propensity for radical socialist dominating the party persisted, although the spectrum of party ideology diversified as the newly emerging small factions identified themselves as social democrats.

Generally, the party’s policy-making process was monopolised by the two factions, while the Secretary General (Choi, Gyuyeop), chairman of the Policy Making Committee (Ju Daewhan), majority of the Central Committee and other main leadership positions of the local bureaux were held by either the NL or PD factions.  After the DLP successfully entered the parliament by obtaining ten seats in 2004, two DLP congressmen, Rho Whoichan and Shim Sangjung (both of whom belonged to the PD faction) became political celebrities as they introduced insightful legislative politics and emerged as icons of the Left.





Preamble, Platform, Tenet and Strategy
There is strong evidence that proves the DLP is not yet a moderate socialist party and the evidence originates from the party’s platforms, key strategies and campaigns.  In the preamble of the party’s platform (in 2000), the party states that capitalism in Korea will soon face wholesale crisis due to the failure of neo-liberalism.  As the preamble explains, the roots of the party’s ideology, the DLP’s fundamental understanding of capitalism in Korea, is absolutely the same as the conventional Marxist apocalyptic view.  This is the first piece of evidence that the DLP cannot be classified as a Western style moderate socialist party.  In an interview, Kang Gigap (one of the DLP congressmen from 2004 to the present and a president of the DLP from 2008–10) states that social democracy has clear shortcomings and rejects it:

In general, social democracy agrees to the principle of a right of private ownership and this right is recognised as a key pillar of the economic structure of capitalism.  Although social democracy aims to expand democracy and the realisation of social equality, social democracy cannot solve the fundamental contradictions which originate from a capitalist system because social democracy compromises on many principles of capitalism.  Therefore, I condemn social democracy (Author’s translation).​[507]​

The truth is that from its inception, the DLP clearly opposed the party’s characterisation as a parliamentary party and maintained a critical attitude toward parliamentarism.​[508]​  The DLP clearly demonstrates the need for overcoming both state socialism and social democracy (in the platform).  Moreover, the party’s internal rule indicates the prohibition of dual positions in congress and within the party (author’s translation). ​[509]​

In its platform, the DLP states its hopes to overcome both state socialism and social democracy: “to overcome the shortcomings of capitalism and to build a labour and people centred socio-economic system”.​[510]​  And, in the following section, the party clearly identifies what it means by an alternative socialism: “labour/people centred nation’s autonomous socio-economic system; it would be a system that restricts private possession; nationalisation of means of production in major industries; and demonstrates how a planned economy is superior to a market system.”​[511]​  With these evidences, it is clear that the DLP pursues essentially state socialism (which is far different from social democrat solutions within a capitalist system).

A prime example of how the DLP understands the rights of private property (one of the main principles of liberal democracy) is the party’s strategy for solving the issue of Chaebol (the Korean conglomerates) originated problems (monopolistic privileges, imbalance between Chaebols and small and medium-size companies, patron–client relationship between Chaebols and politics, all illegal operations including tax evasion, repressive anti-trade unions, etc.).  The DLP announced officially that they would dismiss the conglomerates and nationalise the monopolistic giants.​[512]​  Regardless of its validity from an economic perspective, this position seriously violates the Korean constitution.  That is why “The Lawyers Coalition for Protecting the Constitution” sued the DLP with the charge of violating the constitution.

The majority faction’s, the NL, radicalism is more severe than their rival’s, the PD.  A leading theorist in the NL faction, Choi Gyuyeop (2010) identifies the final goal of the DLP as: (1) complete unification; (2) termination of imperialist rule; (3) the end of capitalist exploitation”.​[513]​  It comes as no surprise that the latter two aims look like the objectives of conventional maximalist socialism.  With Choi as the essentially head of ideology, it is no surprise that his maximalist socialism and radical nationalism influenced the party’s practices (radical anti-Chaebol policy, radical nationalistic unification and pro-North Korean policies) of the DLP, including the formation of the party’s platform.  The platform of the DLP states that the party’s strategic aspiration is “to build a working class and people centred nation’s autonomous people’s democratic state”.​[514]​  The party’s “people’s democracy” seems like what Mao sought in his “new people’s democracy”; in other words, the Chinese Communist Party is the dominating power.  This idea of a “people’s democracy” originated from Lenin’s principle of a ‘proletariat dictatorship.





“The completion of socialism is not deterministic.  It requires a great degree of sacrifice for those who embrace socialism.  Unlike the path of totalitarianism, social democracy rejects people’s pessimistic participation, but rather it believes that unless an active activity of people, socialism could not be realised.  In this junction, it can be said that socialism is the highest form of democracy.

“Socialism aims to erect a new society within the system that guarantees individual freedom and democracy.  No freedom, no socialism.  Socialism can only be accomplished by democracy and democracy can be matured by socialism.”​[515]​

There is an example that contrasts the view stated above from Socialist International (a moderate socialist tendency).  During the 2002 presidential election, one of the groups of the PD faction, ‘Junjin’ supported a “People’s Representative Parliament” and “The Constitutional Assembly” (not an amendment to the constitution) for electoral commitment and this sort of radical proposition was welcomed by the PD factions. ​[516]​  But the PD faction’s radical socialism is dwarfed by the radical nationalistic socialism of the NL faction.  

Social Democracy in Western Europe
The formation of this platform in the history of socialism is the fruit of the ideological struggle between two factions, the revolutionary socialist tendency (Marxist–Leninist) and the revisionist force (social democrats).  For the SPD in Germany, the ideological struggle between Marxist and Lasalle groups resulted in the formation of the Gotha Platform (in 1875) in which it reflected both ideas (it actually favoured Marxist idea).  Later in the Erfurt platform (drafted by Karl Kaustky and Bernstein) in 1891, the Marxist position emerged as the dominate ideology and Lasalle principles disappeared.  After the Erfurt convention, the German SPD was reborn as a Marxist party.  However, the German SPD’s transition from a Marxist party to a social democrat party started with the adoption of a completely new platform, the “Gothenburg Platform”, in 1959.  In its platform, the German socialists discarded their Marxism rooted socialist doctrines which included the abolishment of a belief in the nationalisation (or socialisation) of means of production and adopted a hybrid system, “social market system”.  Socialist parties in Western Europe experienced a complete conversion from Marxist socialist parties to reformist socialist parties in the post-war era with the exception of the socialist part in Sweden (this conversion occurred in Sweden in the 1920s).

In the late nineteenth century the Erfurt Program (prepared under Kautsky’s leadership) failed to persuade the majority of socialists in Western Europe although it admitted to the possibility of a peaceful transition within a parliamentary system.  However, this change was, as Bernstein would describe, incomplete because it originated from two well known and problematic assumptions: “first, if a proletarian majority actually is imminent; secondly, if the state apparatus can in fact be seized peacefully and made to transition society.”​[517]​  As the leader of a real reformist party, Bernstein refused to accept the first assumption and ignored the second.​[518]​  Under Kautsky’s assumption, class structure was predetermined, but rather it is indeterminate.  As Bernstein states, “the party cannot afford to sit and wait for a proletarian majority simply to happen.  Majority has to be created.”​[519]​  For Kautsky’s social democrat party in parliament, a proletarian majority was just a potential tool, but for Bernstein, socialists must generate a proletarian majority and it is a necessary precondition for social democrat class formation.


The Japanese Social democrat Party (1960s–’70s)
The successful social democrat parties in Western Europe in the post-democratic period often stand in contrast to the failed revolutionary socialist parties in the Eastern Bloc.  It can be said that the essential component to their success should be understood in the context of the party’s ideological conversion from a Marxist socialist party to a social democrat party.  With respect to this claim, many of these parties in many countries (mostly the countries in the periphery) where socialist parties were new and managed by a revolutionary force failed due to their incomplete ideological conversion.  The failure of the socialist party in Japan in the post-war period is an essential example.

Like the DLP in Korea, the Japanese SPD also failed to be a majority party or ruling party for the past thirty-three years (from 1960 to 1993).  The SPD never gained more than 30 percent of the seats in parliament.  It is argued that the rapid deterioration of the SPD can be compared to the emergence of the golden age of economy (1960s–’80s) and its outcome as the working class become the middle class.  The Japanese workers were the benefactors from the economic prosperity and like the Korean workers in the 1990s they were no longer interested in revolutionary change.  The support that the working class provided to the SPD plummeted as it reached 30 percent in 1975 from 50 percent in 1955.​[520]​  The Japanese social democrat party was pressed to overhaul its traditional platform and strategy (it contained somewhat revolutionary characteristics).  But this revisionist reform of the party (like what Crosland offered for the Labour Party in the U.K. in the 1950s) did not occur.

The key factor in the failure to reform the party was that the party was led by two major factions, the revolutionary faction and reformist faction.  The party failed to reconcile the ideological discontent between the two factions.  Actually, the Japanese SPD has a long history of disputes between the revolutionary force and the reformist force.  With respect to this main character of the party, the “Morito/Inmura discontent” in 1949​[521]​ occurred and the fundamental dispute (about the party’s characteristic) was prolonged into “75 days of separation” in 1950, then, at last, the SDP was completely divided that same year (December, 1950).  Later, the two divided socialist tendencies reunited in 1955 because of: (1) mounting pressure from the trade unions (The Committee of National Trade Unions)​[522]​; (2) the U.K. Labour Party’s reform inspired the Japanese socialists; and (3) the unification of the right–wing party (two conservative parties, Liberty Party and Democratic Party merged to form a single powerful conservative party, The Liberty Democratic Party (LDP) was established.  Consequently, the reunification failed to capture the imagination of the working class and the party failed to win any additional seats in the parliament.  Constant discontent between the two factions about the party’s characteristics or party’s ideologies frustrated the majority of the voters (white collar working–class).  In 1975 the unified SDP gained 30 percent support among white collar workers, but the party had 55 percent of these votes in 1955.  In particular, the revolutionary faction never compromised on their North Korean Communist Party friendly attitude and policy, even thought this principle noticeably increased the party’s isolation from ordinary people.  Japanese society was shocked after their government announced that the North Korean Communist regime was the main culprit in the abduction of more than 20 Japanese civilians.  The revolutionary faction’s sectarian struggle and practices accelerated the decline of the party.  

The Failure of Orthodox Socialism
As explained in the previous chapter, the radical nationalistic socialist group, the NL faction dominates the DLP’s decision making process.  First, they hold key positions (for instance, the president, general secretary and chairman of the party’s policy making committee).  Second, the NL faction is a more powerful influence than the PD on the KDTU.  With these factors in mind, the NL faction often manipulates or sets up strategically significant agendas, for instance, anti–America, pro-North Korea and radical nationalistic economic and diplomatic policies.​[523]​  Social democrat parties like the Labour Party in Britain rarely endorse radical nationalistic campaigns on economic and international affairs as demonstrated in the party’s support for Britain’s further integration into European economics and politics.  The French socialist party (that once had a very stubborn attitude toward the U.S.) allowed France to cooperate with the U.S. led NATO.  In terms of their anti-America policy, it is clear that the DLP is closer to the Socialists in Venezuela and Bolivia than the social democrat parties of Western Europe.  

Under the NL faction’s leadership, the DLP adopted radical nationalistic policies that provide security to Kim Jong-Il’s regime: (1) the immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea; (2) Korean nation centred autonomous and peaceful unification (this is similar to North Korea’s offer, “Confederation System and autonomous unification”).  The party’s request for the immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops from Seoul (what North Korean and ChinesecCommunists desperately want), was not welcomed by the majority of constituents because of the reality that North Korea never stopped threatening the South while China remains a credible ally of North Korea.​[524]​  The majority faction, the NL, does not have an alternative solution for the possible breaking of the balance of power in the Far East region after the withdrawal of the US, which would cause (unnecessary crisis and tension between China and Japan, between China and South Korea and between South Korea and North Korea).  Unlike the DLP, Gonzales led the POSE (in the 1980s) to manage the NATO issue in a pragmatic way.  Although the POSE previously opposed participation in NATO, after the POSE became a ruling party, the party leaders defended Spain maintaining its status as one of NATO’s member countries.  The Gonzales administration organised a referendum on the question in 1986, calling for a favourable vote and won.  To appease his opponents, Gonzales used the unofficial title of Atlantic Alliance Terms rather than the official name of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation or NATO.

The essential leaders of the party were radical socialists, so, a radical socialism persisted in the party’s platform and strategically important tenets.  Basically, these internal conditions constantly limited the DLP from expanding its political influence among the working class (who preferred a gradual change of political economy); creating a broad alliance with the civil movement organisations (represent the interests of the middle class); and build a cooperative front with the centrist Democratic Party against the unending neoliberal politics.  

The Derivative and Parliamentary Policies
As explained in the previous section, in terms of party ideology, the DLP failed to transform from a Marxist–Leninist socialist party to a social democrat party.  And, this incomplete conversion resulted in negative derivative party practices in the development of policies toward the working and middle classes and in their parliamentary activity.  Borrowing Esping-Anderson’s clarification on the social democrat road to power, social democracy must create a broad alliance between the working–class and other major classes; otherwise a social democrat party cannot become a major ruling party.​[525]​  However, the DLP failed to expand its political influence among the working–class; at the same time, the party failed to create a broad alliance with the middle class.  

At the conference for the DLP’s 10th anniversary in 2010, the majority of the panels and presenters mentioned that the party failed in creating a broad alliance. They also failed in developing effective policies for working and middle classes as well as in their parliament activity.  Moreover, we would like to stress that the “factionalism” created primarily by the majority NL faction was one of the factors that negatively influenced the deterioration of the party.  The increased factionalism affected a record number of party members


Policies towards the Working Class
As a result of the rapid economic development (with somewhat prosperous economic conditions), Korean workers and the middle class, once a key ally for the working–class (in the democratisation era), preferred gradual reform (see the outcome of the presidential election in 2002 and 2007).  The leadership of the DLP during the early stage of its history did not conform to the demands of their potential major supporter.  Moreover, the trade union movements were declining and resulted in low unionisation, individual factory centred trade unions and neo-liberalism embedded working-class unfriendly policies.  The unionisation ratio continuously dropped (at its peak, unionisation was at 19.8 percent in 1989) and it dropped to 10.3 percent in 2006.​[526]​  Four factors decisively aggravated the retreat of the working class movements in the 1990s.  First, although violent repression of the trade union movements declined, the state still regulated and deterred the unions in administrative ways.  Second, the capitalists’ aggression towards the working class movements continued.  Several anti trade union campaigns were adopted by the capitalists, which were backed by the government: “no work, no income”, “flexible labour markets policy” and expanded use of temporary workers.  Third, certain ideologies like “labour responsibility” for the economic difficulties were also mobilised through the campaigns of the conservative media.  Fourth, the weak labour party, the DLP, failed to prevent the working class from falling into tendencies that tend to divided it, including loss of class identity and lack of solidarity within the working class.  

More seriously, the KDTU only covered very limited specific unions (regular large size companies).  In 2006, the numbers of the KDTU were about 660,000, whereas the overall numbers of unionised workers were 1,559,000.​[527]​  One of the main reasons for the declining unionisation rate was the dramatic increase in temporary workers after the government adopted a neo–liberalism embedded flexible labour market policy (author’s translation).​[528]​

Park Sangbyung states the following with respect to the original organisation goal in the early stage of the DLP:

The DLP strives to build a people’s party (working-class centred) by first inviting the entire leftist tendency.  Then, the party intends to represent the whole working class.  Then the party would move forward with the next step which is to create a wide alliance with other classes, such as the peasant and urban poor.  The leaders of the party clearly knew that the DLP needed to overcome the reality that the party lacked a supporter as the party was only backed by the KDTU and the small peasant organisation, the National Peasant Association (NPA).  Otherwise, the party could face a severe organisational dilemma and at the same time the party would meet some internal conflicts (among the party members and the party supporters) when public opinion clashes with the interests of the KDTU and the NPA (Author’s translation).​[529]​

However, the DLP failed to expand its organisational boundary due to its inability to overcome its organisational dilemma.  The organisational dilemmas that the DLP faced can be summarised as follows: although the DLP intended to expand its political influence among the working class as a whole (to build a working class-centred mass socialist party like the SPD in Germany), eventually the party failed to do so because the party did not succeed in obtaining support from the majority of workers.

There are two critical factors that caused this failure.  First, the DLP obsessively represented the key shareholder of the party, the KDTU and its interests.  If the DLP had neglected the big shareholder, the party would have immediately confronted challenges, including financial and organisational difficulties.  But the dilemma for the DLP is that the KDTU represents only a small numbers of the militant trade unions who represent regular workers in large-size companies.  Evidently, the party did not properly represent the majority of workers, for instance, temporary and women workers.  The number of temporary workers and women workers surpassed the regular male workers amid augmenting neo-liberal reforms in the labour market and as the proportion of workers in the third industry became the largest segment.  In addition, the number of foreign workers (mostly from South-East Asia) rapidly increased and became an important social issue.  However, the DLP did not pay much attention to these newly emerged significant issues and situation.  Regarding this careless working-class policy of the DLP, Dr. Choi Jinwon (former member of the DLP and a political scientist) states that: 

After the 17th national congressional election, most of the members who left the DLP were temporary workers.  They thought that the DLP represents regular workers or specific large size companies’ workers and pays less attention to the other social minorities like temporary workers and lower classes (Author’s translation).​[530]​

The DLP’s regular worker-centred campaigns resulted in a decrease in party membership (mostly, the temporary workers left the party) and the withdrawal of support from people outside of the party.  The DLP’s ‘Central Committee’ confirms the party’s mistake by evaluating their defeat in the by-election in Ulsan City in 2005:

We failed to deal with temporary workers or other lower classes who suffer from the consequence of neo-liberal politics and this mistake brought electoral defeat at the by-election in 2005 (Author’s translation).​[531]​

As explained earlier, the DLP failed to obtain support from the majority of the working classes due mainly to the fact that the majority of workers could not swallow the party’s radical campaigns and at the same time the party neglected issues related to the newly emerged working class, temporary and women workers.  This seriously erroneous judgment doesn’t stop there because the party also failed to develop a specific policy that would create an alliance with the middle class.  It is argued that this failure to make an alliance with the middle class is also deeply connected to the party’s radical campaigns.  Like the majority of the working classes, since democracy took place in the 1980s, the Korean middle classes gave their support to gradual reform rather than radical change.

In the outcome of the DLP’s failure to develop the necessary policies for the working class (creating more jobs and improving the gap between regular and irregular workers in terms of income and other social rights), in the 1997 and 2002 presidential elections, the DLP presidential candidate, Kwon Youngil, gained 5 percent and 3.9 percent of votes from the blue collar class, whereas the conservative candidate obtained 37.5 percent and 30 percent of votes (see Appendix 2).  Moreover, during the national congressional election in 2000, 31.5 percent of the members of the Federation of Korean Unions (FKTU) expressed that they preferred the reformist candidates to the radical DLP candidates.  Over 41.7 percent of the members responded that the main mission for reform in Korean politics is curing injustice and corruption (not capitalism itself).  Moreover, 18.3 percent of the FKTU members endorsed the conservative party (Grand National Party) whereas only 13.8 percent of the members supported the DLP.​[532]​  Only 3 percent of the KDTU (Korea Democratic Trade Union) members joined the DLP in 2000.​[533]​  

Policy Concerning the Middle Class
The key concept of the DLP’s politics in the parliament is how the party will create a broader alliance between the working class and other classes, such as the middle class.  In other words, the socialist party has to show how it can consolidate working-class and national interests.  The solution that the social democrat parties in Western Europe adopted were Keynesian demand-side macroeconomic strategies which can achieve full employment and include a welfare state system.  But the DLP’s revolutionary and extreme nationalistic tenets and campaigns caused a great degree of difficulty in the creation of a sound alliance with the middle class.  As mentioned earlier, the Korean middle class (as benefactors of the economic prosperity) has two key characteristics; they are reformist and prefer the status quo.

There are some good examples (like the Swedish Social Democrat Party) that demonstrate how socialists have obtained unity amongst the working class and convinced their allies in order to become a major party.  A legitimate solution that can harmonise the two interests, working-class and national interests and pragmatic politics that can create a broad alliance with potential supporters are the key tools to success. But the DLP failed to expand the size of its organisation because the party failed to convince potential supporters (or potential party members; white collar workers or progressive middle classes) by showing them a clear and legitimate strategy (the socialist road to power) and tactics.  According to the supporters of the DLP, the party did not have the capability to convince its potential allies that the party can be a future ruling party.  In an interview, Kwon Mihyuk (President of the Korean Women’s Rights Association): “the DLP failed to show a clear strategy obtaining power, so the party was unsuccessful in persuading potential supporters like us.”​[534]​

According to Koo, there are two sharply different views on the role of the middle class in democratisation and labour movements.  First, as Han points out, the middle class had sympathy for the plight of the victims under the military regime’s dictatorial development, victims such as poor farmers, factory workers and slum dwellers.​[535]​  The Korean middle class endorsed a social market system (Germany) that could ensure more equitable and sustainable economic prosperity.​[536]​  The middle classes supported the students’ pro-democracy movement, workers’ union movement which mainly focused on gaining economic rights, thus, it can be said that the Korean middle strata is a pro-democracy movement.​[537]​  Actually, one of the main engines of the June Upheaval in 1987 that prompted the Chun military government to accept a constitutional democracy and discard authoritarianism rooted in dictatorship was white collar workers (largely from the middle class).  But regarding the working-class struggle, other scholars like Jangjip Choi disagree with the above positive view and argue that the middle class strata, intellectual segment, played a small role compared to their Western counterparts.  These scholars point to the opportunistic reaction of the middle class at several critical periods of political transition, for instance, the military coup in 1961, Yushin Referendum in 1972 and Chun’s coup in 1980.​[538]​  As empirical evidence proved, each argument alone can hardly explain the dual (or complicated) attitudes of the Korean middle classes in the contemporary era.  The middle class has remained a substantial and silent force, with the potential to be the backbone of stability, or the engine for change.​[539]​

The Korean middle classes, at least the middle classes in the 1980s and ’90s, were anxious to build a liberal democratic society (according to Tim Shorrock, it would resemble the U.S.; see Shorrock, 1986), therefore, they supported democratisation including trade union movements as long as those waves were tied up within liberal means.  In contrast, when the democratisation movements (students and trade unions in the 1990s) engaged in street demonstrations and protests beyond liberal bounds, they withdrew their support and turned more conservative.  To reiterate, in their position between the capitalists and working class, the Korean middle classes behaved differently at different junctures (as an independent effect) in the balance of power between the two major classes.​[540]​

Economic Policy
It is true that the “economy” was one of the main electoral issues in any of the elections in the 2000s.  And, historically, the Korean middle classes were one of the largest benefactors of the rapid economic development and economic prosperity in the 1970s and ’80s.  Therefore, the middle class voters desired the revitalisation of the economy, whereas the working class demanded that politics manage the creation of more jobs.  In reference to these voters’ requests, Lee summarised the main economic strategy for the revitalisation of the Korean economy as follows:

It can be said that the critical obstacles for sustainable growth and prosperity of the Korean economy are the gap between the large size companies and SMEs; and between the capital city and local cities…  As long as were are reinforcing globalisation with a knowledge-based economy, the old system in which Chaebols and the state are the main engine or key coordinator cannot guarantee constructive results and is even inappropriate for innovation.  Therefore, in order to find a new resource for growth, first of all, the central government and Chaebols-led system must be decentralised (active participation of the local governments and SMEs)… It is imperative that we establish a fair market system that guarantees a fair contest between Chaebols and SMEs; a policy which could assist the power of SMEs’ self-generation; a specialised local economic policy along with power decentralisation (Author’s translation).​[541]​

As Lee states, to achieve sustainable economic growth, the Korean economic system must fix its own shortcomings; for instance, the huge gap between Chaebols and the Small-and-Medium (SMEs) firms (which have less comparative advantages); the unfair relationship between Chaebols and their suppliers (the Korean Chaebols do not provide a proper margin for their suppliers); and the gap between the capital city and the local cities.  In addition, the discrimination and inequality (in terms of income) between regular works and irregular workers, or minorities (Lee missed this significant point) also emerged as a key problem that prevented the realisation of social equality.  However, until the national congressional election in 2008, the DLP failed to demonstrate visible and persuasive policies that could contribute to bringing back dynamism in the economy and more jobs for the working class.  During the 18th national congressional election, the DLP unveiled the “20 Tenets” which mainly focused on social equality issues.  But these tenets ignored both economic growth and supporting the SMEs.  The only one that came close was the 20th tenets, “Mandatory Hiring of Youth”, which was inspired by the Belgian policy regarding youth.  It states that companies with over 50 employees must maintain a ratio of over 5 percent of youth employees and in the “Creation of 1 million jobs” in public service and cultural sectors (at government expense).​[542]​  But, the DLP’s solution missed the key point that without upgrading the weak SMEs (a bottleneck in the international contest and sustainable growth), both growth and creating jobs, or realisation of social equality, are difficult.  SMEs account for more than 88.4 percent of employment (2007) and account for over 40.8 percent of exports (2007).​[543]​  But the APM (average profit margin) of the SMEs continuously dropped from 6 percent in 1998 to 4.3 percent in 2006.​[544]​  For sustainable growth to be possible and at the same time to secure the job markets, SMEs have to contain the following: (1) a constant increase of APM; (2) productivity; (3) deter unfair Chaebols monopoly-based offers towards the SMEs; (4) improve the management and manufacturing level of SMEs to an international standard.  Paradoxically, in order to increase productivity and comparative advantages in management and manufacturing, the Korean SMEs need to gain support from the governments and at the same time, the Chaebols (which are close to the international level in their know-how in innovation, technology, management and marketing in the world markets and are useful for upgrading the SMEs).  The DLP did not have any position on the SMEs issue and the party argued its conventional and radical tenet of forceful dismissal of entire Chaebols.  Accordingly, the DLP failed to change the Korean voters’ long-term bias that the Left is worse than the Right in economic issue as the party did not recognise the key problem of the Korean economy.  The DLP did not offer a correct solution for reconciling growth and social equality and it resulted in their painful defeats in several elections in the 2000s.  

Activity in Parliament
Parliamentary democracy with the supplemented electoral system, such as a proportional electoral system can fairly (not completely) reflect class conflict rooted political struggles.  In other words, a party system under liberal democracy is a by-product of a marriage between class structures and political organisation under liberal democracy.​[545]​  As numerous scholars state, liberal democracy provides a relatively advantageous environment for the development of socialism.​[546]​ Thus, the majority of socialists (both revolutionary and reformist socialists) in Western Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century intended to build a mass party-style socialist party.  The mass party-style socialist party could lead the revolutionary socialist party to realise socialism through revolutionary mobilisation, whereas the reformist socialists aimed to construct a socialist society through obtaining the working class vote.​[547]​  The reformist parties were better than the revolutionary parties in obtaining a vast range of support from the working class. 

The DLP did not successfully utilise the parliamentary democracy system, however.  The truth is that the leaders of the DLP were not enthusiastic about being a part of that system.  According to Choi, the majority of the nationalistic socialist faction of the DLP is actually a part of “Tongiljunsunjunsul” (the United Front) for the future socialist revolution.​[548]​  Based on this, there are no imperative reasons for the DLP to develop detailed tactics and policies for their activity in the parliament.

In 2007, on behalf of the DLP, the Hangil Research Institute conducted a survey among the key supporting voters of the DLP about what issues were most important to them during the period of the 17th national congress and the results are as follows: an economic invigoration policy for the people (66.4 percent); policy for the enhancement of the welfare system and curing social polarisation (33.9 percent); political reform (22.9 percent); anti-FTA between Korean and the U.S. (22.9 percent); environment/human rights/women, protect minority (14.6 percent); improve relations between North/South (6.6 percent) and regaining the Right of military operations in wartime (4.3 percent).  But the DLP not only failed to focus on the economic issue (as the majority of voter’s wanted), but the party also failed to show an alternative solution to two very sensitive issues, sustainable growth and social equality.  Even the level of industrialisation (or economic conditions) in Korea during the 1980s were not like they are at present, the radical Korean socialists ignored the need for further growth which is a precondition for achieving sustainable social equality.

Regarding the role of economic growth among developing countries, Dollar and Kraay state that, “Our findings do not imply that growth is all that is needed to improve the lives of the poor.  Rather, we simply emphasise that growth on average does benefit the poor as much as anyone else in society and so standard growth-enhancing policies should be at the centre of any effective poverty reduction strategy.  This also does not mean that the potential distributional effects of growth, or the policies that support growth, can or should be ignored.”​[549]​ 

The Policy towards North Korea
In the meantime, the DLP was silent on two critical issues about North Korea, the development of nuclear weapons and human right violations.  Not surprisingly, in June 2011, the president of the DLP, Lee Junghee was forced to express (officially) strong criticisms of North Korea’s recent leadership transition.  Not surprisingly, however, Lee rejected demonstrating the party’s criticism of the development of nuclear weapons and violation of human rights in North Korea.​[550]​  Moreover, this North Korean friendly attitude not only resulted in their isolation from the people, but it also caused a severe conflict with the minority faction, the PD faction (which condemns the North Korean style of state socialism).  

The NL faction’s attitude of friendliness to North Korea and its related policies further aggravated negative views of the party among pro-centrist voters.  Regarding North Korea’s nuclear weapons development, the DLP was officially silent although the minority faction, PD faction constantly pressed the leaders of the party to demonstrate a clear condemnation of such destructive actions.  Several key members of the DLP were arrested on charges of espionage with North Korea.  Some of the leaders including the leading theorist of the NL faction, Choi Gyuyeop, endorsed North Korea’s unification strategy (Confederation of Korea) to the press while they were visiting Pyongyang.  Yet the DLP has not clearly criticised the totalitarian state, North Korea and the Communist leader who constantly violate the basic principles of democracy as well as human rights.  This was one of the critical issues that caused the marginalisation of the party among the majority of constituents who consider the North Korean system to be a failed model.

Conclusion 
Although the DLP experienced limited success, the DLP eventually failed to develop a theoretical rationale.  Their radical socialism never allowed for a realignment of programs in response to the current requirements for alliance formation and only admitted recruits who were willing to adhere to its manifesto.  The DLP not only failed to obtain the support from the working class and maintain unity among them, but it also failed to develop class alliances between the working class and the middle class (a major voting force).  According to Esping-Anderson, these actions are key elements (or conditions) for the success of moderate socialist politics.​[551]​  With respect to their failure, Park sees the key factor as being their theoretical error.​[552]​  Park’s perspective seems appropriate because the Korean radical socialists adopted obsolete Leninism and its subordinate theories on capitalism (as imperialism), state (as a class state) and the road to power (as a vanguard party leads a proletariat dictatorship).  Theoretical failure and theoretical poverty drove the Leninist force to be isolated from the people.  The radical socialists were widely excluded from politics.  Heywood states that better theory is not a sufficient resource for their success, but it is a necessary condition for the sustainable development of socialism and the socialist movements in the post democratic era are a prime example for this statement.​[553]​

For leftists, it is more important than for other political movements to show an alternative ideology with a futuristic vision because they claim the need for changing the status quo.  In contrast, for conservatives, it is enough to defend privilege by properly interpreting the present.  It is the progressive tendency that tenaciously seeks change that regularly confronts several dilemmas including the “dilemma of power”, “dilemma of institutionalisation” and “the dilemma of confidence”.  Cho (2010) suggests that such dilemmas can be overcome by constant development (supplement) of party ideology, strategy, tactics and most importantly, good leadership. ​[554]​  But as one of the leaders of the DLP, Lee claims that the leaders of the DLP (from 2000 to 2006), particularly, the leaders of the majority faction (NL), failed to demonstrate proper leadership because they showed their factionalism based leadership.​[555]​  The majority faction, NL even rejected the renovation of the party in terms of reforming party ideology, strategy and the party’s prevailing internal problems, namely factionalism.​[556]​  As a result, the DLP’s political influence deteriorated​[557]​ and the backlash has escalated After the PD faction left the party and established The New Progress Party, in 2008.






This thesis has sought to determine the key factors which contributed to the failure of socialism in South Korea during the post-Korean War era, 1945–2007.  In doing so, we have rejected the conventional explanation (mostly the radical nationalistic socialists’ view) which overemphasises the authoritarian regime’s repression against the socialist tendency.  Actually, this view reflects only part of the truth.  During the authoritarian rule, the hostile anti-leftist sentiment and policies, based in the state ideology of anti-socialism, resulted in the impossibility of the development of any kinds of leftist movement.  Under these unfavourable conditions (particularly the rule of the fascist state from 1971–87), even moderate or centrist parties could barely survive.  Under the Cold War system and the rule of these tyrannical governments, politics in Korea developed as an enhancement of oligarchic conservative politics (along with the conservative party cartel party system).  Along with democracy and capitalism, some state that a socialist party is the third key element in the development of socialism.​[559]​  The impossibility of a prevailing socialist party in Korea in the pre-democratic era would clearly explain the negative effects of socialist movements.

However, the repression-centred explanation is partial because it does not explain the exceptional case of the ephemeral success of the PP in the 1950s (during the height of the Cold War).  Although the PP was established lacking broader support and suppressed by the authoritarian Rhee government, the moderate socialist party proved that social democrat politics are possible even under disadvantageous conditions though the successful mobilisation of lower classes.  The view that states unfavourable conditions and repression also does not provide an adequate justification for the complete devastation of the socialist tendency.  Throughout the Korean War, any leftist tendencies, from the radical Communist tendency to the centre-leftist tendency or even the moderate socialist tendency were entirely extinct.  During their suppression, the socialist tendency could have minimally preserved a main leadership or maintained their ties to their supporter by utilising some defensive tactics, creating an alliance with other centrist forces, or demonstrating ideological and political compromise.  But they failed to do so in Korea between the 1950s and the 1970s.  Surely the socialist tendency was eliminated because the repression was successful.  Thus, there is no point in denying the repression as a critical factor for the failure of socialism; however, the repression is not the whole explanation of how it shaped the development of socialism later on.  The ideological descendants of the Communists sustained their revolutionary underground socialist party activities during the rule of the military although such campaigns have proved their invalidity.  Regarding the moderate socialist tendency during the military rule, the affect of the following factors should not be forgotten in the explanation of its deterioration: the social democratic force failed to develop effective politics which could create a broader alliance and it was unsuccessful in overcoming its genuine shortcomings of disunity and factionalism.

Moreover, in a logical aspect, a party is relatively independent from socio-economic and political conditions.  As Lipset emphasises, in the short term, the party was restricted by the people’s specific demands which sometimes limited the socialist party’s activity or structural options, but in the long term the party not only actively changed people’s political sentiment, but also overcame such structural obstacles.  Moreover, the structural-centred (and its outcome as repression against the socialist tendency) view seems even more incomprehensible when explaining the failure of the DLP experiment in the post-democratic era because the legalised socialist party’s activities took place under (relatively) favourable conditions.  There was a thawing of the Cold War system, a fully functioning democracy (as Freedom House confirmed), deterioration of the conservative party cartel and ten years of centrist government which provided an advantageous environment for the socialist tendency which included the adoption of a proportional electoral system.

We argue that the development of socialism faced qualitatively different obstacles between the pre-democracy era and the post-democracy era.  Korea in the pre-democracy era lacked certain preconditions for social democracy, such as democratisation and capitalism along with facing harsh repression toward socialist movements.  These were critical obstacles for the development of socialism in the pre-democracy era, whereas an unrealistic radical party ideology coupled with poor leadership in legal politics contributed to the disappointment of the DLP in the post-democratic period.  Unlike the nationalistic socialists in the DLP and their views, the primitive provision of structural conditions and repression can no longer be considered to be a critical feature in explaining the failure of socialism.  These explanations are inadequate because the DLP existed under relatively favourable circumstances for the development of socialism.  There was a fully functioning democracy along with a mature capitalist system.  In the case of the DLP, we argue that radical socialism was a critical factor in their limited success.

The Socialist Movements in the Pre-Democratic Era
At the height of the Cold War, the USAMGIK aimed to separate the moderate leftist tendency from the radical Communist movement.  The LRCC backed by the USAMGIK and the moderate socialists could have seized the initiative to build a modern state.  But such efforts did not occur after the collapse of the LRCC while the U.S.–Soviet dialogue petered out.  The Korean Peninsula was divided by the Communist-controlled North (backed by the Soviets) and the USAMGIK-sponsored extreme right-wing dominant south.  Whereas the Communist tendency suppressed (and wiped out) the nationalist and right wing movements in the North, the tyrannical right-wing government suppressed and destroyed the South.  At the end of the liberation era, the ideology based conflicts between the North and the South expanded into a civil war, the Korean War.  Throughout the disastrous war, more powerful tyrannical regimes emerged in both the North and the South, thus, in both regions; basic principles of democracy were obliterated.

Particularly in the South, the frailed Rhee regime strengthened itself (then, successfully settled down) by mobilising an anti-Communist campaign throughout the Korean War (in the name of national security and stabilising society).  The Communist tendency was completely destroyed and only a few moderate socialists survived.  The remaining socialists were further suppressed by the military dictatorship in the 1960s and ’70s.  Along with the conventional tool for suppressing the Left, an anti-Left campaign, the military dictatorship employed rapid state-led industrialisation for justifying its tyrannical rule.  In the name of economic modernisation, any of the basic resources for developing socialism were suppressed, such as trade union movements.  The basic political and economic rights of the workers were sacrificed for fast economic growth.  As the military ruler rejected basic principles of liberal democracy, in other words, the military regime adopted a fascist system, the socialist tendency was further suppressed and all kinds of socialist movements were destroyed.  During the military dictatorship, moderate socialism was essentially impossible and the rising dissident tendency against the dictatorship, “undongkwon” was radicalised.

The first and second assumptions which were presented in the introduction are as follows: there was a lack of preconditions, such as democracy, for the development of socialism in the pre-democracy era; furthermore, under the authoritarian and fascist regime, a socialist party could not exist as a legal political force.  However, we do not agree with the view that those weak structural conditions are the most critical factors for the failure of the socialist movements because of the following reasons; the unrealistic risk-taking of the radical socialist tendency and the failure in leadership of the Communist tendency should also be considered as critical factors.  The harsh suppressions by the USAMGIK or the Rhee regime are not necessarily the only critical cause for the devastation of the socialist tendency. Also, the provocative Communist tendency’s unrealistic, risky military campaigns caused unnecessary repression and the end of socialism.  Under these conditions the leadership made a number of misjudged decisions which meant that socialism failed to develop a strong base or develop the capacity for class compromise that is necessary in a democratic system.  In the liberation period, the Cold War system forced the division of the nation and its politics into two sharply different ideologies, Communism and capitalism.  In order to avoid the negative affect of the Cold War, the domestic politicians needed to develop wise (pragmatic) politics based upon a strong sense of unity.  The Austrian leftists and right-wingers worked together and suggested “a neutral state” to the allies.  Unlike the Communists in Korea, even the Austrian Communists did not organise provocative armed upheavals which could possibly evoke unnecessary repression.  The LRCC was terminated amid a sharp clash between the leftists and right-wingers.  Moreover, regarding the U.N. resolution of “trusteeship”, the leaders of both leftist (Communist mostly) and right-wing parties were divided as the centrists supported the trusteeship, the extreme right-wingers and Communists were fervently against it.  This level of disunity and somewhat chaotic political condition were primarily caused by the high tensions between the Communists and the extreme right-wingers provided by the Cold War rivals, the U.S. and the Soviets carried out their own divided politics on the peninsula.  When the right-wing government was established by backing the U.S. in the South, the ordeal started for the socialist movement.  Thus, the extreme right-wing government’s repressive policy forced the Left to adapt to the changed situation.  The Left needed to adopt defensive tactics against the suppression (along with institutionally unfavourable options; for example, the National Security Law which illegalised the Communist Party).  Contrary to the reality, the Communists practiced offensive tactics as the Communist Party led military revolts in support of the Communist Party in the North.  Groundless optimism along with an unrealistic risk–taking sentiment pervaded the leaders of the Communist Party at that time.  There is a good example of the Communist Party leaders’ unsubstantiated optimism on the revolutionary situation in the South.  After the initiation of the Korean War, the North Korean Communist Party’s leader, Kim illsung ordered his troops to stay in Seoul for three days even though the Communist-armed force had a dominant power to continue its advance to the South.  This order gave the deafted (and desperated) South Korean military force and the U.S. time to prepare a line of defence.  Kim Ilsung issued such an order at the time based on the Communist leader in the South, Park Honyoung, telling Kim to await the South Korean people’s nationwide revolutionary revolts.​[560]​  Park Honyoung wanted to show his leadership (in the South), but, the upheaval among the people in the South did not occurr.  During and after the war, Park’s authority deteriorated dramatically.  Park was executed in 1956 for espionage activity (for the US).  As a result of the Communist force’s complete failure of leadership, the entire leftist tendency was destroyed throughout the Korean War and the social democrat tendency also withered.

Despite its invalidity, radical socialism lingered.  In the 1950s and ’60s, the Communists focused on underground activities rooted in a revolutionary socialism strategy.  But it never worked and the Communists’ guerrilla campaigns were easily and quickly suppressed by the right-wing government’s well equipped and trained (by the U.S.) special military forces.  Even though the PP showed the possibility of social democracy, it also collapsed within a very short time of the authoritarian Rhee regime.  The PP and its successful electoral campaigns in the mid-1950s (on the eve of the Cold War) is another example.  In a logical aspect, a party is an independent subject from structural conditions although a party’s fortunes are limited by the structural options in a great degree in the short term; however, as many socialist movements in the main and periphery prove, a socialist party is neither completely destroyed nor constantly defeated due only to repression.  The case of withered socialism in Korea in the liberation period (1945–53) is an essential example of this principle.

Like the Progressive Party in the U.S., new socialists in the South could hardly overcome Cold War-originated barriers.  In 1948 the American socialists separated from the Democratic Party and participated in the election as an independent party, the Progressive Party (PT).  Although the PT revealed progressive tenets, such as suffrage for African-Americans, termination of racism based discrimination policies’ and universal health care, the party gained 2.5 percent of the popular vote and none of the constituency votes.​[561]​  Eventually, the PT failed to surmount the embedded “anti-Communist/anti-Soviet” sentiment in the society.  As a matter of a fact, under sturdy anti-socialist conditions (institutionalised and embedded sentiment in the society as a whole), even a veteran socialist party could not easily enhance socialist politics and the socialists in the U.S. and Korea are typical of this.  However, this does not necessarily mean that Cold War conditions are absolute variables which affected the failure of socialism.

The Socialist Movements in the Post-Democratic Era
During the democratisation movements the revived leftists, the student activists, became revolutionary socialists.  The centrists got a windfall and the revolutionary socialists constantly failed to show that socialists can build a better society than other centrists and extreme conservatives.  Later, in the 1990s, the PD faction finally changed it strategy, but due to the fact that: (1) only small factions of the elite socialists participated in the People’s Party; (2) the trade unions and the peasant unions did not join in the experiment.  The NL faction continuously focused on underground activities for the leadership of the Communists in the North.  The NL even prevented the process of the independent party construction. 

In the 2000s, although finally the majority group NL joined the workers’ party and established the DLP, the party did not completely discard radical socialism.  The DLP in the post-democratic era (since 2000) was defeated in consecutive elections.  The main cause was that the DLP failed to transform from a revolutionary party to a reformist party in terms of its party programs, tenets and election campaigns.  This failure contrasts with the success of the socialist tendencies in Western Europe in the post-war era and the socialist parties in South America in the post-Cold War era.  The commonality between the remarkable successes for those socialist parties in the twentieth century primarily originated from the transition from a Marxist socialist party to a moderate reformist socialist party.  

In the West, socialism developed by creating a class alliance within a parliamentary system, whereas in Latin America, despite authoritarian governments, there are examples of revolutionary parties assuming electoral politics during the process of democratisation.  By the post-World War II (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​World_War_II" \o "World War II​) period, most social democrats in Europe had abandoned all remaining ideological connection to Marxism.  The reformist socialist parties in the core believed that gradual reform -- enhancement of political and economic democracy and social rights (and ownership (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Social_ownership" \o "Social ownership​))—could expand the rights of the working-class.  The social democratic campaigns captured the attention of the working-classes and became major political forces (while the Marxist-Leninist socialist parties in the Eastern Bloc collapsed).  Thus, many of the policies espoused by social democrats in the first half of the 20th century have been put into practice by social democratic governments throughout the industrialised world.  But as shoen by social democracy in Western Europe in the 1960s and 1970s, disadvantageous conditions caused the retreat of social democracy.  In particular, working-class pro-reform consciousness along with the dismantling of traditional industries and the growth of pro-centrist white-collar workers reduced the size of the traditional working class.  Unless a social democratic party creates a solution or an alternative (such as a class alliance) for what Przeworski characterises as its ideological and organisational dilemmas, the party’s political influence may decline in a series of electoral defeats.  

In South America, the dilemmas of social democracy were linked to (1) the problematic populist politics that often caused economic disasters, such as hyper-inflation which brought social unrest and failed to cure one of the primary problems of poverty; (2) the failure of consolidation (or compromise) between the capitalists and the lower class (in some cases between the middle class and the lower class).  As the reactionary coup in Venezuela in 2002 demonstrated, the alienated groups from Chávez’s radical politics such as the capitalists and the middle class turned into a dangerous challenge with the right-wing military.  However, many moderate socialist parties in South America overcame their weaknesses (vulnerable economies and social unrest or a lack of solidarity among the major classes) by employing pragamatic social democratic politics which included the enhancement of social equality with sustainable economic growth.  The moderate leftist party, the PT (People’s Party) in Brazil is a quintessential example of the successful creation of legal reforms and economic redistribution (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Redistribution_of_wealth" \o "Redistribution of wealth​) programs to eliminate long-term mass poverty.       
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Appendix 1: Chronology of the Park Regime’s Anti-Constitutional (or Anti-Democratic) Campaigns

June 1964: Declare Martial Law
August 1965: The Garrison Decree Act (deployed 6 divisions in Seoul)
September 1965: Ordered to permanent closure of the two universities: Korea University and Yeonse University
June 1967: Ordered to closure of 28 universities and 57 high schools
June 1969: Closure of Seoul National University
October 1971: The Garrison Decree Act
December 1971: Declared State Emergency
October 1972: Yushin Referendum (authoritarianism initiated)
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